Can Russia become China’s strategic mercenary?

SAVX0287-2(1).jpg — *Can Russia become China’s strategic mercenary?*

12 October 2021

When Joe Biden won the US presidency against Donald Trump, very few expected that Washington’s relations with Moscow could get better while their relations with Beijing would get worse. Yet this is exactly what is happening now under the Biden administration. Despite labelling Vladimir Putin a “killer”, the new US president has made a number of significant moves aimed at stabilising the relationship with Russia. These include the prompt extension of a crucial strategic arms treaty with Russia, refusal to block Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany, and holding a face-to-face summit with Putin in Geneva at which the two leaders agreed on a joint statement on strategic stability and launched bilateral working-level talks on security issues.

Seeking a truce with Russia?

Biden’s approach to Russia is characterised as “cautious” and may be interpreted as an attempt to reach a mutual non-aggression pact. Cyber is apparently one major subject for the presumptive pact between the White House and the Kremlin. It may not be a coincidence that, following the Geneva summit, an allegedly Russia-linked ransomware gang behind high-profile hacks of US companies suddenly disappeared.

While seeking “stable and predictable” ties with Russia, the Biden administration offers China nothing of the sort. No non-aggression pact is being proposed to Beijing. Under Biden, Washington is essentially continuing the Trump administration’s policy of treating China as the main national security threat, the only difference being that the Biden team’s efforts to contain China are far more sophisticated and systemic.

In a nutshell, Russia could become a giant military contractor — a twenty-first-century condottiero state, and a nuclear-armed one at that. A broke but still militarily strong and audacious country that does the bidding of a rich superpower — for remuneration.

In order to concentrate on the existential challenge from China, Biden needs at least relative calm elsewhere. This is the main reason why Washington wants ‘stability and predictability’ with Moscow. However, the success of Washington's Russia stabilisation policy is not guaranteed. Even if Russia and the US manage to achieve a measure of compromise, how durable would it be? Ukraine remains the most problematic flashpoint between Russia and the US. It is unlikely that Washington would agree to recognise Ukraine as being within Russia’s security perimeter as Moscow demands. US-Russia relations will remain adversarial unless and until the Ukraine problem is resolved, and this will push Russia to seek closer strategic ties with China.

The Russia-China entente: Back to WW1?

Putin and Xi have not held a physical meeting since 2019, but the pandemic-related restrictions have hardly dampened the steady growth of the Sino-Russian ‘strategic partnership’. The two powers pompously celebrated the 20th anniversary of the bilateral 2001 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighbourliness, with Putin and Xi issuing a lengthy joint statement on that occasion. One interesting bit of the joint statement concerns the Arctic. Moscow and Beijing pledged to enhance cooperation on the Russia-controlled Northern Sea Route (NSR), but, as the statement stipulates, this should be based on "respect for the interests of the littoral state", i.e. Russia. This is the first time China explicitly acknowledged the NSR as Russia's domain.

In stark contrast to the Russia-West tussle over Ukraine, Moscow and Beijing have apparently come to a mutual understanding over the Arctic, an area that Russia considers vital for its security and identity. One can surmise that, in return for China’s recognition of Russia’s privileges in the Polar North, Russia may have agreed to acknowledge China’s interests somewhere else. That would be in accordance with the spirit of strategic transactionalism that largely guides the contemporary Sino-Russian diplomatic relationship.

Remarkably, the Putin-Xi joint statement characterised the Sino-Russian strategic partnership as a form of interstate relations which "is not a political-military alliance” but is in fact "superior" to traditional Cold War alliances. This formula was reiterated by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov who, meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, pointed out that Russia-China relations are “not similar to a military and political alliance in the Cold War era, but a new type of state-to-state relations that transcends that model”.

However, the mode of the present-day Sino-Russian alignment may not be that new after all. It strongly resembles some of the great power alignments that existed more than a century ago, specifically the Triple Entente of Russia, Great Britain and France. Like the contemporary Sino-Russian strategic partnership, the Triple Entente was not based on a mutual defence treaty, but on informal understandings and the shared purpose of countering their mutual main adversary: the German Empire. Whereas the German-led Triple Alliance collapsed (with Italy reneging on its obligations toward Germany and Austria at the outbreak of World War I), the Entente endured. If only for these historical analogies, the Moscow-Beijing entente that is now shaping up should not be underestimated.

Russia’s military prowess in exchange for renminbi?

A great power entente can only exist when its participants are more or less equal in strength. For the next ten years or so, Russia will likely maintain rough strategic parity with China. But in the long run that may become increasingly problematic as China is set to emerge as a full-fledged superpower while Russia will struggle to retain great power status.

The state of the economy will be a key factor determining both Russia’s status in the global hierarchy and the character of Moscow’s future relationship with Beijing. Russia’s GDP growth has been stagnating for almost a decade and the decarbonisation of the global economy poses an existential threat to Moscow’s coffers. Russia’s top officials, albeit not Putin himself, have lately increasingly voiced concerns about expected major revenue losses due to a global push toward renewable energy and a subsequent fall in demand for fossil fuels. Alexei Kudrin, Russia's former finance minister and now the chief of the Accounts Chamber, warns that by 2030, Russian oil may sell substantially cheaper. Unless Russia manages to reinvent its carbon-based economic model, the country may face a severe budget crunch around the late 2030s and early 2040s.

Even if Russia’s hydrocarbons become worthless, Russia will still possess something which is always in demand in international relations — military might. Two decades from now, Russia will likely remain a formidable military player. Why not try and convert Russia’s military prowess as well as its pivotal geostrategic position into money? China could become the main customer, generously paying Russia to perform military missions Beijing is unwilling, or unable, to undertake on its own.

There are various ways Russia could serve as a mercenary for China. For example, Beijing could ask Moscow to amass Russian troops on the borders with the Baltic or Nordic countries to put the US on high alert in the European theatre and keep it this way as long as possible. Another creative option would involve Russian forces harassing Alaska which is just across the Bering Sea. Russian units could even be hired by China for expeditionary missions in places like the Middle East or Africa.

Russian private military companies’ activities in some of the world’s flashpoints may already offer a hint of what Moscow may be up to under the envisioned scenario. In a nutshell, Russia could become a giant military contractor — a twenty-first-century condottiero state, and a nuclear-armed one at that. A broke but still militarily strong and audacious country that does the bidding of a rich superpower — for remuneration. Sounds a bit medieval? Perhaps. But isn't it often said that global politics may be entering the New Middle Ages, marked by the ragtag multitude of players, brutal competition, and complex hierarchies?

Of course, the above scenario is hypothetical. But it is not entirely fantastical. Ten years ago, who could have thought that an American president would demand that allies pay protection money to the US? Yet this is what happened under Donald Trump and might reoccur under a future US president. The good news is that the incumbent Russian president is certainly not a guy to make his country a mercenary state. For all his seeming audacity, Putin is rather conventional and conservative, at least by the standards of Russian political culture. But those who come after Putin could be less orthodox and more out of the box.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Artyom Lukin is an Associate Professor at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University, in Vladivostok on Russia’s Pacific coast. He is an expert with the Russian International Affairs Council and the Valdai International Discussion Club. He is also a frequent commentator for Russian and international news media. His articles and interviews have appeared in major media outlets, including RT, South China Morning Post, Washington Post, Huffington Post, BBC, CNN, Stratfor. Image credit: Wikipedia.