Canada's Indo-Pacific realignment
CANADA MOVES TOWARD INDO-PACIFIC REALIGNMENT
WRITTEN BY GRANT WYETH
4 April 2020
From its consolidation as a modern state, Canada has been a predominantly Atlantic-facing country. With its conception from two European colonial powers, its symbiotic relationship with its dominant southern neighbour, and a population distribution that heavily favoured its eastern flank, this made sense. Yet with the massive shift in the global distribution of wealth from the north Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific taking place, Ottawa’s calculations of its global opportunities, interests, and risks, require a reevaluation. As a wealthy middle power on the periphery of the Indo-Pacific, Canada has the potential to be a state of positive regional influence, yet this will require the kind of investment the country has previously been reluctant to make.
There are a variety of different and competing conceptions of the “Indo-Pacific” - both geographically and strategically - and Canada is yet to fully develop its own position. Indeed, Canada still uses the term “Asia-Pacific” in its official communications. However, the country does seem to be shifting its thinking towards what could be broadly understood by the new label. While Asia-Pacific construct reflected the ideas of economic integration and the burgeoning prosperity of the region - and the stability this should have created - the Indo-Pacific has a firmer security focus; a recognition that the mechanisms of prosperity require stronger safeguards.
Canada’s participation in last year’s joint U.S-Australia Talisman Sabre exercise was also an indication that Ottawa has an awareness of the importance of regional security architecture, even if Ottawa is yet to fully internalise the Indo-Pacific as the world’s new primary theatre of engagement.
In 2017 Canada released a new defence policy titled Strong, Secure, Engaged, which established the direction of Canadian defence priorities over the next 20 years, with a notable planned increase in defence spending. Yet assured of its territorial security due to its location next to the United States, even with its increased spending Canada’s defence budget remains smaller than Australia’s, a country of 12 million fewer people. While the new defence policy states that Canada’s security “requires active engagement abroad” it says little about this engagement in Asia, focusing instead on Canada’s traditional commitments to NATO and NORAD.
Yet Canada is not inactive in the region, and has made some recent demonstrations of its commitment to the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Last year the naval frigate HMCS Ottawa made two passes through the Taiwan Strait, a symbolic act that carries added weight due to Canada’s ongoing tension with China over the extradition proceedings of Huawei executive, Meng Wangzhou, and the two Canadian hostages Beijing has taken in response. The HMCS Ottawa had been supporting the implementation of UN Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea, and in between rotations had conducted two iterations of the KAEDEX joint naval exercises with Japan, the first in South China Sea, and a second off Japan’s coast.
Canada’s participation in last year’s joint U.S-Australia Talisman Sabre exercise was also an indication that Ottawa has an awareness of the importance of regional security architecture, even if Ottawa is yet to fully internalise the Indo-Pacific as the world’s new primary theatre of engagement. Yet by 2030 four of the five largest economies in the world will be within the Indo-Pacific geographic region, and Canada will undoubtedly see the region as one of ample opportunity, and need to invest more enthusiastically to protect its interests.
These interests could be considerable. Canada is a formidable energy power, holding the third largest oil reserves in the world, as well as being the fourth largest natural gas producer. By 2030 China’s consumption of imported oil will expand from its current 65 per cent of its total consumption to around 80 per cent. India’s oil demand will grow by 30 per cent, and 80 per cent of the global growth of gas consumption will be in the Indo-Pacific. This presents major opportunities for Canada’s resource-extracting, and Pacific-facing provinces.
However, Canada currently finds itself in a significant internal dispute over its resource industries. The responsibilities the country has towards reducing its carbon footprint, the reliance on resource-extraction of two of its provinces, and the resistance of its indigenous First Nations people to pipelines across their land to the country’s Pacific coast, are all creating serious tensions. This indicates that Canada may be restricted in its ability to facilitate the growing energy demands of the Indo-Pacific.
Despite this there remains considerable forces in the country that are shifting its focus from its Atlantic to its Pacific coast, and across to the Indo-Pacific. In particular the country’s demographics. Canada has a generous immigration program, one that welcomed over 340,000 people last year (and plans to expand this to 360,000 in the coming years), and this intake is dominated by Indians, Filipinos, and Chinese. These are groups that move to Canada seeking opportunity, but also understand that opportunity remains in Asia. They are transnational envoys, and establish intimate networks and provide essential local knowledge for the country. Although the coronavirus crisis may now impact Canada’s population ambitions.
This bottom up approach is of significant importance, but in a shifting regional landscape, where international norms, rules and institutions are under threat, a more direct approach from the Canadian state itself is required. As a keen multilateralist Canada has been rightfully concerned about the “might is right” turn in strategic culture of late.
As a significant middle power Canada has the resources to form coalitions to help create an Indo-Pacific that is resilient to coercion and capable of defending a set of mutually beneficial norms. Canada has always been an active values-based power, and its current attempt to gain a UN Security Council seat for 2021-2022 is testament to its diplomatic ambitions. But Canada’s eventual Indo-Pacific pivot may need to involve a greater demonstration of its security capabilities than it has previously been willing to prove.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Grant Wyeth is a Melbourne-based political analyst specializing in Australia and the Pacific, India and Canada. Alongside his work for The Diplomat, his analysis has been published by foreign policy publications attached to The Lowy Institute, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and the Australian Institute of International Affairs, as well as by mainstream news outlets The Age, The Guardian, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and Inside Story. Image credit: by Prime Minister of Canada/Flickr.