Branding is the Quad’s biggest problem

Branding is the Quad’s biggest problem  

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WRITTEN BY HAYLEY CHANNER AND ELLA PARKER

30 August 2021

This past week off the coast of Guam, the Indian, American, Japanese, and Australian navies participated in Exercise Malabar. Having the navies of the four ‘Quad’ countries operating in our region brings the strategic Quad grouping, and so-called ‘Quad Plus’, back into focus. Quad Plus is being used to refer to any multilateral group that involves the US, Japan, Australia, and India ‘plus’ other countries. However, while it may seem like semantics, interested stakeholders must avoid referring to multilateralism as ‘Quad Plus’. Here’s why: the Quad name is politicised and negatively associated; ASEAN support for the Quad itself could diminish; and, it relegates the ‘plus’ countries to a lower rather than equal status.

At the inaugural Leaders’ Summit in March, the Quad expanded its agenda from a focus on maritime security to cooperation in non-traditional security areas including health, via COVID-19 vaccines, climate change and critical technology. This broader remit necessitates working with a wider array of partners to realise its goals, and the Quad has already started doing this. In early 2020, the Quad countries met at the Senior Official-level with South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand, and in mid-2020, they met at the Foreign Minister-level with Brazil, Israel, and South Korea to share information and coordinate responses on the COVID-19 pandemic. However, calling arrangements like these ‘Quad Plus’ — while useful shorthand — could have the unintended consequence of discouraging future Indo-Pacific multilateral security frameworks involving the Quad nations.

The ‘Quad’ name attracts China’s ire

‘Quad Plus’ is frequently referred to by think tanks and analysts in public commentary and government officials use the term in private. But the ‘Quad’ brand carries a lot of baggage. Heaviest of all is persistent claims from China — with some cut-through — that the Quad is an “anti-Beijing club”. Due to this association, regardless of the nature of the security cooperation, any collaboration under the Quad Plus banner could be seen as a growing front against China. As many potential Quad partners hope to foster an inclusive regional order, they are less likely to want to sign up to an arrangement that both antagonises and excludes China.

Importantly, labelling additional members as ‘plus’ countries automatically relegates them to a lower status than full-membership countries, creating the impression that they are add-ons rather than equal partners.

Moreover, the economic, security or political consequences China could inflict on countries seen to be supporting the framework has the effect of warning-off interest. With many nations in the region dependent on China as their primary trade partner or vulnerable to Chinese physical or political coercion, joining any arrangement linked with the Quad becomes unattractive.

Take South Korea, for example. South Korea has frequently been mooted as a likely ‘Quad Plus’ partner and, while it has already worked multilaterally with Quad countries and others, Seoul may be dissuaded from joining something called ‘Quad Plus’ if it is the only additional nation. This is because China is South Korea’s largest trading partner and Beijing plays a pivotal role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. As such, if South Korea were to work with the Quad nations more frequently and in areas outside of responding to the COVID-19 crisis, there are several punitory policy levers Beijing could pull.

The Quad name is also tainted by a chequered history of meetings followed by disbandment. As a result, it has lost some credibility and exposed itself to criticism that its members lack conviction. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it, “they are like sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean: they get some attention but will soon dissipate”. Other countries participating in a ‘Quad Plus’ arrangement would unavoidably entangle themselves with the Quad framework including its credibility or lack thereof, its perceived staying power, and the likelihood of success. ‘Quad Plus’ sets false expectations for the intentions and credibility of multilateral frameworks that include Quad countries but are otherwise completely unrelated.

Regional countries are likely to reject ‘Quad Plus’

Another reason to avoid ‘Quad Plus’ is because it could communicate, wrongly, to ASEAN the Quad is expanding and may come to dominate multilateral frameworks in the region, threatening ASEAN’s prized centrality. Although views differ between Southeast Asian nations, the region largely rejects the idea of an expanded Quad. Some ASEAN member states are concerned an expanded Quad may be more likely to reduce the significance of ASEAN related bodies, side-lining existing forums and institutions. This is an important dynamic to manage, as keeping ASEAN on-side is critical to the Quad shaping the whole Indo-Pacific region towards its interests and encouraging adoption of its preferred values and norms of behaviour.

Importantly, labelling additional members as ‘plus’ countries automatically relegates them to a lower status than full-membership countries, creating the impression that they are add-ons rather than equal partners. This could reduce the motivation of countries to collaborate with the Quad, particularly when considered in conjunction with the other associated risks. Countries interested in working with the Quad are often motivated by a desire to gain influence in the Indo-Pacific and develop middle power status. However, as a ‘plus’ country they may be perceived as supporting and subservient to Quad priorities rather than their own.

Forming new multilateral frameworks in the Indo-Pacific to respond to specific challenges will be an important value-add to the regional security architecture. However, the politicisation and negative association around the Quad, the potential to alienate ASEAN and some of its members, and unequal status of ‘plus’ nations mean there is every reason to avoid using the Quad name for anything outside of cooperation involving Australia, the US, Japan and India. In practice, Quad nations should actively discourage references to ‘Quad Plus’ and disassociate the Quad from other forms of multilateralism.

By definition, anything more than four is no longer a quad.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Hayler Channer is a Senior Policy Fellow and Ella Parker is a Research Intern at the Perth USAsia Centre, an independent foreign affairs think tank based in Perth, Australia. Image credit: Wikimedia.