The ‘virtual maritime gate’ and Indonesia’s new capital
The ‘virtual maritime gate’ and Indonesia’s new capital
WRITTEN BY JEFFERSON NG
17 August 2022
Indonesia is embarking on a multi-decade effort to shift and relocate its capital from Jakarta to Nusantara in East Kalimantan, near the city of Balikpapan. The first stage of the USD 32 billion (IDR 466 trillion) megaproject is expected to be completed in late 2024, when the presidential palace, key government ministries, and the headquarters for the armed forces and police force will be shifted to the new capital.
With the imminent relocation of Indonesia’s political and national leadership, the defence of the new capital has become a growing concern, especially as the new location is more geographically vulnerable than Jakarta. Highlighting these concerns, a new defensive concept known as the ‘virtual maritime gate’ (gerbang maritim virtual) has been put forward in publicly accessible documents related to the Law on the New Capital and its implementing regulations. The plan envisions developing a maritime surveillance and monitoring system able to track, quantify, and identify ships and undersea vessels passing through the Makassar Strait. According to the information available, the gate will utilise technological elements such as sensors, undersea detectors, platform buoys, communication systems, and ground data terminals. An information fusion centre will act as the main clearinghouse for data collection and analysis along the 600-kilometre-long strait.
New capital and the growing importance of the Makassar Strait
The virtual maritime gate concept reflects the growing strategic and economic importance of the Makassar Strait for Indonesia over the medium to long term. The Makassar Strait is about 600 kilometres long from north to south, between 100 to 200 kilometres in width along the length of the strait, and has a depth of several hundred metres to about 2 kilometres. Currently, the Makassar Strait’s location is far from the conventional shipping routes in the Straits of Malacca. However, its depth and width mean that it is suitable for the passage of ultra-large crude carriers seeking access to East Asian markets. Besides being used for Indonesia’s domestic shipping, the Makassar Strait is an outlet to the South China Sea, which means that it serves international ships travelling between Australia and East Asia.
The Makassar Strait is likely to grow in prominence as Indonesia’s new capital emerges as a centre of economic activity alongside Jakarta, and defence policymakers in Indonesia will want to better control the flow of maritime traffic passing through the Strait.
The Makassar Strait is also convenient for foreign naval warships and submarines passing between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The lack of small islands along the Strait facilitates the passage of surface vessels, while its depth makes it easy for submarines to pass undetected. Furthermore, the ‘archipelagic sea lanes passage’ regime under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) applies to the passage of foreign warships through the Makassar Strait. Therefore, under international law, Indonesia can neither force submarines to surface while transiting the Makassar Strait nor obstruct their right of passage.
Image credit: Wikimedia.
Built some 30-40 kilometres from the western banks of the Makassar Strait, the new capital will likely reinforce the strategic importance of the Makassar Strait for Indonesia. The capital’s proximity to Balikpapan Bay and the Indonesian government’s plans to build new ports or upgrade existing ones will create a new logistical network that will enable the capital to serve as a regional economic superhub for Kalimantan and Sulawesi, bolstering economic activity along the Makassar Strait. In this regard, securing the Makassar Strait becomes increasingly crucial for safeguarding the new economic activity around the Strait and for protecting the new capital from non-traditional maritime threats in the neighbouring Sulu-Celebes Sea, as well as the threat of being embroiled in a larger regional conflict around the South China Sea.
Implications of the virtual maritime gate
With some 7.9 million kilometres of sea, Indonesian maritime agencies lack the capability to effectively patrol and continuously monitor all of its maritime waters. The discovery of Chinese-manufactured unmanned underwater drones collecting oceanographic data in Indonesian waters over the last few years has highlighted the large gaps in the country’s detection and monitoring capabilities. With the intensifying US-China rivalry in the South China Sea, policymakers will likely want to monitor the movements of warships and submarines transiting so close to the new capital.
The virtual maritime gate would enable policymakers to collect intelligence on the flow of maritime traffic and detect unmanned submersibles and submarines. As ships are also likely to transit in a predictable path within the Strait, the system can be supplemented with manned surface patrols or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The movement of civilian and military vessels through the Makassar Strait is not expected to be affected by the virtual maritime gate. Although Indonesia had once implemented a temporary closure of the Strait in 1988, this is unlikely to happen again. At least during peacetime, unobstructed passage through archipelagic sea lanes is a key element of the archipelagic state concept, and it is not in Indonesia’s interest to undermine the UNCLOS.
A shift in the defence paradigm
More broadly, the virtual maritime gate concept suggests that moving the capital could influence how Indonesia conceives its defensive needs. As it is impossible to maintain a continuous presence over all of Indonesia’s maritime waters, the current thinking seems to be that of focusing limited resources on key maritime chokepoints — like the Makassar Strait. The current Governor of Indonesia’s National Resilience Institute, Andi Widjajanto, proposed in a recent webinar that defence planners should emphasise three main concepts related to the defence of the new capital.
First, given the new capital’s greater vulnerability to aerial threats like ballistic and hypersonic missiles, there is a need to develop capabilities for the rapid evacuation of the national leadership to a more defensible location when facing a superior enemy. Second, there is a need to develop anti-access/area-denial capabilities against potential aerial and maritime threats. For instance, Indonesia has been looking at purchasing the anti-ship BrahMos missile. Anti-air and anti-ship capabilities will be needed to fortify the new capital. Third, Widjajanto suggested that Indonesia should develop a forward presence, especially in maritime capabilities, to be able to respond effectively to maritime threats.
The main challenge with these defence plans is the lack of adequate budgetary resources from the state. Besides guaranteed spending requirements for education, healthcare, and regional governments, the government is also spending a significant amount on COVID-19 recovery and fuel subsidies. This has restricted its fiscal capabilities. For instance, in the 2022 List of Planned Priority Loans, only USD 2 billion of external loans were proposed to the Ministry of Finance for defence spending from the original spending list of USD 16.7 billion. External loan financing for the proposed acquisition of weapons platforms announced publicly in 2021 (such as fighter jets, submarines, and frigates) was omitted from the list, highlighting the current fiscal limitations.
More aspirational than realistic at this point?
Given the current fiscal challenges, it appears that plans to develop the virtual maritime gate for Indonesia’s new capital remain a work-in-progress. It is likely that funding for such initiatives will only be available after 2024, when the first stage of the capital’s construction will be complete, and if global oil prices have begun to fall substantially.
Nonetheless, two things seem clear. The Makassar Strait is likely to grow in prominence as the new capital emerges as a centre of economic activity alongside Jakarta, and defence policymakers in Indonesia will want to better control the flow of maritime traffic passing through the Strait. The main question is how the gap between intent and reality will be squared over the next few years.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Jefferson Ng is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Image credit: Flickr/U.S. Pacific Fleet.