Vietnam's strengthening ties with the United States
Vietnam's strengthening ties with the United States
WRITTEN BY TAM-SANG HUYNH
16 July 2020
In recent months China has undertaken actions that have stirred up increased tensions with Vietnam in the South China Sea, contradicting Beijing’s repeated declarations that the two countries are “comrades and brothers.”
The pattern of increasing assertiveness by Chinese vessels in Vietnamese waters and the attendant changes in Sino-Vietnamese relations have produced a deliberate policy change, with Vietnam now tilting diplomatically towards the United States (US). Amid the US-China trade war and concerns over the COVID-19 pandemic, perceptions of China within Washington have changed and may well work to Vietnam’s advantage.
More assertive China, more determined Vietnam
China’s attempts to alter the status quo in the South China Sea have been ongoing for many years, but the recent trade war and pandemic have coincided with increasing Chinese coercive tactics, both in frequency and intensity.
Last year, a Chinese survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8, and its escorts conducted an unlicensed seismic exploration activity within the Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This not only ignored Vietnam’s long-standing sovereign rights in the South China Sea but also indicated an interest in oil exploration in the energy-rich waters of Vietnam’s coastline. Tensions between the two sides grew even worse in April 2020, when a Chinese coastguard cutter sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel islands. This blatant act of aggression received only modest diplomatic pushback as world leaders have been distracted by COVID-19.
Hanoi has sought to navigate the growing storms in the South China Sea by quietly welcoming a more robust US-Vietnam partnership. Vietnam’s drift away from China’s ideological wake comes in parallel with the forging of the US-Vietnam defence relationship.
Vietnam’s response to these incidents has been largely diplomatic. Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a note of protest with the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi, requesting the Chinese side investigate the incident. In the same month, Vietnam rejected China’s claims of sovereignty over Vietnamese territories and protested China’s submission to the United Nations of two diplomatic notes laying claim to the South China Sea.
China further complicated the regional environment by conducting naval drills in and around the Paracel Islands in and around 1 July. These naval exercises took place amid speculation that China might set up an Air Defense Identification Area (ADIZ) in the South China Sea. This show of force by the People’s Liberation Army Navy showcased "its ability to storm and seize islands with the coast guard and navy ships,” and further served to increase pressure on smaller claimant states.
China’s military drills in the contested waters faced strong opposition from Hanoi. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang on 2 June told reporters that the Chinese move “runs in contrast to the spirit of the Declaration of Conduct of the Parties in the East Sea (DOC) and further complicates the situation in the East Sea.” Hang acknowledged, “Vietnam has communicated, handed over a note of opposition, and requested that the northern neighbour does not undertake similar actions in the future.”
The 2 June response is subtly different from earlier statements issued by the Vietnamese government. When China had previously conducted military drills near the disputed Paracel Islands, in July 2016, Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Le Hai Binh had stated that China’s moves “run counter to common perceptions of senior leaders from both countries and defies international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC).”
In comparing the two responses, the most significant difference is that the conciliatory phrase “common perceptions of senior leaders from both countries,” has been replaced with a more confrontational tone: “a note of opposition.” The change of language highlights a fraying of relations, as China increasingly challenges Vietnam’s sovereignty in the South China Sea.
This fraying of relations is also occurring in wider civil society. Vietnamese citizens today increasingly consider Beijing a significant threat “as the two countries lock horns over Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea.” Where once the two were ideological allies, today Vietnam and China risk becoming outright foes.
China is pushing, America is moving
Although Chinese expansion in the South China Sea has won concessions from Vietnam, the effect has also been to create an opening for the US to improve relations with Vietnam, particularly over the past year.
The US, while fighting the pandemic at home, repeatedly criticised China and called upon it “to stop exploiting the distraction or vulnerability of other states to expand its unlawful claims in the South China Sea.” Last year, US Assistant Secretary of State in the bureau for East Asian and Pacific affairs David Stilwell, condemned “the PLAN, law enforcement agencies, and maritime militia – continue to intimidate and bully other countries.” He added, “Their constant harassment of Vietnamese assets around Vanguard Bank is a case in point.”
US State Department Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus in August 2019 voiced US concern about Chinese “interference with Vietnam’s longstanding oil and gas activities in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claim.” The statement also added that “the United States is committed to bolstering the energy security of our partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific region and in ensuring uninterrupted regional oil and gas production for the global market.”
In response to China’s assertiveness, Washington has begun building stronger military ties with Hanoi. It is exploring selling weapons to Vietnam. When US Defense Secretary Mark Esper visited Vietnam in November 2019, he emphasized the US-Vietnam “defence partnership,” and announced the US “will transfer a second Hamilton-class High Endurance Cutter to Vietnam.” This will provide Vietnam with defence systems that can put a check on Chinese maritime ambitions.
Chinese military expansion has likely triggered these American concerns. Chinese engagement in contested territorial disputes could destabilize the Indo-Pacific region and threaten US relations with Vietnam – one of its “growing security and economic partners.”
The “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China” report released in May 2020 demonstrated a whole-of-government strategy toward China, affirming “The United States military will continue to exercise the right to navigate and operate wherever international law allows, including in the South China Sea. We are speaking up for regional allies and partners, and providing security assistance to help them build capacity to withstand Beijing’s attempts to use its military, paramilitary, and law enforcement forces to coerce and prevail in disputes.” This strategic approach reveals a growing US perception of China as its prime adversary and “revisionist power.”
The US Department of Defense issued its condemnation of China’s military exercises on 2 July, describing China’s actions as an attempt to “assert unlawful maritime claims and disadvantage its Southeast Asian neighbours in the South China Sea.” The next day, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo voiced support for Vietnam over China’s “highly provocative” military exercises “in disputed waters of the South China Sea.” Pompeo deliberately mentioned the condemnation statement made by Vietnam’s Press Department of Foreign Ministry, saying: “Vietnam made a presentation to and lodged a diplomatic note of protest and demanded the Chinese side not to repeat similar violations in the future.”
The USS Ronald Reagan, the USS Nimitz, and other warships were sent to the South China Sea to conduct exercises during the same five days as the Chinese naval drills near the Paracel Islands. Rear Admiral George Wikoff, commander of the operation, affirmed the intention of the US stance by saying, “The purpose (of the planned exercises) is to show an unambiguous signal to our partners and allies that we are committed to regional security and stability.”
DA NANG, Vietnam (March 9, 2020) The aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) sits at anchor near Da Nang during a port visit. Theodore Roosevelt is on a scheduled deployment to the Indo-Pacific and is visiting Da Nang to commemorate the 25th anniversary of U.S.-Vietnam diplomatic relations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Nicholas V. Huynh)
US diplomatic support for Vietnam is an essential motivation behind closer US-Vietnam relations. On 2 July, US Ambassador to Vietnam Daniel Kritenbrink said “the two countries’ cooperation in the COVID-19 fight has been extraordinary,” and added, “When the US has faced difficulties amid the pandemic, the Vietnamese Government and thousands of Vietnamese friends have donated millions of face masks and other types of protective medical equipment for use in the US.”
While observers can opine about the pros and cons of elevating US-Vietnam to a “strategic partnership,” the more significant outcome is the actual progress of bilateral relations. Kritenbrink recognized the symbolic implications of the naming of the relationship but noted that the US priority lies in bilateral cooperative activities. He reaffirmed the possibility of forging US-Vietnam relations by saying, “We believe that US-Vietnam relations are at the best and strongest level ever. This cooperation would be stronger no matter what we call the relationship.”
A recent move that underscores US determination is the Trump administration’s schedule to redeploy several thousand American troops to the Indo-Pacific region as “Americans and allies face the most significant geopolitical challenge since the end of the Cold War.” Beijing, without doubt, centres on the realignment of US global posture.
A more confident Vietnam?
China’s flexing of its military muscle in the South China Sea may have done it more harm than good. Chinese behaviour amid simmering tensions in disputed waters has not translated into “kowtowing” from Vietnam. Instead, Hanoi has sought to navigate the growing storms in the South China Sea by quietly welcoming a more robust US-Vietnam partnership. Vietnam’s drift away from China’s ideological wake comes in parallel with the forging of the US-Vietnam defence relationship.
Vietnam with support from the US has been more vocal against China’s maritime claims. The 36th ASEAN Summit – ASEAN’s highest policy-making body – held via teleconference in June 2020 – provides insights into Vietnam’s new stance. Vietnam cited “recent developments” and “serious incidents” -- phrases not highlighted in past ASEAN Chair statements. Hanoi’s warning of alarming occurrences and irresponsible acts in the South China Sea happened at the critical moment of rising unity within the ASEAN.
The Chairman’s Statement of this year’s Summit affirmed for the first time the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as “the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out.” “UNCLOS” was mentioned six times in the 2020 Chairman’s Statement compared with two mentions in the 2019 Chairman’s Statement.
Additionally, this statement is quite similar to Vietnam’s submission of Note Verbale No.22/HC-2020 to the UN protesting China’s nine-section claim in March 2020. The Note Verbale declares: “Viet Nam affirms that as between Viet Nam and China, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the sole legal basis for and defines comprehensively the scope of their respective maritime entitlements in the East Sea."
The US-Vietnam partnership is now strategic in all but name. Vietnam’s latest Defense White Paper, released in November of last year, does not rule out the possibility of fostering defence ties with the US as “defence cooperation” depends on “circumstances and specific conditions.” Vietnam would likely continue to play a pivotal role in the US Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly if President Trump were to win a second term.
US-Vietnam ties are moving forward
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has stirred the waters of maritime conflict. From an American perspective, the only positive aspect of this power shift is the improvement of ties with countries such as Vietnam. Vietnam’s courage to tackle China’s repeatedly aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea underlines its fear and confidence: fear of Chinese encroachment into its maritime territory, and confidence of a significant breakthrough in US-Vietnam relations and a viable partnership in coming years.
Small nations navigating the shoals of great power competitions is always a challenge, and so is choosing sides amid the US-China rivalry. Vietnam may have experienced the potential threat of being abandoned by great powers. The fall of South Vietnam in April 1975 has been associated with the abandonment of the US. Deng Xiaoping’s 1979 invasion, launched to “teach Vietnam a lesson,” left the Vietnamese people with the “four-good” motto: good neighbours, good friends, good comrades, and good partners.
Unlike the Cold War’s ideological motivations, the current logic of maritime geopolitics favours Vietnam to make a strategic move towards the US, which seems to accommodate Vietnam’s "foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, openness, diversification, and multilateralization of external relations and active international integration". The philosophy that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” now becomes relevant as anti-Chinese animosity awakens. Washington and Hanoi perceive Beijing as the prime challenger of regional stability, especially in the South China Sea.
A steady US-Vietnam partnership is within reach
In the long term, Vietnam could gradually break with China and come into a more pragmatic foreign policy, which could (and should) be driven by domestic and foreign interests, rather than being constrained by ideological or institutional settings.
The emergence of a US-Vietnam soft alignment will likely benefit the two countries. The likely new trajectory would see the US supporting Vietnam’s rights in the South China Sea while making no formal political commitments to Vietnam. Such a soft alignment would allow for informal security guarantees for the bilateral relationship and mitigate concerns about China's current military ascendancy in the region. This would also maximize Vietnam’s flexibility to accommodate US participation in the South China Sea. This credible alternative to a formal alliance could free both countries from taking on responsibilities beyond their capability or strategic interests.
This critical moment in US-Vietnam relations has come as China strives to boost its claims for a dominant status in Southeast Asia, with the South China Sea serving as the first target. Vietnam and the US, looking toward a post-COVID world, have much room for manoeuvre, though being challenged by China’s belligerent quest for regional maritime hegemony.
It is too early to know how far Vietnam’s strategic ties with the US will proceed. Nevertheless, for the leaders seated in Hanoi, it has become unrealistic to expect China to begin showing restraint in the years to come. Arguably, Hanoi can continue to foster relations with Washington, undertake a central role in ASEAN by maximizing its credibility and security via support from the US.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Tam-Sang Huynh is a Lecturer of the Faculty of International Relations and research fellow of Center for International Studies at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University-Ho Chi Minh City. His main fields of interest are Vietnam’s foreign policy, US-China strategic competition, and security and conflict in the South China Sea. Image credit: White house/Flickr/US Navy/Flickr.