Democracy and dissent in Hong Kong
Democracy and dissent in Hong Kong
12 January 2021
The situation in Hong Kong further deteriorated last week with the arrest of over 50 pro-democracy activists under the new Beijing-imposed national security law.
The EU and the Five Eyes group of countries have criticised China's actions in Hong Kong with widening calls for it to respect the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984.
Despite widespread protests by citizens, China has continued its efforts to undermine the liberal values of Hong Kong while the international community has done little more than issue condemnations.
Has time run out for democracy in Hong Kong? Here is a collection of excellent short reads from our contributors that explore its past, present, and future.
Image credit: Flickr/Studio Incendo
— HONG KONG —
While Chris Patten, as governor, was highly responsive to public demands for reform, Hong Kong’s democracy camp may have learned the wrong lesson: that it is enough to simply protest to get their way rather than developing highly inclusive member-based political parties.
THE TIME FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG WAS BEFORE BRITAIN HANDED OVER TO CHINA – NOW IT MAY BE TOO LATE
WRITTEN BY ANDREAS FULDA
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration was supposed to guarantee Hong Kong’s liberal democratic way of life until 2047. Recent developments have shown that the CCP no longer feels bound by the ‘one country, two systems’. The demise of this formula raises the question of whether this descent into authoritarianism could have been prevented. Would the situation today be different if the UK had done more to institutionalise democracy prior to the 1997 handover?
In 2017, Hong Kong’s last governor, Chris Patten, offered a self-critical evaluation. In an interview with The Guardian, he suggested that ‘we could have done more’. This post-facto rationalisation, however, overlooks the constraints Patten was operating under. He was unable to serve Hong Kongers the complete menu of democratic reforms. Prior to 1997, the CCP leadership made credible threats that they would roll back political reforms which they did not deem to be in their interest.
The people of Hong Kong have been protesting to safeguard their democracy since at least 2003. Prof. Amelia Hadfield of the University of Surrey reviews the changing character of these protests over time.
HONG KONG: CAN IT BE SAVED?
WRITTEN BY AMELIA HADFIELD
In 2014, the ‘Umbrella Movement‘ protests took place prompted by Beijing’s ‘plans to influence the selection’ of the city’s chief executive, which in turn increased momentum for a clear and distinct pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. The Umbrella Movement drew up to a million people to the streets, with police resorting to the use of tear gas to deter the protesters. The protests were quashed only after 79 days, by which time, the protestors and their cause had received sustained global attention.
Last year, protests once again erupted, this time over an extradition bill introduced by Beijing in April 2019 which ‘would have allowed for criminal suspects to be extradited to mainland China under certain circumstances’. Hong Kong Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, conceded that the bill would be suspended indefinitely, but only after sustained protests, with a major escalation in July 2019 (the anniversary of the 1997 Joint Declaration) oftentimes descending into violence, largely arising from police brutality. It was not until September 2019, that Lam formally withdrew the bill. By this point, however, ‘the protests had ballooned into a movement centred on a broader set of democratic demands’.
China has introduced new legislation to strengthen its control. Last year, Beijing imposed a new national security law, which is being used to suppress dissent. Here, Dr. Sari Arho Havren, Futures Fellow with the Mercator Institute on China Studies, explores the wider domestic and international politics of this law.
“HONG KONG PEOPLE ARE TO RUN HONG KONG” — THE LOST PROMISE OF 1997
WRITTEN BY SARI ARHO HAVRÉN
The law also enables Beijing to open a new security office in Hong Kong, where its personnel will be free of Hong Kong’s jurisdiction; the same jurisdiction that was supposed to be independent now holds no power over how the law is interpreted. This power lies in Beijing’s hands only. Some of the cases under the National Security Law can even be tried in mainland China but nobody knows which ones. A Chinese-style veil of secrecy and unpredictability seems to have fallen on the city.
While some voices have called for patience in order to see how the national security law will be implemented, one cannot expect lenience when taking into consideration article 43 and the extended powers police have been given. The nearly 400 arrests made during Hong Kong’s first day under the new law made clear the direction of travel. The cases of Xinjiang and Tibet offer frightening examples of what a worst-case-scenario could look like. In addition, the backgrounds of some mainland leaders now appointed to Hong Kong, such as Zheng Yanxiong, who will lead the agency overseeing the implementation of the National Security Law should give rise to a moments pause.
Beijing also keeps tight control over media and information in China. Last year in an unprecedented move, it expelled 13 American journalists. Dr. Yuan Zeng of the University of Leeds explores the domestic and international dimensions of the Party's efforts to control the press.
CHINA’S EXPULSION OF JOURNALISTS A DANGEROUS MISTAKE AT A DEADLY MOMENT
WRITTEN BY YUAN ZENG
One of the ways the Chinese government keeps the foreign press corps on a leash is to impose a strict accreditation system, under which foreign journalists need to apply for a press card and a ‘journalist visa’. Both are reviewed and renewed every year. With this system, China can expel journalists deemed not friendly enough. This happened to the Wall Street Journal reporter Chun Han Wong in 2019, as well as Ursula Gauthier a reporter for French weekly magazine L’Obs, in 2015 and Al Jazeera journalist Melissa Chan in 2012.
But such a large expulsion of thirteen journalists with a clear message of retaliation against another superpower has never been seen before. The ban also covers Hong Kong, the Asian hub for most international news outlets. The semi-autonomous territory, which has its own legal and media system, has been hit by waves of protests and violence in recent months amid defiance at Chinese influence on its governance.
The move clearly mirrors Xi’s strong-handed governance and diplomatic style. Since coming to power in 2012, he has noticeably tightened the state’s grip over media and civil society at home and has abandoned the ‘hide and bide’ diplomacy strategy of former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in favour of an assertive, and increasingly belligerent one.
In December 2020, many opposition legislators resigned in protest of Chinese intereference in Hong Kong. Prof. Leila Choukroune of the University of Portsmouth argues this attack on press freedom and judicial independence will affect Hong Kong's status as an important legal and business hub.
HEAVY HAND OF CHINA IS PROMPTING FEARS FOR HONG KONG’S FUTURE AS A MAJOR BUSINESS HUB
WRITTEN BY LEILA CHOUKROUNE
With the passage of the new security law — or, to give it its full title, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region — the independence of the territory’s already vulnerable judicial system is under threat.
Articles 12, 16 and 18 are particularly worrying. On their basis, Hong Kong is establishing a ‘Committee for Safeguarding National Security’, the police force is creating a ‘department for safeguarding national security with law enforcement capacity’ and, finally, the Department of Justice is putting in place a ‘specialised prosecution division responsible for the prosecution of offences endangering national security and other related legal work’.
What can then remain of the independence of the judiciary while the very definition of national security is extremely broad and can virtually cover anything and anyone including Hong Kong foreign residents and visitors?
As the gap in values between them increases, the EU will find it increasingly difficult to build a successful strategic partnership with China. Dr. Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, of 9DASHLINE and Taiwan NextGen Foundation, takes stock of this bilateral relationship and assesses EU's approach to China.
THE EU’S TOUGHENING STANCE ON CHINA: WILL IT LAST?
WRITTEN BY ZSUZSA ANNA FERENCZY
By contrast, during decades of intense bilateral exchange, Europe has remained open to China, on all fronts and has facilitated China’s integration into the international community guided by human rights, democracy and rule of law. But the lack of reciprocity – both economic and political — has led to an asymmetric relationship, which has not only benefited China at the expense of Europe, it has also made the EU vulnerable and exposed to Chinese influence. As China portrayed itself as a source of unlimited economic opportunities, Europe has been too naïve, EU leaders agree. Beyond Europe, China’s behaviour — increased repression at home and assertiveness abroad — undermines democracy around the world.
As tensions are deeply embedded in fundamental differences, and the reconciliation of differences seems unlikely in the near future, frictions will remain. The real question Europeans should be asking themselves is can the EU fix the glaring asymmetry and lack of reciprocity and ensure EU-China ties will be truly mutually beneficial?