A perfect storm of crises: Afghanistan in 2022

17 February 2022

Two years ago, I speculated on America’s legacy in Afghanistan. I projected ahead twenty years, to an Afghanistan where the war was over and former Taliban fighters (now Afghan government officials) lightly ribbed an incoming US ambassador on the US’s counter-insurgency failings in the 2001-2021 era. It seems we are still on track for this scenario, although not entirely in the way I foresaw.

President Biden, on taking office last year, inherited a limp and inept “agreement” with the Taliban from the outgoing and indifferent Trump administration. Biden’s dilemma was unenviable. Sticking to the rushed and imbalanced plan would concede much to the Taliban for little in return. Reneging on the deal would likely see a large-scale return to violence. Neither prospect was appetising.

Biden, a known sceptic of the long-term US commitment in Afghanistan, stuck with the deal. He was rewarded by a rapid collapse of the Ghani government. There was to be no “figleaf” of even a few months’ delay to allow the US to withdraw in good order. The raft of ‘helicopters evacuating from the embassy’ photographs compounded the humiliation.

America retreated into an uncooperative stance, freezing billions of dollars of Afghan central bank reserves. Unlocking these crucial banking assets has proven difficult. President Biden’s most recent decision involves returning only half of the USD 7 billion of frozen funds and pointedly distributing the other half to the victims of 9/11. This appears to punish Afghans for the crimes of Osama Bin Laden.

The Taliban’s seizure of power and the sheer speed of government collapse took everyone by surprise, including the Taliban themselves. The international community, Afghanistan’s neighbourhood and — often unforgivably overlooked — the Afghan population themselves, are now attempting to understand and address the implications of a Taliban regime. Although most of the fighting has stopped, the security situation in the country is unstable and dangerous. Reliable information is limited: many journalists have fled or are being aggressively intimidated. There is only a minimal international presence on the ground.

Harsh realities

The Taliban have formed a government that they describe as “interim”, without offering a credible definition of the term. Its composition looks unappetising. Ministerial positions are entirely biased towards Taliban members, religious leaders, and the Pashtun ethnic group from which the majority of the Taliban come. Many are on international terrorist sanctions lists. There are no women in any government positions and the Taliban have made it unambiguously clear that women will not have such posts. The strict enforcement of Sharia law remains at the core of the Taliban’s beliefs. Many social, ethnic, gender, and religious groups in Afghanistan are now excluded and fearful about repressive and extreme treatment from the Taliban.

The Taliban have formed a government that they describe as “interim”, without offering a credible definition of the term. Its composition looks unappetising.

Functioning government is limited. There are numerous and highly credible reports of Taliban revenge attacks and killings against a wide range of groups and individuals, in particular those who worked for or supported the previous government. Individuals have been abducted in Kabul in the boots of unmarked cars at gunpoint by armed men in plain clothes.

Afghanistan is in a state of economic and societal turmoil. Humanitarian issues, including drought, famine, food insecurity, population displacement, and unemployment — all in the offing long before the Taliban took power — have reached “perfect storm” proportions. A “brain drain” of those seeking to flee the Taliban is likely to make it hard for the Taliban to get the country on an even keel. Violence, instability, and humanitarian challenges will continue to impact Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.

Is renewed fighting inevitable?

Does this inevitably lead to a new civil war? There are arguments on both sides. The “yes” side of the fence will point to the messy internal strife and economic crises of the 1990s, and see it as the natural prologue to further conflict. The Taliban will prove unable to run a modern government, the argument will go. They will overly rely on repression as they exclude large parts of society (a common fault of ‘winning sides’ in Afghanistan’s recent history). A loose coalition of armed local warlords, harnessing local grievances, will inevitably rise in opposition. Neighbouring (and perhaps not-so-neighbouring) countries will choose sides and provide money, recognition, and weapons.

The potential for such resistance already exists. Local political, religious, and warlord figures are accustomed to tactical shifts of allegiance and biding their time after a sudden reverse of fortune. In response to low-level friction between rival Taliban groups in Faryab province in January, the Uzbek warlord (and former vice president of Afghanistan) Abdul Rashid Dostum, has already called for the people to mobilise, claiming that the fall of the Taliban is very close. This is jumping the gun, to say the very least. But if you are a warlord, perhaps you tend to see an armed uprising as the solution to every problem.

The emergence of the National Resistance Front (NRF) is another example of the assumption that the ‘solution’ to the Taliban comes from more violence. The NRF announced its creation shortly after Kabul fell, stating resistance would continue against the Taliban from the Panjshir Valley. Ahmed Massoud, the NRF leader, dresses exactly like his father Ahmed Shah Massoud, a legendary Afghan resistance leader. He is cultured, well-educated, and trained at Sandhurst, the British Army’s officer training centre.

With the Taliban now functioning as government forces, anti-Taliban movements like the NRF can once again become Mujahideen fighters like their fathers once were, hopping from rock to rock, RPGs and Stingers in hand. But the movement and its leader are largely untested. Besides, there is danger in copying a move from history in very different circumstances. Resistance in the Panjshir petered out within weeks, and the Taliban now control the province. Massoud — alongside Amrullah Saleh, another former old regime vice president — are believed to be in exile in Tajikistan, watching and waiting.

The case against the likelihood of a collapse back into wider fighting perhaps starts with the one factor strongly working in the Taliban’s favour. However the fighting ended, after 40 years, most of the population have welcomed the absence of conflict. They have the opportunity to rebuild houses, work their land (including clearing it of mines and unexploded weapons), and be less concerned about improvised explosive devices and airstrikes. The sheer scale of the humanitarian crisis — with millions at risk of severe malnutrition and people selling body parts and children to afford food — is probably dominating most other considerations. Widespread fighting looks unlikely over the next few years.

But you do not have to look far to find other strains of resistance against the Taliban. The Islamic State remains active and capable, routinely launching attacks against the Taliban regime, particularly in the east of the country. Women are also protesting in a way that was never seen before — for human rights, women’s rights, the rights of girls to go to school and to work how they please. The Taliban are responding by targeting, attacking and “disappearing” them.

Bleak prospects

Much depends upon how the Taliban decide to wield power in the wake of their sudden victory. They may reach reconciliation with ex-members of the last government in the form of a power-sharing deal. That, together with some Taliban concessions on human rights, represents the ideal for much of the international community. Some of the least pleasant sides of the Taliban’s character might be mitigated. This currently looks unlikely. At present, the Taliban have the initiative and total control. Compromise is not on the agenda. They have slipped naturally into the dictatorial practises that any authoritarian ruler would recognise: they deny, denounce and deflect bringers of bad news while employing state-sanctioned intimidation and violence against critics and demonstrators.

Six months in, it is already clear that the Taliban are struggling to run a diverse (and even modern) state like Afghanistan. They demonstrate neither the skills nor the interest to do so. Pushing forward with a harsh interpretation of Sharia trumps other considerations. The leadership may squabble further when they realise that repression and propaganda are insufficient to compensate for economic inability. In the months and years to come, anti-Taliban resistance may come from terrorist groups such as Islamic State, warlords in exile, or more spontaneous local uprisings, armed or otherwise.

For the moment, there is no appetite for fighting in Afghanistan. The international community is likely to reach a certain level of de facto accommodation with the Taliban regime if only to ensure the smooth distribution of humanitarian aid. But the clock is ticking. If the Taliban are clearly failing to deliver economically and socially over the next two to five years and offer only repression, an array of national, regional, and international actors would be quite happy to see the Taliban booted out in ignominy.

The US still has the capability to reach in with air and special forces strikes. Financial and military backing to exiled warlords could stir the pot at a relatively low cost. When the Taliban were defeated in 2001, they regrouped in exile to lick their wounds, rearm, develop a narrative of resistance, and secure the support of regional backers. This allowed them to re-emerge a few years later, ready to take the fight forward. It is likely that myriad local anti-Taliban actors have learnt these lessons and are adopting the same approach.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Tim Foxley is an independent political and military analyst. He can be found on Twitter and LinkedIn. Image credit: Wikimedia.