China’s 'history learning' regulations
China’s ‘History Learning’ Regulations
WRITTEN BY MANOJ KEWALRAMANI AND RAKSHITH SHETTY
13 March 2024
In February, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) released regulations governing the study of the Party's history. According to Chinese media, the document serves as the CPC’s “core internal guideline” for organising and implementing study programmes about the Party’s history, with the goal of “strengthening understanding, conviction, integrity, and diligence”.
The culture of recorded written history is important in Chinese politics. Throughout Chinese history, it has been wielded as a tool for political legitimacy and continuity, characterising the ruling regime as the rightful successor of earlier dynasties. In China, as in some other countries, the telling of history often gets mixed up with politics. Instead of focusing on the facts, it tends to reflect the agendas of those in charge. The CPC understands this dynamic, as evidenced by the strategic use of historical narratives by leaders such as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Jinping to legitimise their political agenda. In other words, like earlier dynasties in China, CPC leaders have been acutely aware that in politics, history is about the future rather than the past. Analysing the new regulations on studying the Party’s history helps us understand how the CPC strategically utilises historical narratives to bolster its legitimacy, consolidate power, and shape the trajectory of its governance.
A brief history of the Party’s history learning regulations
The Party approved its first definitive resolution on historical issues under Mao’s leadership in 1945, giving him unparalleled authority of the CPC. The resolution unified the thinking of the whole Party, consolidated its unity, promoted the rapid advance of the people’s revolutionary cause, and accelerated the CPC’s eventual triumph in the civil war against the Kuomintang. The second history resolution was approved at the end of the chaos that followed Mao’s death in 1976. The 1981 document was critical to Deng Xiaoping’s political and economic reform agenda. It argued for prioritising economic development and modernisation over class struggle, while warning against the over-concentration of power within one individual. Despite acknowledging historical errors, it refrained from outright criticism and emphasised the importance of collective leadership.
The enforcement of these regulations is expected to further fortify Xi’s leadership and consolidate ideological conformity within the Party.
The current effort under Xi dates back to February 2021, when the Party began preparations for its centenary and launched the History Learning and Education Campaign. This campaign culminated in the approval of the Party’s third resolution on historical issues in November 2021. The document served as a synthesis of Mao's emphasis on the uniqueness of his rule and Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on drawing lessons from past mistakes and setbacks, while also strengthening Xi's status as the legitimate heir to the Party’s leadership. It underscored the distinctiveness of his rule and portrayed his policy agenda as the natural progression of the evolution of the Party’s original ambition to modernise China. An explanatory note issued by Xi at the time emphasised that the resolution was designed as an instrument for building consensus on future policy directions rather than delving into historical investigations.
Understanding the Party’s history learning regulation
The recent regulations on history education must be viewed in light of their broader scope. These regulations are not merely about learning history; they navigate the complex interplay between history and various facets of contemporary life, including politics, academia, research, and propaganda. Like previous regulations, the current regulation seeks to cultivate ideological conformity not just within the Party but across society at large. It is designed to ensure that everyone — from Party members to Chinese citizens — adheres to a unified understanding of history that aligns with the Party's narrative and bolsters the legitimacy of the CPC and its core leader, Xi Jinping. For instance, Article 15 of the document calls to "Foster a correct understanding of Party history...; accurately grasp the themes, main lines, and essential characteristics of the Party’s historical development; firmly oppose and resist historical nihilism and ensure that the correct historical narrative becomes a consensus throughout the entire Party and society".
Xi’s objective is to ensure that his narrative of history is not only dominant but also the only one that prevails. In terms of the content of history learning and education, while Article 10 mentions core theories of past CPC leaders such as Marxism-Leninism, Mao’s Thought, Deng’s Theory, the Theory of Three Represents by former General-Secretary Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook on Development, the primary emphasis remains on Xi’s signature ideology — Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. The education campaign targets not only Party cadres and schools but also all educational institutions, state institutions, state-owned enterprises, and grassroots organisations. The aim, as is clearly stated in the document, is to “continuously enhance the political, ideological, theoretical and emotional identification” of society and Party members with the Party’s theories, thereby fostering loyalty. Unlike the previous two regulations, the current one will have a greater impact on the way China interacts with its external environment. This is due to Xi’s strengthened surveillance apparatus within society and augmented authority over state law enforcement agencies and the military.
What does the regulation seek to achieve?
Article 4 of the regulations outlines four broad tasks — “strengthening understanding, conviction, integrity, and diligence” through continuous learning of the Party’s history.
In this context, “strengthening understanding” implies educating and guiding Party members to deeply comprehend the reasons behind the CPC’s success, the effectiveness of Marxism, and the rationale behind the suitability of socialism with Chinese characteristics for China’s conditions. The aim is to instil “unwavering confidence in the Party's leadership” and “follow the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics”. This should be understood within the context of the perceived systems competition between the Party and Western democracy. Therefore, the task of “boosting conviction” or trust entails the use of history learning to strengthen Party members’ and society’s faith in Marxism, communism, and socialism with Chinese characteristics.
The aim is to challenge Western democracy and nurture a society of committed believers in Xi Jinping’s ideologies. To achieve this, the Party seeks to “cultivate integrity, virtue, and diligence”, which underscores its desire to maintain top-down central control and performance legitimacy. Here, history serves as a tool for strengthening political loyalty to Xi Jinping and emphasises the implementation of the Party's development agenda for the benefit of the people.
Implications of ideological reinforcement
In essence, the regulations represent a concerted effort to solidify Xi Jinping's authority and strengthen his command over the Party. It is an institutionalised measure to reinforce ideological conformity and promote a unified understanding of history among Party members and the society, thereby legitimising the Party’s governance and fostering loyalty to Xi Jinping. The enforcement of these regulations is expected to further fortify Xi’s leadership and consolidate ideological conformity within the Party.
While enforcing these regulations may promote political stability, it also raises concerns about potential repercussions, including a more assertive claim towards historically disputed territories with China’s neighbours. For instance, Beijing invokes its historical sovereignty to claim the Spratly Islands (contested by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei) and the Senkaku Islands (contested by China, Taiwan, and Japan). Similarly, China's dispute with India over Arunachal Pradesh, known as "South Tibet" in China, stems from historical disagreements and border tensions.
There may also be an increase in ideological assertiveness against Western liberal democracy, exemplified by China's condemnation of Western democratic values and its promotion of an alternative authoritarian model. This could shape Beijing’s interactions with its neighbours and Western nations, influencing the global discourse on governance and ideology as China seeks to present its political system as a viable alternative to Western democracy.
A single narrative of history learning is problematic as it restricts critical thinking and promotes a biased understanding of events. In China's case, this has fuelled territorial disputes and ideological assertiveness, leading to regional instability. It is imperative for the global community to promote diverse narratives of history in order to counterbalance Xi Jinping’s singular narrative.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Manoj Kewalramani is Fellow-China Studies and the Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution. He is a Senior Associate (Non-resident), Freeman Chair in China Studies, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (US), and also currently serves as a Visiting Senior Fellow (Nov 2023 - Feb 2024) at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (Singapore).
Rakshith Shetty is a Research Analyst with the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution. He tracks China's Green Energy Capacities and Implications for India. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/The Communist Revolution in Gansu.