Balancing the peninsula: Indonesia’s diplomacy between the two Koreas

27 October 2025

Indonesia’s diplomacy is entering a more assertive phase, defined by an ambition to balance relations among competing powers, including North and South Korea, rather than align with any. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Indonesian Foreign Minister’s visit to Pyongyang on 11 October 2025, which coincided with North Korea’s 80th Workers’ Party anniversary parade, as well as Indonesia’s own 80th Armed Forces Day.

This rapprochement, however, has raised concerns in Seoul regarding the KF-21 fighter jet — a joint 4.5-generation aircraft co-developed by Indonesia and South Korea — prompting questions about whether Jakarta’s ties to Pyongyang could put Seoul’s security at risk. Indonesia now finds itself navigating the delicate balance between two opposing Koreas, and the success of its free and active foreign policy doctrine will depend on its ability to engage Pyongyang without jeopardising strategic ties with Seoul.

Jakarta’s warm ties with Pyongyang and robust relations with Seoul

Indonesia and North Korea have maintained cordial relations since the Cold War, establishing diplomatic ties in 1964 as part of Jakarta’s non-aligned foreign policy. North Korea maintains its embassy in Jakarta, and after a COVID-19 shutdown, Indonesia reopened its Pyongyang embassy in July 2025. Nevertheless, trade between the two countries remains limited, with official data showing a decrease from USD 2.3 million in the first eight months of 2024 to USD 2.1 million over the same period in 2025.

Jakarta has never been aimless in its approach to the Koreas — it seeks to de-escalate tensions on the peninsula by keeping dialogue alive, even with an isolated Pyongyang, while simultaneously deepening cooperation with a democratic Seoul and its Western allies.

By contrast, Indonesia’s ties with South Korea, as like-minded middle powers, have been robust and steadily deepening since 1973. The two countries formalised a strategic partnership in 2006, which was upgraded in 2017 to a Special Strategic Partnership focused on defence cooperation, infrastructure development, people-to-people exchanges, and broader global collaboration. The 2020 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, furthermore, has helped maintain significant trade between the two nations, which reached about USD 18.37 billion in 2024, making Seoul one of Jakarta’s key partners in East Asia.

Unlike Indonesia’s friendly relations with both countries, North and South Korea continue to maintain an adversarial and largely stagnant relationship, with the peninsula experiencing occasional détente but more frequent escalations since the 1950-53 Korean War armistice.

Despite ongoing tensions, efforts at reconciliation continue. In September 2025, President Lee Jae-myung told the UN General Assembly that Seoul would work to reduce military tensions and pursue phased denuclearisation, but Kim Jong Un dismissed partial measures as insincere, insisting that Pyongyang will not give up nuclear weapons without guarantees. In this context, Indonesia’s move to revive ties with North Korea is, therefore, a deliberate effort to position itself as a balancing actor in the Korean Peninsula.

How far can Indonesia engage the two Koreas?

Indonesia has embarked on a major defence build-up since President Prabowo took office in 2024. During its recent military anniversary parade, Jakarta showcased domestic and imported systems — notably unveiling its first autonomous unmanned submarine, the KSOT-008, which signals a clear intent to strengthen undersea and maritime capabilities. The country, likewise, has expanded and diversified its arms procurement, sourcing equipment and technology from a wide range of partners including France, Turkey, Russia, the United Kingdom, India, Italy, China, and most notably, South Korea.

A key piece of this modernisation is the Indonesia-South Korea KF-21 Boramae fighter project. Jakarta initially committed to funding about 20 per cent of the KRW 8.1 trillion programme in exchange for 48 advanced aircraft and significant technology transfer. Repeated delays in payments, nevertheless, forced Seoul and Jakarta to renegotiate the deal — leaving Indonesia contributing roughly one-third of its initial commitment and receiving fewer transfer rights — which undermined South Korea’s confidence in Indonesia.

Indonesia’s quiet return to Pyongyang, though only formalised through a Memorandum of Understanding for a bilateral consultation mechanism covering political, socio-cultural, technical, and sports cooperation, has nonetheless heightened Seoul’s concern due to their potential “grey-zone” cooperation. And while the South Korean Defense Acquisition Programme Administration affirmed that all KF-21 related data remains secure under strict agreements, Indonesia’s history of weakness in managing sensitive information and past sabotage incidents might drive Seoul to rethink its partnerships and limit the transfer of critical defence capabilities to Jakarta.

As one of South Korea’s major trade and defence partners, Indonesia must walk a fine line by reassuring Seoul and its Western allies that the renewal of Indonesia-North Korea ties remains limited to UN-sanctioned parameters and is conducted with full transparency, and is not driven by anti-Western alignment but by sovereign pragmatism. South Korea, conversely, must calibrate its response carefully and avoid overreacting, as any excessive pressure is likely to push Jakarta closer to the other side.

Indonesia and ASEAN as mediators

At this critical juncture, there is speculation over whether Indonesia can act as a mediator between the two Koreas, though this remains unlikely for now. Indonesia has no formal influence over Pyongyang, and Seoul’s own handling of the relationship remains driven by alliance dynamics with the United States. A crisis on the peninsula would ultimately be decided by major powers.

Be that as it may, with Indonesia widely perceived as the de facto leader within ASEAN, its opportunity lies in leveraging the region to facilitate engagement with the two Koreas. Jakarta is signalling openness to North Korea-ASEAN engagement through the ASEAN Regional Forum, where Seoul and other key influential actors already participate. Over time, this approach could lay the groundwork for an ASEAN–Koreas summit involving North and South Korea, which would establish a structured regional dialogue mainly on security and economic issues.

Another critical question is how ASEAN members would react. The ASEAN bloc remains committed to diplomacy and adherence to UN rules, as demonstrated at the November 2024 ASEAN Summit, in which member states expressed “grave concern” regarding North Korea’s missile testing and repeated demands for compliance with UN resolutions. Moreover, ASEAN is also wary of North Korea’s reported involvement of troops in the Russia–Ukraine conflict that risks destabilising the broader Indo-Pacific region and undermining ASEAN-led security efforts.

Southeast Asia is likely to take a positive view given North Korea’s deliberate efforts to re-establish contact with the region in recent years. Vietnam and Laos, specifically, have sustained high-level party-to-party interactions, while for Thailand and Singapore, 2025 marks the 50th anniversary of formal relations with Pyongyang. Furthermore, although the 2025 ASEAN Chair, Malaysia, and the 2026 Chair, the Philippines, have no official ties with North Korea, they, along with other ASEAN member states, are likely to be cautiously receptive to engagement that reinforces regional stability, provided it stays within certain lines.

Indonesia’s middle power role through free and active foreign policy

While some may portray Indonesia as caught in a strategic dilemma over the Koreas, as it stands, it is far from being so. Indonesia is following a long-held playbook of non-alignment diplomacy, and with Prabowo’s hands-on, proactive, and assertive foreign policy posture, the country is likely to engage both Koreas in a calculated manner aimed at regional stability. Jakarta has never been aimless in its approach to the Koreas — it seeks to de-escalate tensions on the peninsula by keeping dialogue alive, even with an isolated Pyongyang, while simultaneously deepening cooperation with a democratic Seoul and its Western allies.

By taking a measured approach, Indonesia can ultimately maintain confidence in its strategic autonomy while preserving good relations with both North and South Korea. In the event of future escalation on the Korean Peninsula, Indonesia will not take sides but will instead keep communication lines open and serve as a neutral bridge — though not a significant one — between the two Koreas. With that in mind, Jakarta may indeed inch toward playing a constructive middle role, but only as long as its actions remain transparent and grounded in the norms upheld by the UN and ASEAN.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Geo Dzakwan Arshali is Undergraduate Student in International Affais Management at School of International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia, and Research Intern (Regional Security Architecture Programme) with Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). He is concurrently an Emerging Leaders Fellow at FACTS Asia and Senior Analyst & Programme Manager at World Order Lab. Image credit: AI Generated.