Beyond symbolism: Why Indonesia needs China expertise to match its ambition
Beyond Symbolism: Why Indonesia Needs China Expertise to Match Its Ambition
WRITTEN BY DR MUHAMMAD ZULFIKAR RAKHMAT
23 October 2025
Indonesia has just made a highly unusual move in its diplomacy: appointing a vice ambassador to China. Earlier this month in Jakarta, President Prabowo Subianto swore in Irene — an Indonesian politician and medical doctor — as deputy chief of mission in Beijing, alongside ten new ambassadors to other countries. The creation of this post is striking because Indonesia has rarely appointed a vice ambassador before. The decision says much about how Jakarta now sees China — not just as a neighbour, but as a country whose relationship requires a level of attention and institutional presence unlike any other.
A relationship that has outgrown the old model
For decades, Indonesia’s diplomacy has operated on a lean model. Even in major capitals, embassies were typically headed by a single ambassador, supported by a modest team of foreign service officers. That approach made sense when Indonesia’s foreign policy was largely inward-looking, focused on regional stability and domestic development.
But China has changed the equation. Today, Beijing is Indonesia’s largest trading partner, top source of investment, and a critical player in infrastructure and technology projects across the archipelago. Chinese companies bankroll nickel smelters in Sulawesi, high-speed railways in Java, and hydropower plants in Kalimantan. The two countries are also negotiating maritime boundaries and navigating sensitive issues in the South China Sea. Simply put, China now touches nearly every dimension of Indonesia’s economy and security.
In this context, the workload at Indonesia’s embassy in Beijing has markedly increased. The embassy coordinates with three consulates — in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong — with a fourth reportedly planned. Tens of thousands of Indonesians live, study, and work in China, generating a heavy consular burden. There are also layers of political and economic engagement that must be managed simultaneously — from joint research programs and student exchanges to complex investment disputes. As Foreign Minister Sugiono put it, “China is a very large country, and the workload is significant”, justifying the new deputy role.
From political symbolism to policy substance
So far, so good. Creating the position makes sense. The question, however, is whether Indonesia will use this new role to strengthen institutional capacity or to continue the long-standing habit of political appointments that prioritise loyalty over expertise.
Irene’s appointment has raised eyebrows in Jakarta and beyond. Her rise within Prabowo’s Gerindra Party has been closely tied to political patronage rather than foreign policy credentials. To be clear, her appointment carries symbolic weight: she hails from Indonesia’s easternmost region, a part of the country often underrepresented in national institutions. Her presence in Beijing can thus be seen as a gesture of inclusivity and national diversity. Yet symbolism alone cannot substitute for the kind of deep, specialised knowledge that effective diplomacy with China now demands.
Indonesia’s foreign service, though respected in ASEAN, has not fully kept pace with the demands of a world where China is central to trade, technology, and security. Without a cadre of China specialists embedded across government and academia, Jakarta risks responding to events rather than shaping them.
In 2025, Indonesia’s engagement with China has become too complex to be managed by generalists or political loyalists alone. Beijing’s bureaucracy operates through layers of formality, hierarchy, and coded language. Understanding China’s political system, strategic ambitions, and economic statecraft requires sustained study and institutional memory. None of this can be improvised. Yet Indonesia’s foreign service remains thinly staffed with China specialists. Few diplomats are fluent in Mandarin, and even fewer have spent time embedded in China’s academic, economic, or political circles. This lack of “China literacy” is not unique to the foreign ministry — it runs through much of Indonesia’s political establishment.
Building China literacy, not just managing China
This is where the new vice ambassador position could have represented a turning point. By appointing a career diplomat or a seasoned China hand, Jakarta could have signalled that it understands the strategic importance of institutional expertise. Instead, the choice reinforces a pattern in which political loyalty continues to outweigh competence. The irony is that the very creation of the role recognised that China is too important to be handled through business as usual — yet the appointment risks perpetuating precisely that mindset.
Indonesia needs a deliberate strategy for building China expertise across its institutions. That begins with human capital investment: expanding Mandarin language training, supporting graduate studies and professional exchanges in China, and creating a pipeline of civil servants who can engage Beijing with confidence and nuance. The foreign ministry already established a dedicated foreign service officer for China Affairs, but rather than consisting of generalists, it must comprise a multidisciplinary team that draws expertise from economists, strategists, and cultural scholars to provide analysis for decision-makers in Jakarta.
Other ASEAN states, such as Singapore and Vietnam, have long invested in such institutionalised knowledge. Indonesia, with its growing regional ambitions, cannot afford to lag behind.
A regional responsibility
Beyond the bureaucracy, Indonesia’s universities, think tanks, and media have a vital role in cultivating a more sophisticated understanding of China. Public debates too often swing between uncritical enthusiasm for investment and reflexive suspicion over sovereignty or labour, leaving little room for nuanced policy discussion. A more informed discourse would help policymakers craft strategies that attract Chinese capital while protecting Indonesia’s autonomy and aligning cooperation with national priorities.
If Indonesia aspires to regional leadership, this knowledge gap cannot persist. Establishing a National Center for China Studies — anchored at a leading university and linked to key ministries — could bridge the divide between analysis and policy. Such an institution could study China’s economic practices and Belt and Road projects while training a new generation of diplomats and scholars fluent in Mandarin and policy analysis.
Civil society and the media must also play their part. Better training, exchange programs, and collaboration with regional counterparts could foster more balanced, evidence-based reporting on China. Likewise, partnerships among ASEAN think tanks — from Singapore to Vietnam — could help develop a shared regional perspective on managing China’s growing influence.
As ASEAN’s leading power, Indonesia’s approach to China regularly sets the tone for the region. Jakarta has long sought to engage Beijing without being dominated by it. To do so credibly, it must strengthen not only its diplomatic capacity but also its intellectual infrastructure. The vice ambassador post in Beijing should be the start of a broader professionalisation of Indonesia’s China policy — not an isolated experiment in political symbolism.
Ultimately, leadership in this era of great-power competition will depend not on who attracts the most investment, but on who understands China best. Building that understanding requires sustained investment in people and institutions — an effort that will define Indonesia’s diplomacy for decades to come.
A missed opportunity — and a call to rebuild
Indonesia’s recognition that China deserves a special institutional focus is a step forward. It signals that Jakarta understands the magnitude of its relationship with Beijing and the need for a stronger, more permanent presence to manage it. Yet symbolism and structure will count for little without the matching substance of competence and continuity. The coming years will test whether Indonesia can move from ad hoc, personality-driven diplomacy toward a more coherent, knowledge-based China policy — one that is not merely reactive or transactional, but informed and sustainable.
Irene’s appointment should thus be viewed less as an isolated controversy and more as a reflection of a deeper institutional weakness. Indonesia’s foreign service, though respected in ASEAN, has not fully kept pace with the demands of a world where China is central to trade, technology, and security. Without a cadre of China specialists embedded across government and academia, Jakarta risks responding to events rather than shaping them.
This is not to say that political figures have no place in diplomacy — representation and diversity matter, especially in a country as plural as Indonesia. But those values must complement, not replace, technical expertise. A more effective approach would pair symbolic appointments with mechanisms that ensure professional knowledge remains central — through mentorship, targeted training, and closer coordination between ministries and embassies.
As China’s role in the Indo-Pacific deepens and Prabowo’s administration seeks a larger global voice, the stakes could not be higher. Diplomacy with Beijing demands more than presence — it requires preparation, literacy, and institutional courage. If Indonesia can invest in those capacities, it will not only manage its China challenge more effectively but also set a new standard for ASEAN diplomacy — leading not through symbolism, but through knowledge, professionalism, and strategic confidence.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Athor biography
Dr Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the Director of the China–Indonesia Desk at the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS) in Jakarta. Image credit: AI Generated Image via ChatGPT.