How will South Korea react to China's hegemony beyond 2020?
How will South Korea react to China's hegemony beyond 2020?
WRITTEN BY GOKUL SAHNI
31 March 2020
The rise of China in the 21st century has been accepted by most international relations scholars as an unalterable geopolitical event that will have significant impact with regards to the international order. A closer look at history suggests that this is not the emergence of China, but rather the re-emergence of a state that was historically the dominant political and cultural force within East Asia, and saw itself as the ‘Middle Kingdom’, and central lynchpin of a hierarchical regional order.
How will its neighbour, South Korea --an under-appreciated yet key success story of the US-led liberal international order-- react to its giant western neighbour growing in stature and influence across the 2020s? There are some answers to be found, both in theory and in practice.
For or Against?
Perhaps the most apt lens for a clear-cut, binary answer to South Korea’s China policy is Stephen Walt’s comparison of a state choosing to either balance or bandwagon when confronted by a significant external threat. Walt defines balancing as ‘allying with others against the prevailing threat’ and bandwagoning as ‘alignment with the source of danger’. Walt notes that in general, the weaker the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon rather than balance, and proposes that geographical proximity is an important indicator, with weak states tempted to bandwagon when threatened by a great power.
The solidity of this alliance, however, could be severely tested in coming months if US President Donald Trump, a well-known sceptic of the US-South Korea alliance, wins re-election in November 2020 and makes South Korea’s decision much easier for them.
Is South Korea a ‘weak state’? As a G20 member with the world’s 11th-largest economy in nominal GDP terms, and possessing a well-trained, modern military (without accounting for the 28,000 US troops deployed on the ground), it seems an unlikely label. Yet upon closer inspection, South Korea might grow to resemble a ‘weak state’ if China achieves hegemony in the 2020s. Several analysts, for example, expect China to become the world’s largest economy in nominal GDP terms by 2030, and dominate across East Asia if not Asia in its entirety.
China is already South Korea’s most important economic partner today, accounting for 31% of total exports and almost 22% of total imports. Total foreign trade of $277.16 billion between South Korea and China in 2019 was twice that of South Korea’s trade of $135.22 billion with the US. Tourists from China, along with its territories of Hong Kong and Macau, were the single largest source of tourists to South Korea, with 6.18 million visitors in 2019 accounting for 39% of a total of 16.05 million visitors. But most importantly, China has shown no qualms about flexing this newly developed economic muscle with South Korea, as was on display in 2017 when Chinese sanctions in response to the US missile defence system, THAAD, cost South Korea billions of dollars.
Indeed, it is China’s economic heft and its willingness to use it as a tool of coercion in foreign policy that makes balancing against it such a costly option. China’s disregard of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling, which stated that there was no historical basis for China’s claim to 85 per cent of the South China Sea waters in 2016, during its dispute with the Philippines, has given a glimpse as to what sort of power China is likely to become when its national interests clash with international law.
From Seoul’s perspective, there is little to be gained from clashing with such a major power at its doorstep. As long as its sovereignty is respected, there are few convincing arguments for South Korea to not pursue a bandwagoning strategy with its far larger and very near neighbour. This has been on clear display as South Korea remains reluctant to join the Quad, the China-balancing coalition of Australia, India, Japan and the US, or even articulate it’s desire for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ at risk of antagonizing China. Slowly but surely, Seoul is signalling its preference is to bandwagon with, rather than balance against China.
Back to the Future?
The key to understanding the future may lie in the past, in this case. Chosŏn (the ancient name for Korea) did not have a relationship with China as an equal, but rather as a tributary to be protected, a prize to be coveted, or as a dangerous land bridge which might convey ‘outer barbarians’ into China.
In his 2003 article, recognized Asia authority David Shambaugh writes that China tends to view the Korean peninsula as its natural sphere of influence, similarly to how the United States views Latin America or Russia views Central Asia, and implies that a powerful China would brook no dissent or opposition from South Korea, and demand its obeisance. Shambaugh’s 2003 prediction was that China’s strategic calculus would be to use its proximity and growing interdependence as the determining factor to establish deferential relationships with both Korean states. Drifting into China’s sphere of influence is, therefore, a return to historical precedence for South Korea – even if the country today is an established liberal democracy and a US treaty ally.
China’s re-emergence as a great power would undoubtedly upset the current balance of power that exists in East Asia, largely unchanged since the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and South Korea was signed in the aftermath of the Korean War in 1953. Even today, the United States maintains over 28,000 troops on the ground, includes South Korea on a ‘non-negotiable’ basis under its nuclear umbrella, and remains Seoul’s primary security partner.
The solidity of this alliance, however, could be severely tested in coming months if US President Donald Trump, a well-known sceptic of the US-South Korea alliance, wins re-election in November 2020 and makes South Korea’s decision much easier for them. As a state in the immediate proximity of China, and undoubtedly keen to not antagonize its most important economic partner, South Korea may find that history guides its future role of cooperation, rather than (aiding) conflict.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Gokul Sahni is based in Singapore and writes on geopolitics and geoeconomics, with a particular focus on Indian foreign policy. He holds an MSc in International Relations from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and an MBA from the Saïd Business School, University of Oxford. All views and opinions expressed are personal. Image credit: CC BY-NC 4.0/Republic of Korea/Flickr.