European warships alone cannot save the South China Sea and Washington knows it

WRITTEN BY MOISES DE SOUZA AND DEAN KARALEKAS

2 September 2021

Although signals have been sent since 2019, the recent rush of European naval assets to the South China Sea has been one of the geopolitical novelties of 2021. Ostensibly to stand up to China’s increased belligerence in the region, the deployments by the UK, France, and Germany are signalling those governments’ support of American and Japanese efforts to protect freedom of navigation in an area threatened by Chinese militarisation. It is debatable how helpful it will be, however, for assets from continents far away to occasionally conduct FONOPs, especially when the governments of the area are themselves hesitant to make similar moves and to stand up for the same cause of freedom of navigation — one of the key identifying elements of the liberal international order.

Under the banner of “global power with truly global interest”, the fleet flagship of the Royal Navy, HMS Queen Elizabeth, sailed into the contested waters of the South China Sea last month. The aim, according to Prime Minister Boris Johnson, was “to vindicate our belief in the rules-based international system and the freedom of navigation through those waterways which are absolutely vital for world trade”.

In February, vessels from France’s Marine Nationale set sail for the Asia-Pacific region on Mission Jeanne d'Arc 2021, to join their American and Japanese counterparts. In addition to the nuclear attack submarine SNA Emeraude, the amphibious assault ship Tonnerre and frigate Surcouf were set to operate in the South China Sea for three months. Not to be outdone by these British and French “presence operations”, Germany followed suit, sending the frigate Bayern into the Indo-Pacific at the invitation of the Japanese government.

The recent G7 decision to invest US$40 trillion in infrastructure projects to rival China’s BRI in developing countries is an excellent step in this direction as long as it includes a long-term commitment with the recipient nations, principally when dealing with those located within Southeast Asia’s geopolitical landscape.

Given the complications surrounding Brexit and the tragic consequences of the pandemic, “keeping oceans free” is the least of Europe’s concerns at the moment. Questions related to the social inequality costs of the pandemic, disagreements over the imposition of austerity policies among EU members, the legitimisation of populist leaders and the economic reignition of the Eurozone have topped European priorities since 2020. Thus, any other slogan designed to placate a domestic audience — especially as far away as the Asia-Pacific — will certainly be seen as absolutely unimportant, perhaps even as a luxury.

But the wheel of history never stops, and the South China Sea today is the battleground where competing visions of an idealised past and future are struggling to shape the reality of the present.

The competing pasts in the South China Sea

The past is represented by America’s post-war maritime hegemony in the region — a condition that is no longer accepted by an increasingly confident and militarily capable China. But Beijing is also eying another past, one going back to China’s central position in the pre-modern tributary system, and is seeking to revive, at least in spirit, that tradition through the implementation of New-Tianxia-ism — an international relations perspective that is gaining ground in the halls of power of the once-and-future Middle Kingdom.

Now, as then, smaller nations in Southeast Asia are being asked to accept China’s natural rights over the South China Sea, which is essentially achieving praxis in the absence of any global public contestation, while keeping the appearance of equal and balanced relations that, once crystalised, would open the door to the marvels of China’s vast market and economic resources. The underlying rationale is simple: normalise the idea that China’s economic development and that of the region as a whole are inextricably linked in such a way that Chinese sovereignty over the entire South China Sea is a small price to pay for prosperity.

Washington is adamant about maintaining the status quo in terms of ensuring its presence as the region’s sole security guarantor. Ironically, it is pushing adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (while the United States follows UNCLOS as the codification of customary international law, it has not ratified it) to constrain the actions of China (which ratified the pact in 1996 but routinely abrogates its more inconvenient stipulations).

China has staked its maritime claims on shaky historical evidence, such as the nine-dashed line map and apparently manipulated archaeological artefacts to prove a Chinese presence in the Spratly Islands before 1946. Few people outside China take this evidence seriously. It is little wonder, then, that in this contest between the Western-derived Westphalian paradigm on sovereignty and China’s efforts to move past that to a new (or rather, old) way of organising international authority, Western European powers and the EU as a whole should side with the former.

Southeast Asia: the missing piece

However, the missing part of this puzzle is the community of nations in the Southeast Asian region, largely represented by ASEAN. Thus far, capitals in the region have been hedging their bets between Washington and Beijing, and have avoided taking sides, even as one of their own — the Philippines — has been forced into an asymmetrical geopolitical drama with China. This hesitation is undermining any semblance of significance ASEAN may once have had in terms of regional integration in Southeast Asia.

Between the lines, Beijing is pushing the ASEAN states to accept a ‘resinicisation’ of Southeast Asia, and to that end has reframed its diplomatic vocabulary and opened its wallet. Besides reiterating its rhetoric about joint-exploration of all marine resources in the South China Sea, since 2012 Xi Jinping has declared his commitment to raising the current strategic partnership with ASEAN to a level based on the concept of “community of common destiny” indicating that China’s relations with the region are based on a commitment that goes beyond the Western economic or geopolitical practicalities.

China sees its support for the creation of an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, the US$13 billion aid and interest-free loans to be used in infrastructure projects, invitation to join the BRI project, and the expansion of the China-ASEAN technology transference program, as definitive demonstrations of its willingness to act as a benevolent elder brother offering a share of its own prosperity.

On this basis, the West's defence of freedom of navigation and international law alone would be cold comfort to regional stakeholders who fear the contest for hegemony will erupt into a US-China conflict. It, therefore, behoves the US and its regional allies to secure greater buy-in from Southeast Asia. The recent G7 decision to invest US$40 trillion in infrastructure projects to rival China’s BRI in developing countries is an excellent step in this direction as long as it includes a long-term commitment with the recipient nations, principally when dealing with those located within Southeast Asia’s geopolitical landscape.

Beijing may exert an outsized influence on the operation of ASEAN itself, but member nations could only benefit from more Western attention being paid to their individual needs, which include an open, reliable, and transparent alternative that is firmly founded on liberal values, in opposition to the Chinese project and world views that they know so well.

Therefore, Biden should make sure that the ideas and plans discussed in Cornwall reach the ears and hearts of Vietnam’s Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, Malaysia's Muhyiddin Yassin, and Indonesia’s Joko Widodo as soon as possible. Because even with European partners on board, the US will not be able to save the South China Sea from Beijing without key partners in Southeast Asia, and Washington knows it. Or should.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Moises de Souza — Assistant Professor in Asia Pacific Studies at the School of Humanities, Language and Global Studies and Chair of the Northern England Policy Centre for the Asia Pacific (NEPCAP) at the University of Central Lancashire (UCLan). Dean Karalekas — Editor-at-Large of Strategic Vision for Taiwan Security, published by the Taiwan Center for Security Studies. Image credit: Flickr/European Parliment.