Cross-Strait relations amid the CPC’s centenary celebration

16 July 2021

Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and China’s president gave his much-anticipated grand speech at the centenary ceremony of the CPC on 1 July 2021. The world was not only watching this muscle-showing celebration but also trying to decipher the messages hidden in the speech.

Cross-strait relations between the PRC and Taiwan stand at the centre of the CPC’s grand strategy. In many senses, Xi’s comments on Taiwan are not surprising — they repeated the CPC’s well-known ambitions towards Taiwan. However, identifying ‘Taiwan independence’ as a threat and roadblock to the CPC’s call for national rejuvenation is significant and will make cross-strait relations more difficult going forward. While strategic ambiguity has worked as a buffer for peaceful development and stability in the region, the space for strategic ambiguity is getting smaller for Taiwan as the CPC narrows and harnesses this space.

Three main messages in Xi’s speech

First, the CPC General Secretary began his comments on Taiwan by referencing the reunification of China as “a historic mission and an unshakable commitment” of the CPC. As China’s ‘grand revolution’ cannot be completed without ‘liberating’ Taiwan, reunification is vital for the CPC’s struggle and revolution. Later in the speech, Xi also requested “compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait” to “create a bright future for national rejuvenation”. This implies that the Taiwan question is more than merely the end of a long journey of reunification. Rather, it is explicitly related to the national rejuvenation of the Chinese dream. Linking the Taiwan question with China’s nationalism seems to imply that striving for reunification is out of national sentiment rather than socialist pursuit.

Strategic ambiguity used to provide a grey area for cross-strait communications and provided some stability in the region. But the CPC's "unshakeable commitment" may spell the end of strategic ambiguity and force all parties to play on their own terms.

Second, Xi’s subsequent statement that “we will uphold the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, and advance peaceful national reunification” reinforces past commitments to pursue peaceful national reunification through the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. While this is nothing new, the framing of this path to unification entails that the CPC defines and limits the Taiwan question to the legacy of the civil war between the CPC and the Kuomintang (KMT). Once it is defined as an issue between two political parties, the Taiwan question becomes a domestic issue rather than an international one.

However, the ‘one country, two systems’ idea as well as a timeline for the CPC’s national reunification were conspicuously missing from the speech. The absence of the former principle, which appeared when Xi talked about Hong Kong and Macau, may signify the end of ‘one country, two systems’ as the guiding principle of reunification with Taiwan. The lack of a timeline for national reunification, on the other hand, could have multiple possibilities. It could mean that the CPC is not in a hurry to complete this mission, as it believes it holds enough leverage. However, the opposite is much more likely, namely, that it lacks the confidence to set any timelines; the trend of more people in Taiwan identifying themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese is not easily reconciled with the CPC’s use of nationalism.

Third, on the CPC’s path to national reunification with Taiwan, “Taiwan independence” has become the main enemy. This is addressed in the speech by emphasising that “We must take resolute action to utterly defeat any attempt toward ‘Taiwan independence’”. This ultimately constitutes a repetition of the messages in the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which specifically aims to crush any discussions of Taiwanese independence. This law, which leaves open the possibility of using military force, also works as a legal tool to reinforce the CPC’s efforts to turn the Taiwan question into a domestic rather than an international issue.

The Taiwanese government’s response

At the practical level, treating Taiwan's independence as the enemy and offering the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus as the way-out is a continuation of the CPC’s united front tactic. This is a revolutionary tactic based on maneuvering the binary distinction between friend and enemy. Whereas identifying and eliminating the enemy is crucial, it is equally important to utilise every resource available and work with forces that can defeat the enemy, including the CPC’s previous enemy and/or the enemy’s enemy. The goal is to crush the enemy by creating internal conflicts in Taiwanese society. This strategy has proven effective if we keep an eye on the KMT’s policies and attitudes toward the CPC. Not to mention that many KMT leaders and pro-unification politicians sent congratulatory messages to the CPC before the centenary ceremony started.

In response to Xi’s speech, Lai Ching-te, Vice President of Taiwan R.O.C., tweeted that "Unsurprisingly, Mr Xi referred today to Taiwan as part of Chinese territory. Our answer is a firm “no”. The future of Taiwan is determined by the Taiwanese people. This is the practice of a democratic country". With the growing consensus around a distinctly Taiwanese consciousness, the current ruling party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), disagrees with every assumption made by the CPC. However, Xi’s speech sends a clear message to Tsai’s government in Taiwan that Beijing defines the terms and conditions of cross-strait communications. Dialogue is conditional on accepting the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, and military action is always possible if Tsai’s government dares to show any signs of independence.

The role of the US and risks ahead

While strategic ambiguity has long been the US policy toward cross-strait relations, Xi’s speech poses challenges to the US. Beijing is increasingly conscious of “discourse power (話語權)” and has been trying to control the meaning of strategic ambiguity.

Although the US has not yet changed its position regarding strategic ambiguity and dual deterrence, debates on shifting toward strategic clarity are underway. Further adjustments to the current policy of strategic ambiguity are expected if the Biden administration chooses not to make swift changes. Contrary to the CPC’s intention to keep the Taiwan question a domestic concern, the Biden administration seems intent on internationalising the Taiwan question. This is indicated by attempts to draw attention to the Taiwan Strait at the US-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement, Biden’s summit with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, and the G7 calling for peace across Taiwan Strait

However, Xi’s speech delivered a unilateral framework for cross-strait relations without much room for negotiation. Strategic ambiguity used to provide a grey area for cross-strait communications and provided some stability in the region. But the CPC's "unshakeable commitment" may spell the end of strategic ambiguity and force all parties to play on their own terms. Without a mutually recognised framework, further tensions and escalations in cross-strait relations are likely.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Li-chia Lo is a political theorist who travels between critical theory and Asian experiences. His broader areas of research include deliberative democracy, Chinese politics, Taiwan politics, cross-strait relations, and global politics. Image credit: Wikipedia.