China is replacing India as South Asia's key power

11 April 2020

Last month, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke to the leaders of South Asia over a video conference and discussed a common strategy to tackle the Covid-19 crises in the region. Many saw it as a renewed attempt by India to woo its smaller neighbors in the face of rising Chinese assertiveness in the region. India pledged a contribution of $10 million towards a mutually agreed ‘SAARC Covid-19 Emergency Fund’ proposed by Narendra Modi.

Barely three days later, China extended a financial assistance amounting to $500 million to Sri Lanka alone puncturing if any gas left in India’s pandemic diplomacy.

For decades, India has taken regional connectivity for granted while conveniently assuming South Asia as its non-penetrable backyard. As a result, New Delhi allowed domestic politics to influence its relations with the Indian neighborhood without fearing the fallout. The Kashmir dispute estranged ties with Pakistan, Tamil question derailed relations with Sri Lanka and river disputes hampered progress with Bangladesh. This does not however mean that India alone was responsible for all that went wrong but that it saw very little incentive for resolving the stalemates. Consequently, India today is situated in the world’s least integrated region. The share of intra-regional trade was abysmally low at 5% in 2014, according to a World Bank report, compared to 30% in the not so distant ASEAN region.

In the pre-colonial era, much of South Asia was part of Indian mainland or a natural extension of it. The spread of Hinduism and Buddhism to South Asian countries from India encapsulates the cultural affinity in the region which gravitated heavily towards India. During the colonial period from the 16th century onwards, India’s regional interactions were influenced by London. Much of neighboring states became colonial outposts and buffer zones which were to be secured at all costs. If these developments would have had a lasting legacy, Independent India’s role in integrating the region should have been much wider. Instead, India followed the dual policies of political isolationism and economic protectionism thereby leaving very little scope for co-operation with its neighbors. So, it was Bangladesh not India which mooted the idea for a regional grouping leading to the formation of SAARC in 1985.

This lax approach of taking the neighborhood for granted was again evident in early 90’s when New Delhi was more interested in upgrading ties with South-East Asia through its ‘Look East Policy’ while conveniently bypassing the nearer South Asia. In 2000’s too even when there was an attempt at a major reapproachment with Pakistan, South Asia as a whole remained a distant priority. However by the second decade of the millennium, China massively expanded its diplomatic, economic, and political footprint across South Asia. With the sole exception of Bhutan, all of India’s other neighbors joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a project which India views suspiciously. However, New Delhi’s sentiments have not prevented its neighbors from endorsing Chinese investment and trade. China has been developing deep sea ports, acquiring stakes in stock exchanges and selling submarines to India’s neighbors. In 2018, Chinese trade in the region peaked at $1.5 trillion, five times more than India’s commercial exchanges with the region.

Rather than reducing its neighborhood policy to a reaction to China- South Asia relations, New Delhi would be better off reviving the economic and social linkages that have existed between India and its neighbors for centuries, not just the ones that matter to its rivalry with China.

India’s response to this has at best been reactionary. It has followed up with increase in credit lines to its South Asian neighbors and played catch-up by proposing similar infrastructure projects such as the BBN Motor Vehicle Agreement signed in 2015 and a renewed emphasis on BIMSTEC grouping. But can these projects match up with the Chinese investment? Certainly not. China is a five times bigger economy than India and Beijing commands absolute command over its resources and can utilize them at its will. That certainly is not possible with India. So if Narendra Modi, as it seems, intends to have a South Asia strategy centered on combating China’s reach in the region solely by investing in rival projects, then that policy is doomed to fail.

Rather, India needs to recognize how China’s influence actually works. The kind of ties exemplified by China’s Covid-19 medical assistance- rather than more traditional points of attention, such as China’s growing financial involvement, its stakes in stock exchanges, or the Chinese- built roads and bridges- give China its real advantage over India in South Asia. China has been increasingly putting more effort into cultivating ties with key politicians and bureaucrats in South Asian countries. Between 2000 and 2017, Chinese officials made 1,039 visits to South Asia, according to a study by AidData. The most popular destinations were Nepal with 129 official visits in the period and Sri Lanka with 102. Unlike India, China does not take sides or care about the legitimacy of the regime. They simply woo whosoever is in power.

China- South Asia relations are certainly about infrastructure investments, but these also go hand in hand with investments in people-to-people relations and sustained diplomatic outreach. At the heart of this project is the vast network of Confucius Institutes (CI). In South Asia, it is primarily directed to provide the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) legitimacy by propagating the cultural underpinnings of BRI. In South Asia, they have acquired a firm foothold in Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. Sri Lanka also has two Confucius institutes- at the Colombo and Kelaniya Universities. China also plans to offer 10,000 scholarships, training opportunities to 5000 people, an exchange and training programme for 5000 youth, and train 5000 Chinese language teachers for South Asia in the next five years. Additionally, the Chinese government invests serious efforts and funds into bringing South Asian students to China. In the last six years, the number of inbound students from India’s neighborhood to China has increased by 176%. Even if one excludes Pakistan, China now receives approximately the same number of students from South Asia as India. Upon returning back, these students have a potential to act as China’s brand ambassadors in their home country and work as conduits for others to follow the suit.

Similarly, China has been running several fellowship programs for South Asian journalists to convince them to propagate Chinese ideals in their countries. Since 2016, every year, more than 100 journalists from poor South Asian and even African countries, get training under the fellowship program. This is in line with Xi Jinping’s address to Chinese media houses in 2016 to “tell China’s story better” to the world. Apparently, journalists even from reputed Indian media houses like Indian Express have participated in these programmes.

The Indian diplomacy lags far behind the Chinese efforts. In a recent study by Brookings India, it was observed that India’s attractiveness as a higher education destination is fading. While students from South Asia still constitute half of the total foreign student population in India (49% in 2019), their numbers have been stagnating. The annual growth of students in India from the neighborhood has decreased from 30% to just 9% in the last seven years.

This is in stark contrast from the past when India, not China due to its cultural and linguistic ties would attract the bulk of students from the region. This included Nepal’s former Prime Minister BP Koirala, Afghanistan’s former President Hamid Karzai and Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi. Also when it comes to India’s cultural diplomacy, there are some serious flaws. Narendra Modi has been repeatedly emphasizing the cultural links and the shared religious heritage between India and its neighbors during his visit to South Asian countries. New Delhi’s focus on South Asia has been shaped by an overall quest for cultural reunion in the region, based on the idea that India’s civilization transcends its political borders. But emphasizing alikeness can often prove counter-productive. This was reiterated by a senior Indian diplomat I.P. Khosla according to whom “India’s neighbors find it difficult to endorse proposals that could in any sense hint at the recreation of past unity”. Rather India should take a cue from the Chinese notebook. Respecting the local cultural sensibilities, the Confucius Institutes in South Asia have been including courses of local culture and interest while avoiding stress on cultural unity between China and the region.

But even more crippling to Indian efforts may be the arrogance that oozes from New Delhi for the past few years. Last year, India’s Home Minister Amit Shah described Bangladeshis as ‘termites’ and accused them of ‘infiltrating’ India. This did not go well in Dhaka which called the statement ‘unwanted’ for. Earlier too in 2015, India imposed a tacit blockade on Nepal to cede more rights to Madhesis who share cultural links with Indian Hindus. As a result, Kathmandu sharply gravitated towards Beijing.

Although it has become a stumbling block for New Delhi, assuming South Asians have no agency in their relations with China is a mistake. In December, Sri Lankan President told press that he wanted to renegotiate the agreement with China on the Hambantota port which the island country has leased to China for a 99 year period in 2017. Former Maldives President and speaker of People’s Majlis of Maldives, Mohammad Nasheed was also critical of Chinese ‘debt traps’ in his country. He referred to Chinese investments in Maldives as “imperialism, as colonialism, and land grab” last year.

If Narendra Modi government wants to see India on a steady footing in South Asia, it has to make more credible efforts to strengthen its relations with both the governments and citizens of South Asian countries. India cannot of its own rival the Chinese infrastructure projects. Instead, it can co-operate with like- minded regional powers like Japan and Australia to finance large scale infrastructure projects.

Delhi and Tokyo are already collaborating for a new port terminal in Colombo. With respect to attracting South Asian students, it is highly unlikely that scholars will prefer Indian universities over their Chinese counterparts (China has 22 universities in the global top 500, against just 9 from India). But Indian Institute of Technology (IIT’s) which specialize in technical education command significant reputation all over the world. India should offer an exclusive SAARC quota in IIT’s for South Asian students so as to promote educational connectivity in the region. Instead in 2016, it chose to scrap the 50% discount in tuition fees offered by IIT’s to students from SAARC countries. Mistakes like these can be avoided. New Delhi would also be wise to respect the cultural heterogeneity of South Asian countries and desist from over-emphasizing civilizational unity.

Finally, rather than reducing its neighborhood policy to a reaction to China- South Asia relations, New Delhi would be better off reviving the economic and social linkages that have existed between India and its neighbors for centuries, not just the ones that matter to its rivalry with China. Chinese ambitions in South Asia may not be entirely benevolent, but Beijing’s diplomatic approach is not only outplaying New Delhi, but changing the region for ever. India should act fast.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Minaam Shah is a researcher of India's India's neighborhood policy. His works regularly appears in The National Interest and The Diplomat. Image credit: Ministry of External Affairs (India)/Flickr.

East Asia9DLApril 11, 2020China, India, South Asia, Modi, Xi Jinping