Building a safe shared future for the People’s Republic of China

Building a safe shared future for the People’s Republic of China


WRITTEN BY DR SARI ARHO HAVRÉN

8 November 2023

Much has been written in recent years about China’s challenge to the existing global order and Xi’s vision for the world. But what exactly is this alternative that Beijing is offering? Back in 2013, Xi Jinping called for building a community with a shared future for mankind. This conceptual framework embodies the idea of a new international order that reflects the governing principles of the People’s Republic of China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Now, a decade later, Beijing has formally released its proposal for a novel global order, titled Proposal of the People's Republic of China on the Reform and Development of Global Governance.

The conceptualisation of a new global order is not solely attributable to Xi Jinping but dates back to at least as early as 1997 when the leaders of China and Russia formalised their aspirations through the Joint Declaration on the Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order. This document, some twenty-six years ago, openly articulated the desire to change the existing global order, and — while not naming it directly — replace the role of the United States in it. It further delineated their shared strategy of gravitating towards the global south to facilitate this transformation, ultimately pursuing the strategic objectives of China and Russia, although their interests were not and are not entirely congruent. Recently, Xi Jinping’s ‘friend without limits’, Russian President Vladimir Putin, promoted this emerging new world order in October 2023 during his address at the Valdai think tank’s event in Sochi.

China has already made considerable progress in planting the seeds of an international order that would make the future safe for its one-party rule at home by insulating it from outside threats.

For the Chinese Communist Party, success in planting a global order that mirrors the goals and core interests of the Party is pivotal for three reasons. First, it will make the world safe for the one-party rule at home, immunising it against external influences or transnational movements, such as the spread of so-called ‘colour revolutions’, that might seek to challenge the prevailing political equilibrium. Second, it serves the Communist Party’s decades-old strategy to replace the US’ role in the global order and drive the US into isolation across the seas. Finally, establishing a ‘secure’ global order serves as an indispensable precursor to realising the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese state by 2049, positioning China as the preeminent global power.

China is not the torch bearer of the multipolar order

While some voices continue to counter the notion that Xi has a grand strategic plan for changing the global order, and others question China’s actual capacity to effectuate such a transformation, it is imperative to acknowledge that China has already made decisive and successful steps in pursuing its objective — and achieved considerable wins. The recent proposition concerning the novel global order states how the community with a shared future for mankind has “grown from an idea to action and a vision to reality” (emphasis added).

Beijing’s stepping stone to a ‘new era’ is multipolarity. Various countries and regional blocs aspiring to foster a multipolar world often confuse Beijing’s wording with that of their own strategic interests. Multipolarity serves as an aspirational architectural framework for actors confronting the challenges of diminishing global influence. This notably includes the European Union, Russia, Germany, and France, all of whom seek to revitalise their global standing. Concurrently, it is appealing for emerging powers like India, Brazil, and others who harbour ambitions of bolstering their own influence on the global stage.

All of them want to believe that a multipolar world is what China genuinely advocates, and that, with China’s weight, they stand to reap significant advantages from its realisation. During this period of protracted systemic instability, China adeptly leverages the principle of multipolarity to strategically allure ‘swing states’ under its clout. It offers a needed ideational base to attract the global south to its side by offering itself as a powerful counterbalancing force against the United States. In consonance with Xi Jinping’s guiding ideology, the Chinese government has been offering building blocks to establish this new order — which is sold as a multipolar one but is in essence advancing an order that primarily fosters the goals of the Chinese Communist Party.

As early as 2013, Xi Jinping linked the Belt and Road Initiative as a key pillar in propelling mankind toward a ‘shared future’. Since then, Xi in conjunction with the Party has introduced a series of supplementary components aimed at advancing the overarching objective of changing the global order. These components encompassed three distinct initiatives, namely those focused on global development, global security, and global civilisation. Collectively, these pillars and initiatives have been bundled together in Beijing’s official September 2023 proposal for a new global order. Prominent Chinese officials, including Fu Cong, the Chinese Ambassador to the European Union, have strongly encouraged others to study this proposal “to better understand the significance of the vision”.

China’s proposal for a new global order – So what?

China’s September blueprint does not shy away from stating that it provides a solution for common challenges. In reiterating the foundational pillars and principles of Xi Jinping’s paradigm for global governance, the proposal introduces novel nuances and concurrently solidifies Beijing’s position on some issues, most notably Russia’s war against Ukraine, which remains simply a crisis in Beijing’s books.

China’s perspective regarding the root cause of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains unchanged. This is reflected by its implicit alignment with Russia, arguing that the European security architecture does not accommodate the security concerns of all parties. The finger points once again towards the United States and a ‘Cold War mentality’ that is fed by ‘ganging up’ parties. In a similar vein, China’s approach towards the Palestinian issue reiterates its enduring commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. Following the brutal Hamas attack on Israel, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s official statement aligned meticulously with the position articulated in its proposal for global governance. Similar to 2021 — when Israel bombed Gaza and Beijing singled out Israel — in October 2023, China refrained from condemning Hamas’ actions but has called out those of Israel.

The recent proposal indicates a possible potential departure from its nuclear policy dating back to 1964 in one aspect. The nuclear policy explicitly outlines that China would neither be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances nor threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon states. While the principled stance against the use of nuclear weapons was reaffirmed as late as August 2023, it has been omitted from the new global governance proposal. This raises questions about whether China has indeed changed its nuclear posture along with abandoning its minimum deterrent strategy by increasing its count of nuclear weapons with unprecedented speed.

China’s severe domestic economic situation radiates into its aspiration to reform global governance. Beijing is working hard to enhance its international economic security and facilitate access to critical resources, including advanced technology, semiconductors, materials, and the preservation of supply chain resilience, all of which are of paramount significance to its economic viability. The major pillar for advancing its economic goals is encapsulated within the Global Development Initiative (GDI). Similarly, China has successfully advanced its goals in the United Nations by adopting a multifaceted approach encompassing personnel deployment, financial contributions, shaping the language of official documentation, and aligning votes. It is now building upon this success and proposing synergy between the GDI and the UN Development Agenda to achieve interconnected development. The prospective merging of the GDI into the UN’s agenda represents yet another strategic triumph in the promotion of China’s leadership within the global order operating under the auspices of the United Nations.

Unsurprisingly, the proposal ardently advocates free trade and promoting open scientific and technological domains, while concurrently taking a staunch stance against protectionism. Beijing also underscores the necessity of respecting the distinct development paths of different nations, implicitly suggesting that China should be allowed to build its own economic security system without being obstructed from accessing vital resources.

New frontiers – China’s vision for the future

An emerging realm in which Beijing is vying to take a leading role is technology governance. In the October 2023 Belt and Road Forum, China drew directly from its proposal blueprint and introduced another building block of its new global order, known as the Global AI Governance Initiative — a framework for regulating and managing Artificial Intelligence (AI). The proposal is as vague and ambivalent as China’s initiatives typically are, leaving space for Beijing to explore options, navigate, and exploit the evolving shifts that are taking place in international relations. Nonetheless, the Global AI Governance Initiative serves as a foundational platform for disseminating China’s preferred narratives and positioning them as the paradigmatic standard. This is done by asserting that AI technology should not be exploited for the purposes of manipulating public opinion, spreading disinformation, or intervening in other countries’ internal affairs. In addition, the Initiative underscores the importance of controllability, a concept which in the form of stringent censorship, could potentially place Beijing at a disadvantage in global competition in the absence of universally accepted global regulations that could level the playing field to China’s advantage.

The other new frontiers of global governance highlighted within China’s proposal are the deep sea, polar regions, outer space, cyberspace, and digital technology. Make no mistake, these are the areas Beijing has set its eyes on, and as forthcoming major conferences and big fora unfold, new global initiatives — pillars of China-led global order — will surely follow. China has already made considerable progress in planting the seeds of an international order that would make the future safe for its one-party rule at home by insulating it from outside threats. Simultaneously, however, it faces escalating resistance, particularly from Western democracies, which find themselves increasingly at odds with China’s global aspirations.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Sari Arho Havrén is a RUSI Associate Fellow based in Brussels. She specialises in China’s foreign relations, China foresight, and great power competition. She is also a visiting scholar at the University of Helsinki. A certified futurist, she previously lived in mainland China and Hong Kong for 15 years, working in private and public sectors, including in Chinese organisations. Image credit: Wikimedia/Kremlin.