“Hong Kong people are to run Hong Kong” – The lost promise of 1997
“Hong Kong people are to run Hong Kong” — The lost promise of 1997
WRITTEN BY SARI ARHO HAVRÉN
15 July 2020
On 30 June 2020, one hour before midnight, the promise of Hong Kong people running Hong Kong was broken. In 1997, in his farewell speech to the Hong Kong people, Chris Patten, the last governor of Hong Kong, referred to the Joint Declaration between the People’s Republic of China and the United Kingdom with these exact words; words which guaranteed Hong Kong’s autonomy, and assured its residents that their way of life would be maintained for the next half-century.
On 1 July, the 23rd anniversary of the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR, Beijing’s tailor-made National Security Law for Hong Kong was already in full force. In less than 24 hours, the freedoms and long-standing ‘One Country Two Systems’ arrangement had been crushed by its designer, the People’s Republic of China.
New law — old fears
Only a few days earlier, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, said the new law would only target a tiny minority of Hongkongers but as it turned out, under this new law, anyone, anywhere in the world, who breaks the law in the eyes of Beijing, can be held accountable for their actions. Needless to say, the global reaction could best be described as shock. The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the legislation had destroyed Hong Kong’s autonomy and ‘one of China’s greatest achievements’. Susan Shirk, the Chair of the U.C. San Diego 21st Century China Center, a well-known advocate for engagement and dialogue, stated she was rethinking her prior assumptions and questions regarding how best to deal with Xi Jinping and ‘this kind of regime’.
Some Five Eyes members have already suspended their extradition treaties with Hong Kong, and France and Germany are currently pushing other European Union member states to do more than just condemn the National Security Law.
Hong Kong could well be the final straw in awakening even those European nations who have been reluctant in condemning China for its actions. However, with the Chinese Communist Party Centennial approaching, and without a strong response from the international community, Beijing could easily become more emboldened in its actions towards Taiwan.
In trying to explain its views to Hongkongers and the rest of the world, Beijing’s leaders have failed badly. Regardless of what kinds of sanctions foreign governments decide to implement, it is almost certain that Beijing will not back down; it has decided to sacrifice Hong Kong as the world has come to know it.
The National Security law itself is vague and heavy-handed. It criminalises acts of secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign or external forces. In terms of managing issues such as freedom of expression, political views, and in particular the criminalisation of secession (breaking away from the country) and subversion (undermining the power of the Central Government) the new law offers authorities enormous opportunities to abuse their power in order to suppress opinions critical of Beijing or the local Hong Kong government. In addition, the legislation also gives a legal basis for the establishment of blacklists for those Beijing sees as threats.
The power lies in Beijing’s hands only
The law also enables Beijing to open a new security office in Hong Kong, where its personnel will be free of Hong Kong’s jurisdiction; the same jurisdiction that was supposed to be independent now holds no power over how the law is interpreted. This power lies in Beijing’s hands only. Some of the cases under the National Security Law can even be tried in mainland China but nobody knows which ones. A Chinese-style veil of secrecy and unpredictability seems to have fallen on the city.
While some voices have called for patience in order to see how the national security law will be implemented, one cannot expect lenience when taking into consideration article 43 and the extended powers police have been given. The nearly 400 arrests made during Hong Kong’s first day under the new law made clear the direction of travel. The cases of Xinjiang and Tibet offer frightening examples of what a worst-case-scenario could look like. In addition, the backgrounds of some mainland leaders now appointed to Hong Kong, such as Zheng Yanxiong, who will lead the agency overseeing the implementation of the National Security Law should give rise to a moments pause.
In light of the pro-democracy camp’s landslide victory during the November 2019 elections, Beijing was clearly anxious to resolve the Hong Kong situation ahead of September’s Legislative Council. Fears the pro-Beijing side would not do well meant some form of action was always likely to take place.
Hong Kong is, first and foremost, a political and sovereignty issue for the Central Government, and the National Security Law turned out to be a reflection of that. For Beijing, when law and politics conflict, politics leads the way. Professor Sebastian Veg argues along these lines in his noteworthy article in the Tocqueville Review. The ultimate reason behind the implementation of the National Security Law is to establish Beijing’s sovereignty over Hong Kong once and for all. In this framework, it is clear that the Central Government will be ruling over Hong Kong and its local laws. In fact, local Hong Kong courts dealing with politics-related cases would be deemed as challenging the supremacy and sovereignty of the People’s Republic.
Tolerance of Hong Kong’s special position comes to an end
In addition to Hong Kong pro-democrats and numerous foreign governments, the Hong Kong Bar Association raised alarm over the security law well before it went forward and argued that the procedure breached both the Basic Law as well as the Sino-British Joint Declaration. By now, it is well known that the erosion of Hong Kong’s freedoms started long before the National Security Law and even before the Hong Kong government formally introduced the extradition bill in April 2019. In reality, hybrid-influencing aimed at assimilating Hong Kong with Mainland China began gradually after the handover but has since accelerated, especially since the party line has moved towards stronger centralised control, emphasising sovereignty and nationalism. It appears as though Xi Jinping’s predecessors tolerated Hong Kong’s semi-autonomous position better, viewing it as a trade-off for finance, trade and as a US dollar gateway. However, Xi clearly does not see such value in Hong Kong anymore, rather viewing Hong Kong’s freedoms and demands for democracy as a threat to the party and possibly to himself as well.
In trying to explain its views to Hongkongers and the rest of the world, Beijing’s leaders have failed badly. Regardless of what kinds of sanctions foreign governments decide to implement, it is almost certain that Beijing will not back down; it has decided to sacrifice Hong Kong as the world has come to know it.
In terms of human rights and freedoms, Hong Kong’s future looks bleak, and as if the current National Security Law was not enough, Beijing has already signalled that it could draft more laws for Hong Kong to safeguard its national security in the future. While Hong Kong had previously pressed its rule of law as its foremost selling point in separating her from Mainland China — it is now gone.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Sari Arho Havrén is a visiting researcher at the University of Helsinki focusing on international relations, especially during the Cold War period and on geopolitical future analyses in Asia Pacific. She has been living and working in China over a decade and in Asia Pacific close to 15 years. She has a PhD in international relations and she is a certified futurist. Image credit: Jonathan van Smit/Flickr.