Chinese backing for Arakan Army: Do Sino-Myanmar relations face turbulence?
Chinese backing for Arakan Army: Do Sino-Myanmar relations Face turbulence?
WRITTEN BY JELVIN JOSE
21 October 2020
In July 2020, the Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar’s armed forces (the Tatmadaw), Min Aung Hlaing, stated that 'strong forces' are propelling militancy in the country. Though no specific names were stated, it can be inferred from his remarks that senior officials in Myanmar believe that multiple insurgent groups operating within the country, including the Arakan Army (AA) and its sister group the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in Kachin and Rakhine States, are receiving Chinese material assistance.
Beijing's questionable links with the Arakan Army
Multiple instances have revealed Beijing's direct or indirect material support for the AA, the ethnic Rakhine Buddhist rebels who seek to carve out an autonomous region in a model similar to that of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Myanmar’s north. The former BBC correspondent, Subir Bhaumik, in April, issued a story in The Eastern Link that Chinese made weaponry was reaching the Arakan rebels via Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts.
As recently as 23 June, a joint military and police task force in Thailand captured a massive stock of wide-ranging Chinese-made weapons from Mae Sot, near the Myanmar border. According to the Irrawaddy newspaper, both Myanmar and India suspect that this $1 million stockpile intercepted from another Myanmar-based insurgent group located in Karen State, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), was destined for Rakhine and the Arakan Army.
Although this weapons seizure is not definitive evidence, it is part of a broader pattern of attacks undertaken by the AA and other disparate militant groups using similar stockpiles. On 22 June 2019, AA rebels fired Chinese made 107mm surface-to-surface rockets at a Myanmar naval vessel berthed at Sittwe, a major port in Rakhine State, killing members of the crew. Several months later, over 170 weapons, including Chinese made rocket-propelled grenades and FN6 anti-aircraft missile launchers were caught in a raid conducted by the Tatmadaw on the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) camp, another militant ethnic group operating in the northern Shan State near Myanmar’s border with China.
Beijing's support for disparate rebel groups is part of a tacit strategy to reduce dependence on Myanmar’s military leadership. The Tatmadaw is unable to control the whole of Myanmar’s territory. Given this security context, indifference to or outright material support for the Arakan Army is crucial for Beijing.
In a telling March 2020 statement, U Khaing Thukka, an Arakan Army spokesperson, hinted at a relationship between Beijing and the AA, remarking that "China recognises us, but India doesn't".
An ongoing security crisis in Myanmar
Since 2017, Myanmar has been in the grips of a major internal security crisis, centred on Rakhine. The campaign of ethnic cleansing directed towards the Rohingya has sparked new cycles of violence. In January of that year, the Arakan Army attacked four police stations across Rakhine State and assassinated 13 police officers. The Tatmadaw's response was to launch a fresh military offensive in Rakhine against the AA. Fighting between the two sides has only exacerbated the suffering of the civilian population, with over 740,000 people fleeing their homes and into Bangladesh.
In March 2020, the National League for Democracy government under Aung San Suu Kyi declared the AA a terrorist group and excluded it from the Panglong Union Peace Conferences, held ahead of Myanmar’s November 2020 general election. Present at the conference were a plethora of non-state armed groups fighting against Naypyidaw, including the Kokang Army, TNLA, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), known collectively as the Northern Alliance. The AA’s exclusion signalled that the country’s government and Tatmadaw leadership are determined to refuse the AA both political space and a dialogue. Instead, the preference seems to be towards a military solution in Rakhine due to the risks of additional autonomous territories like 'Wa State' which, in their view, would weaken national integrity.
Why would Beijing back the Arakan Army?
Bertil Lintner, the Swedish journalist, explains Beijing's geo-strategic game plan in Myanmar as a carrot and stick policy. For decades, China has been the principal economic player in Myanmar and a core supplier of weapons to its armed forces. Moreover, Beijing shielded the nation and the Tatmadaw’s leadership diplomatically from international outrage over human rights violations and its poor response to humanitarian disasters such as Cyclone Nargis. As such, China seeks to maximise its influence through as many channels as possible
Beijing's support for disparate rebel groups is part of a tacit strategy to reduce dependence on Myanmar’s military leadership. The Tatmadaw is unable to control the whole of Myanmar’s territory. Given this security context, indifference to or outright material support for the Arakan Army is crucial for Beijing. Its flagship infrastructure projects, such as the Kyaukpyu Port, as well as oil and gas pipelines extending from China’s Yunnan province, are near Rakhine state and the Indian Ocean. These projects are critical for Beijing, from a geo-strategic perspective, as they circumvent the Straits of Malacca giving China direct access to energy supplies.
Beijing requires a network of contacts with the Arakan Army to shield or at least prevent interference with its economic and strategic interests in Myanmar. In doing so, China can use these militant links to solidify its position and retain influence in Naypyidaw. The material support to the Arakan Army itself has a historic precedent. The weapons routed to the United Wa State Army (UWSA) along the Sino-Myanmar border have extensive Chinese connections and played a pivotal role in giving Wa State de-facto independence. Yun Sun, a Senior Fellow at the Stimson Centre, argues that the armed ethnic conflicts in Myanmar risk harming Beijing's financial interests and are a cause of increasing mistrust in the bilateral relationship.
Naypyidaw’s pro-Western tilt since 2011, which resulted in US President Barack Obama's historic Myanmar visit in 2012, reinforced Beijing's belief that a somewhat unstable Myanmar might better serve its interests. The suspension of the Myitsone Dam project and growing public resistance towards Chinese ventures via the Belt and Road Initiative impressed upon Beijing's policy circles, the strategic challenges that might accompany democratisation in Myanmar. Authorities in Bejing understand that a peaceful Myanmar, with growing ties to the US, European Union, and Japan, will be less receptive to Chinese capital, infrastructure projects, and port calls by the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
Faced with the prospect of a less pliant Naypyidaw, Beijing undertook efforts to cultivate strategic assets in Myanmar. Beijing is a net beneficiary of the ethnic conflicts and the resulting human rights violations in Myanmar. The international hostility towards Naypyidaw over the Tatmadaw’s conduct in Rakhine State offers a foothold for Beijing in Southeast Asia. International isolation would push Naypyidaw towards political and economic reliance on Beijing. Indeed, the global human rights outcry in 2017 and Chinese support in the international arena played an instrumental role in bringing the pro-western Aung San Suu Kyi into Beijing's orbit.
Naypyidaw's limited policy options
Both Nyaypidaw and the Tatmadaw know that Beijing is playing a double game, therefore both have a strong desire to counterbalance Chinese influence. However, while this increases Myanmar's distrust towards Beijing, the impact on bilateral relations is limited. Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to derail the peace process when Naypyidaw refuses to pay heed to its voice.
Myanmar's options to balance Beijing are limited in the current environment. Since the West seems unwilling to overlook allegations of human rights violations, Naypyidaw's Western outreach is restricted. New Delhi also seems unwilling to pursue a deeper engagement with Myanmar. Naypyidaw's long-term solution to rid itself of Beijing's influence would require giving up its ultra-nationalism and making genuine efforts towards ethnic reconciliation. However, as long as violence prevails, Beijing has undeniable stakes in Myanmar and will maintain a firm strategic grip.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Jelvin Jose is a research intern at the Centre for International Strategic and Security Studies, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), India. He is an Integrated Master’s candidate in Political Science at the Central University of Pondicherry. He has previously published articles at the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) and for NIICE Nepal. Image Credit: Thaths/Flickr