China sees a chance in Nepal with Left Alliance
China sees a chance in Nepal with Left Alliance
WRITTEN BY DR RISHI GUPTA
2 May 2024
From 24 March to 1 April 2024, the newly appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Nepal, Narayan Kaji Shrestha, was on a week-long visit to China at the invitation of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. China was quick to invite Shrestha for his first state visit after he assumed two important offices on 6 March. The freshly formed Left Alliance government was equally prompt in positively responding to the invitation.
China courts the Left
Upon his return, Shrestha told the press that “my visit has deepened the mutual understanding and respect between Nepal and China”. Although no agreements were signed, there was a major focus on connectivity and transit, which remains a big challenge considering the mountainous Himalayan terrain that forms the natural barrier between the two states. For Nepal as a landlocked country, an alternate transit route through China for its third-country trade would be beneficial in case of an uneventful situation at the Nepal-India border. It also helps Nepal reduce its dependence on India, which is currently the only route for its third-country trade and enhance trade resilience in the face of border disruptions such as the 2015 India-Nepal border blockade.
Minister Shrestha’s meetings with the high-ranking members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also highlighted the importance of the ideological connection between the CCP and Nepal’s Left parties, which has been a priority since Nepal transitioned to multi-party democracy in 2006. China has found comfort in working with Nepal’s Left — the Maoist (Centre) and Communist Party of Nepal (UML)-led governments.
Nepal has reportedly conveyed that it would prefer to receive more grants from China instead of taking high-interest loans under the development partnership, including for BRI projects.
The quick invitation of Deputy Prime Minister Shrestha reflects Nepal's strategic importance to Beijing’s larger territorial security considerations, especially the border region in the Himalayas, which is currently at the heart of China’s border conflict with India. China fears that the strategic influence of India and the United States in Nepal, especially in regions along the Nepal-China border, may empower separatist voices in Tibet.
Similarly, Nepal is a gateway for China to connect with South Asia through land, challenging India’s traditional presence in the region. Beyond strategic objectives, China is vying for influence in Nepal to further its economic and geopolitical interests, shaping the dynamics of regional power relations. As China seeks to assert its influence in the region, leveraging its control over Tibet becomes instrumental in shaping its approach towards Nepal and securing its strategic objectives in South Asia.
The Tibet factor
One of the critical components of China’s Nepal policy includes Kathmandu’s assurance to Beijing not to allow Tibetan refugees to carry out ‘anti-China’ demonstrations in Nepal. Currently, more than 10,000 Tibetan refugees reside in Nepal, and their occasional ‘Free Tibet' demonstrations have called attention to China's human rights record internationally. For instance, during the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the Tibet uprising found support among the Tibetans living in Nepal, but the then recently formed first democratic government led by the Maoists Center party had responded to Chinese concerns and jailed hundreds of demonstrators, causing global criticism.
Despite the global criticism of its treatment of Tibetan refugees, Nepal has tried its best to suppress and silence any anti-China or separatist voices since the beginning of diplomatic ties with its neighbour in 1955. Due to the criticality of Tibet in its Nepal policy, China, on the other hand, has ensured that all high-level delegates from Nepal visit Tibet and meet the higher authorities in the Tibetan administration. The most recent Nepali delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Shrestha was also taken to Tibet, where it met with the high-level officials of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
Interestingly, Nepal’s unwavering support to China on anti-separatism policies, including the “One China Policy”, boils down to meeting Chinese strategic interests, precisely subverting the activities of the Tibetan refugees, and any assistance that emanates from China often comes with a lot of bargains, be it in the development sector or humanitarian support. This intricate alignment underscores Nepal’s limited diplomatic capacity to assert its interests independently in the face of pressure from its powerful neighbour.
The broader picture since Xi Jinping
Looking back, the year 2019 was particularly important for bilateral relations as the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Kathmandu marked a giant leap in China's engagement with Nepal. Xi’s visit came after two decades without a Chinese president visiting Nepal. During Xi's visit, the bilateral ties were elevated from a 'Nepal-China Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship' to a 'Strategic Partnership of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship for Development and Prosperity'.
By elevating bilateral ties to a ‘strategic partnership’, China certainly gained a long-term strategic commitment from Nepal. For instance, China has been pressing Nepal to sign a Treaty of Extradition aimed at preventing future defections from Tibet via the Nepal border into India. While China hoped that Nepal would sign the treaty during Xi’s visit in October 2019, human rights organisations and pressure from the international community prevented this. Meanwhile, a Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters was concluded, which many human rights organisations also see with concerns.
In its efforts to safeguard its strategic interests, in May 2017, China also persuaded Nepal to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Nepal initially hoped that generous Chinese assistance would help build infrastructure. However, so far, no single project has proceeded under the BRI mechanism due to Nepal’s looming fears of a ‘debt trap’— a notion that has long been associated with the BRI worldwide, especially in geographically smaller countries. A section of policymakers in Nepal believes that with countries like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Djibouti falling into the Chinese ‘debt trap’ due to high-interest loans while participating in the BRI, Nepal needs to think its participation through.
Nepal has reportedly conveyed that it would prefer to receive more grants from China instead of taking high-interest loans under the development partnership, including for BRI projects. The easiest way for Beijing would be to meet the Nepalese concerns with transparency. However, Beijing prefers to blame India for allegedly pressuring Kathmandu against the BRI. However, infusing life into the BRI was a significant point of discussion during Minister Shrestha’s China visit. In addition to the BRI, China has been trying to convince Nepal to join the Global Security Initiative (GSI) — China’s latest attempt to challenge the Western-led global governance security system. However, after initial considerations, Nepal has sidestepped any conversation about joining the GSI as it might invite serious objections from India and indicate a serious departure from its ‘non-alignment policy’ — aiming for an independent foreign and security policy.
Prerequisite for Beijing
In the last seven decades of formal diplomatic ties with Nepal, China has focused on meeting its strategic objectives, but today’s Nepal is aspirational and needs reciprocity in terms of grants and aid arriving with an assurance of development towards a geographically smaller neighbour. Therefore, China must prioritise tangible and mutually beneficial cooperation beyond symbolic gestures and unmet promises. Because of China’s strategic rigidity, it is far from breaking the traditional influence of India and the United States, whose assistance is more open and has not shown ‘debt-trap’ outcomes in the past seven decades of engagement. Overall, Nepal’s cautious optimism towards China reflects a larger perspective on big-state and small-state relations across the world.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr. Rishi Gupta is the Assistant Director of the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) in Delhi. He is a 2024 Taiwan Fellow and a Visiting Fellow at the Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs (AIDIA), Kathmandu. Before joining ASPI, he contributed to the Vivekananda International Foundation, the Centre for Air Power Studies in Delhi, and Pondicherry University. Dr Gupta earned his PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, MPhil from the University of Calcutta, and MA from Pondicherry University. Image credit: Unsplash/binaya_photography (cropped/blended).