Why Myanmar's election matters
Why Myanmar’s election matters
WRITTEN BY SREERADHA DATTA
1 October 2020
While Myanmar struggles to deal with a rising number of COVID-19 cases, the campaign for its 8 November elections has kicked off. Since the country’s 2015 elections, which saw the first open vote in 25 years, citizens have high expectations for Myanmar to finally strengthen its democratic institutions and processes.
At stake is the Myanmar Union Parliament, a bicameral legislature comprising a 440-seat Lower House or Peoples’ Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw) and a 224-seat Upper House or National Assembly (Amyotha Hluttaw). Presently, 25 per cent of all national and regional legislative seats are reserved for Myanmar’s armed forces (Tatmadaw) who governed the country from 1962 to 2011 and continue to hold considerable political power.
The electoral process
On 8 November, more than 37 million voters, including 5 million first-time voters will select from 7,000 candidates spread over 93 political parties. These candidates will be fighting for 1,171 seats spread over two chambers, seven states and seven regional parliaments. This time around, there are an additional 800 candidates, with the number of political parties having almost tripled from the 37 who stood in 2010. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and the army-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) are the two most prominent parties to contest the elections, alongside several ethnic parties and recently formed alliances.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s choice to align with the Tatmadaw displayed little sympathy for the plight of hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas that were forced to flee their homes amid a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State.
With 25 per cent of the parliamentary seats under the armed forces, the Tatmadaw continues to wield substantial influence, holding the three key cabinet posts of home affairs, defence, and border affairs. In 2015, the NLD was given a huge electoral mandate winning 255 of 323 elected seats in the lower house, 135 of 168 in the upper house with 79.4 per cent of the vote. Despite this emphatic win, the reluctance by the National League for Democracy to initiate any effective measures in limiting the powers of the military in the previous parliament was disappointing for both Myanmar’s citizens and international observers.
In her inaugural campaign speech, Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor of Myanmar and leader of the ruling NLD, expressed some reservations about the role of the armed forces, stating that ‘under the present national constitution, our elections do not meet true democratic standards’. A warning echoed more recently by the United Nations. That Myanmar needs reforms to bring in a more effective democracy is without question. However, there have been few instances thus far where the NLD have sought to challenge the military and Aung San Suu Kyi’s conduct remains far from convincing.
The NLD’s inability to deliver
Suu Kyi’s acquiescence with the military over the Rohingya crisis (especially after 2017) was discouraging but not completely unexpected, especially, given the domestic milieu she has had to navigate. In defending the Rohingya issue as a ‘mere internal armed conflict’ at the International Court of Justice, she let down many hoping for a strong, moral stance amid one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s choice to align with the Tatmadaw displayed little sympathy for the plight of hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas forced to flee their homes amid a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State. This was contrary to expectations in the international community, especially so, when in August 2016, she created the Advisory Commission on the Rakhine State led by Kofi Annan, the former secretary-general of the United Nations. Suu Kyi’s defence of Myanmar during the Rohingya exodus served however to boost her popularity among key sections of the electorate, namely the dominant Bamar community, (Myanmar’s largest ethnic group, traditionally Buddhist with very little sympathies for the Rohingya) as well as those who have strong ties to the Tatmadaw and military rule. Secondly, there was a general expectation both inside and outside Myanmar that the NLD, positioned as champions of human rights, would be able to reduce brewing ethnic tensions through effective mechanisms (dialogue and negotiation) in contrast to the military leaders of the junta.
Unfortunately, the quagmire of inter-ethnic tensions into which Myanmar has fallen has only worsened, and the situation seems no closer to any form of resolution than it was pre-2008 with the military-drafted new constitution. The NLD was the recipient of an overwhelming majority of support from ethnic minority states in 2015. But, the latest, and the fourth session of the 21st Century Panglong Union Peace Conference (UPC), which was working towards agreeing a plan to move forward the country’s stalled peace process under a new government, reflects the inadequacies of the measures thus far undertaken by the NLD. The lack of progress in the peace process has been disappointing for the numerous ethnic minority groups that had pinned their hopes for resolutions on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s interventions.
The Panglong conference has been delayed and the peace process (with the Karen National Union and Restoration Council of Shan State having not signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement) has since stalled. In the absence of a significant breakthrough with the peace process, the NLD will likely see their support dented with ethnic parties having previously endorsed Suu Kyi now turning away and forming coalitions at both intra and inter-state levels.
Consolidation of ethnic minority parties
In 2015, ethnic parties garnered only 11 per cent of the total vote. Thus, this time around, they have changed their strategy. Myanmar has 135 ethnic groups, the Bamar, as the largest, represents nearly 70 per cent of the population. Different states are seeing different electoral alliances — four ethnic parties from Kayin state merged in 2018 to form the KNDP. Similarly, in Kayah, Kachin, Mon, Chin and Shan states, ethnic parties have decided to come together. Many of these parties have also formed a coalition board for the upcoming election, hoping to chip votes away from the NLD.
While Suu Kyi has endeared herself to the larger Bamar community through her nationalistic stance at the ICJ, the plight of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh is barely registering and will likely not decide the outcome of Myanmar’s election or domestic politics. The 2020 by-elections, which gave the NLD 43 of the 44 seats, has only served to reinforce its position. While its overwhelming support will see reductions in some states, the fact remains the NLD fields more candidates than any other party, thus giving them a substantial edge in November. The ethnic parties will have to negotiate in fielding a consensus candidate against Suu Kyi. This may lead to electoral upsets in some states and an NLD-led coalition government should not be ruled out if this were to occur.
Why Myanmar’s election matters
The 2020 parliamentary elections are critical for Myanmar’s transition to full democracy. The 2015 election, the first in a generation to feature multi-party and free and fair elections, changed the political landscape in Myanmar considerably. The roots for democracy have begun to grow with the number of political parties entering the electoral race reflecting a progressive peoples’ journey away from authoritarianism. The November election, however, is a stress test for Myanmar’s institutions, with the role of the Tatmadaw critical if it is to usher in another milestone in its democratic transition.
This election is critical for the outside world too. Even if China’s popularity within Myanmar has often been questioned, irrespective of the electoral outcome, Beijing is eager to increase its stake in the country. Similarly, India, who increasingly enjoys the trust of both the Tatmadaw and the other political forces, would wish to increase its strategic presence. Bangladesh, which hosts close to 750,000 Rohingya refugees is watching the outcome closely too, amid the deployment of troops along the border of Rakhine State. Western economies as well as South-East Asian neighbours are also looking for an opportunity to deepen engagement with Myanmar. The next few weeks are poised to be the most important in Myanmar’s recent history.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Sreeradha Datta, is the Centre Head, Neighbourhood Studies and Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation, India. Formerly Director at the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute for Asian Studies, she specialises in South Asian politics and is the author of several books including the co-edited Bangladesh at 50: Development and Challenges. Her latest book on Act East and India’s Northeast will be published by Dec 2020. Image Credit: UN Women/Allison Joyce/Flickr.