Principled confidence to replace servility to dictators in new Czech foreign policy agenda

9 February 2022

The Czech Republic’s new government will bring sweeping policy changes to relations with China. Unlike the government of populist former prime minister Andrej Babiš, the new centre-right coalition government, which was elected at last October’s legislative poll, has not shied away from clear, principled stances towards China, both in its public statements and future plans.

The agreement between the two electoral alliances that make up the new coalition government explicitly states that there is going to be a return to the foreign policy represented by the first Czech President Václav Havel, meaning increased emphasis on human rights and democratic principles. Thus, we can expect a departure from policies directed towards pursuing economic goals with powers such as China, which have objectively not brought the desired benefits that the old government had promised.

New direction

There has never been a Czech government with a more self-confident approach towards Beijing than the new one. All five parties of the new cabinet led by Prime Minister Petr Fiala publicly criticised the servile approach by the old government before last year’s election and engaged in numerous disagreements on the topic with the country’s president, Miloš Zeman, who is considered a leading architect of better relations with China.

Since the election last October, words have already transformed into actions. During the first week after the new government’s official inauguration, the freshly-appointed minister of foreign affairs, Jan Lipavský, publicly criticised and personally reprimanded the Czech ambassador to China, Vladimír Tomšík, because of his enthusiastic remarks about the alleged support of the Czechs for the upcoming Olympic Winter Games in Beijing.

Prague can even take the route of Lithuania and do the previously almost unimaginable: changing the official name of its bilateral diplomatic representations to include the word “Taiwan” instead of “Taipei”.

Given the past utterances, together with the government’s official proclamations, it is already possible to clearly identify five departures in the Czech Republic’s foreign policy regarding China: exit from ‘16+1’ group; maintaining the counterintelligence leadership; return to the human rights-oriented foreign policy; excluding China from participating in the 5G networks; and shifting the Taiwan-related policy. First, Prague will seriously consider leaving the so-called ‘16+1’ group, a Chinese forum to gain cooperation in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region.

There have not been any tangible gains for its members during the forum’s existence. The new coalition government seems well aware of these facts, yet the exact approach is still in the making. The Czech Republic’s potential exit would be more meaningful if it did not conduct it alone; thus we can anticipate discussions with like-minded countries, such as Slovakia and Estonia, about the 16+1’s future.

Another closely-related issue was the unclear fate of the counterintelligence chief Michal Koudelka, whose tenure in office has been characterised by unconstrained reports that stress Chinese and Russian malign activities and their influence operations in Czech territory over past years. His pursuits have been regularly condemned by President Zeman, and his position as a director appeared shaky at times. Given the new government’s public comments in support of him, Koudelka will likely remain in place.

A return to the trademark human rights-oriented foreign policy of past decades will likely be one of the main characteristics of the new government. With the departure of ministers seeking unproblematic relations with Beijing, we can expect strong calls for progress on the situation of the Uyghurs, and the courage to call it what it is: a genocide. For instance, the new minister of foreign affairs, Lipavský, already confirmed in interviews that he aims to raise issues of human rights in talks with Russia and China.

Consequently, human-rights assistance programs might be strengthened by the Foreign Ministry in order to support persecuted individuals in China. Regarding the perpetrators, the new leadership is expected to finally support the implementation of a Czech version of the Magnitsky Act, which has been long pushed for by the Czech security community and NGOs. The coalition has already promised to submit such a bill to parliament for approval by the end of 2023.

The new administration is also expected to bring a definitive end to any Chinese hopes of participating in the building of the Czech Republic’s 5G network. This approach was already in the making thanks to the firm position of the Czech security community and cyber institutions, which are expected to receive increased funding in the upcoming period, as well. The single most visible change will involve a shift in the area of Taiwan-related policy. What started as an initiative of the president of the senate, Miloš Vystrčil, and his visit to Taipei two years ago, will likely transform into an official government policy of deepening relations with Taiwan on several levels.

We can anticipate more high-level meetings and talks, legitimising Taiwan as a friendly and fully sovereign state actor. Despite Chinese threats, Prague can even take the route of Lithuania and do the previously almost unimaginable: changing the official name of its bilateral diplomatic representations to include the word “Taiwan” instead of “Taipei”.

That relates also to the expected increase of Taiwanese investments in the Czech Republic, which would add to the 24,000 persons already employed by Taiwanese businesses in the country, with the largest potential in the chips-making industry. Domestic policies related to these issues will naturally also undertake a profound transformation. Most importantly, this will involve issues of tax evasion, foreign investment screening policies, and espionage legislation reform. Until now, the Czech Republic has been known as a tax haven for international investors and shady financial entities.

There is much more willingness and understanding of this issue among the new ministers, allowing for hopes of a timely change. Foreign investment screening, as a new necessary instrument, was one of the very few useful legal novelties passed by the former administration, being established at the Ministry of Trade. Yet, its potential is being seriously hampered by the lack of personnel and sources, representing a serious challenge for the new government to tackle.

Last but not least, the hands of the Czech intelligence agencies have been tied by inefficient and out-of-date legislation that does not allow for the neutralising of proxy organisations of totalitarian regimes/actors, like the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front organisations. The new government is also expected to look at changing these legal rules.

First steps on a long path

Despite the long list of tasks and obstacles, the new appointments of Prime Minister Fiala’s cabinet and their first actions reaffirm the determination to really push for much-needed reforms and amendments. The new minister of foreign affairs, for instance, has already started changing his ministry’s approach, especially in his public comments on the Olympic Games in China.

He also repeatedly emphasises the upcoming change in the foreign policy direction regarding human rights, which can be deemed as a promising start on a long journey towards a permanent, confident, and principled policy of Czech relations with China and Russia.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Jakub Janda is Executive Director of the European Values Center for Security Policy in Prague (EVC), which became the first European think tank to establish an office in Taiwan recently. He specialises in the response of democratic states to hostile disinformation and influence operations. Image credit: Flickr/Pirátská strana.