Edge of democracy: China’s influence on Taiwan’s ‘frontline’ islands

WRITTEN BY WEN LII

25 January 2021

Since the Cold War, the twin-island groups of Kinmen and Matsu have been no strangers to security threats that stem from their unique, exclave-like geographic locations sandwiched between two rival governments. Administered by Taiwan (officially the Republic of China), the two offshore counties are located less than 20 kilometres off the coast of the People’s Republic of China.

Today, while no longer subject to periodic shelling, the islands grapple with many non-traditional security challenges. Their close physical proximity to China leads to a vulnerability of maritime resources, as environmentally harmful activities spill over the border — most recently with the alarming amount of illegal sand dredging and fishing — while also increasing the risk of unintended civilian conflict.

Moreover, the offshore counties continue to serve as prime targets for false narratives propagated by China, ranging from calls to reopen ferry routes that have been sealed off since the COVID-19 pandemic, to ongoing Chinese efforts to establish ‘Four New Links’ between the islands and the coastal Fujian Province. Proposals to provide water, electricity and gas to Kinmen and Matsu as well as construct bridges misleadingly portray a shortage of resources among the islands.

In a nutshell, many challenges encountered by Kinmen and Matsu are related to border control issues within the broader context of cross-strait politics and maritime security.

Combatting dredging through legal institutions

Just last month, Taiwan’s legislature passed new legislation designed to deter hundreds of illegal Chinese sand dredging ships from wreaking environmental havoc near the islands. The amendments slapped a heavy monetary fine of NT$ 100 million (US$ 3.3 million) and jail sentences of up to seven years for offenders.

Among locals, opinions may be varied, as tourist outlets that require support from Chinese customers may hold contrasting views from those civil servants whose livelihoods do not. Other businesses that rely on domestic customers from Taiwan may be keen to maintain a virus-free record in Kinmen and Matsu.

Adding to the penalties, a new clause now allows for diverse methods to process detained dredgers to prevent the massive ships from cluttering up harbour space. Instead of being restricted to lengthy court auctions, authorities can now choose to disassemble the illegal vessels, or even potentially use the ships for military target practice or the construction of artificial reefs.

Excessive sand dredging is a transnational issue that has led to a large environmental impact in the region, affecting fishing and tourism industries while even damaging critical infrastructure such as underwater cables and upsetting the security of communications. As Chinese sand dredging ships swarm the region — reaching past the South China Sea and intruding into the internal waters of the Philippines near Batangas — new institutions and legal guidelines are desperately required, especially to prevent dredgers from being employed in grey-zone strategies of intimidation and harassment.

Illegal fishing, maritime debris and other challenges

However, Kinmen and Matsu face environmental challenges that reach beyond illegal sand dredging. For example, a large amount of illegal fishing by Chinese vessels has raised concerns from Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration, not least because of environmentally devastating fishing methods, including illegal trap-bait cages — which often catch fry and fingerling. On the beaches, the islands face a constant onslaught of marine debris, with dozens of tons of trash drifting ashore from the Chinese coast.

Incursions across the borders make the offshore islands fertile ground for unintended conflict. In Matsu, there have long been cases of Chinese fishermen vandalising local fishing nets. Whereas in Kinmen last year, a Chinese fishing boat aggressively rammed into a Taiwanese Coast Guard vessel, in response to CGA efforts to remove illegal nets which have been set up in restricted waters around Kinmen.

While non-military in nature, small-scale clashes such as these grow distrust between the two sides and increase the risk of miscommunication — which makes it all the more important for Chinese authorities to clamp down on environmentally harmful activities in a responsible manner.

‘Three mini links’: China’s push to reopen ferry routes amid COVID-19

Although the short distance leads to frequent exchanges with China in terms of economic and cultural activities, residents in Kinmen and Matsu expect a measured, balanced approach towards border control, particularly on issues related to public health or environmental protection. Last month, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office labelled Taiwan’s move to shut down ferry services between China and the offshore islands as an “artificial obstacle”, in a move to politicise border control measures based primarily on health concerns in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Recent calls by Chinese academics to reopen ferry routes have received little local fanfare, even though voters in Kinmen and Matsu generally favour warmer cross-strait ties. Another proposal, raised by a minor pro-unification party, to shorten the required 14-day quarantine to ease cross-strait travel has also been met with criticism.

In fact, local support for swift government action prompted Taiwan to close ferry routes from February 2020 (similar to moves enacted during the 2003 SARS epidemic). Launched in 2001, the ferry routes were part of the ‘Three Mini Links’ project to thaw cross-strait relations, encompassing transportation, commerce and postage links between China and the offshore islands.

From Taiwan’s perspective, decisions concerning the ‘Three Mini Links' require consideration of the diverse factors including the current spread of the virus and its potential economic impact on Kinmen and Matsu. Among locals, opinions may be varied, as tourist outlets that require support from Chinese customers may hold contrasting views from those civil servants whose livelihoods do not. Other businesses that rely on domestic customers from Taiwan may be keen to maintain a virus-free record in Kinmen and Matsu.

China attempts to feed the false narrative of the ‘Three Mini Links’ as a thermometer of cross-strait ties — while labelling any voices against reestablishing the links as ‘obstructive’ — yet the reality might be much more complex. Not all residents who oppose reopening the links are against warming cross-strait ties. On the other hand, the ‘Three Mini Links’ were established in the first place under a Democratic Progressive Party administration. Therefore, the key challenge for Kinmen and Matsu is to evaluate the conditions for reopening the ferry routes objectively, instead of caving in to political interpretations.

‘Four new links’: false narratives on water and power shortage

On 2 January 2019, Kinmen and Matsu made an appearance in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speech on cross-strait affairs, which proposed to establish ‘Four New Links’ between the offshore islands and China’s Fujian Province, including building water, electricity and gas pipelines, as well as the construction of bridges. In the speech, the ‘Four New Links’ were presented as precursors to other grand objectives, describing how China and Taiwan should, eventually, “promote connectivity wherever necessary, including trade and economic cooperation, infrastructure building, energy and resource development, and sharing industrial standards”.

Ideas about linking water and electricity pipelines to the offshore islands surely did not begin with Xi Jinping’s remarks, as Kinmen just completed its freshwater pipeline connecting the Chinese coast in 2018, a couple of months before the speech.

Xi Jinping’s speech has stirred discussion in Kinmen and Matsu, with proposals to build various pipelines occasionally springing up now and then. However, these proposals often rely on misleading narratives that portray the offshore islands as urgently short on drinking water or electricity — information often stemming from Chinese government statements and later repeated by local opinion leaders.

Both Kinmen and Matsu already house fuel-based power plants, which currently generate enough power for both residents and tourists. In terms of water resources for Matsu, although local reservoirs at times report low storage levels — which proponents for a Chinese freshwater pipeline often cite — in fact, seawater desalination plants have satisfied the local demand for freshwater over the past two decades. In the main island of Nangan, where more than half the population resides, desalination plants normally produce around 70 per cent of freshwater consumed, while production levels can be further amplified in times of drought. Upgrades to the desalination plants due for completion by 2024 will continue to ensure the security of freshwater supplies.

On the other hand, building a cross-strait water pipeline for Matsu might not be financially or logistically practical, since contrary to Kinmen, Matsu features a dispersed topography with many islands, while lacking in inter-island pipelines, meaning that a potential cross-strait pipeline would only be able to provide water for a single island. Moreover, with a low population of less than 10,000 regular inhabitants, water consumption in Matsu might not meet requirements for a minimum purchase quantity in a potential deal with China.

Right across from Matsu, in the small town of Huangqi in Fuzhou City, local authorities held a high-profile ceremony in December 2019 to celebrate the completion of a ‘Water Provision Station for Matsu’, claiming that the station would serve the needy residents of Matsu by filling transportation vessels with water. By late 2020, according to Chinese reports, Fuzhou has only exported a ceremonial figure of 310 tons to Matsu, which is less than 15 per cent of a single day’s water consumption for Matsu’s largest island.

Nevertheless, ceremonial or not, the activities highlight the Chinese government’s perspective on Kinmen and Matsu as politically symbolic microcosms for enhancing cross-strait ties with Taiwan while aiming to capitalise on the success of Kinmen’s water pipeline (as a model for other places) — regardless of practical need or implementation.

As Kinmen and Matsu continue to face challenges from across the Strait — whether in the form of sand dredgers or false narratives — their location on the border continues to offer us a glimpse of China’s increasingly diverse toolbox of exerting influence, while also spurring Taiwan and the rest of the democratic world to devise more creative methods of coping with them.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Wen Lii is director of the Democratic Progressive Party’s newly-launched Lienchiang County Chapter, located on the Matsu Islands, 20 kilometres off the coast of China’s Fujian Province. He is an analyst on foreign policy and regional security issues. Image Credit: Flickr/Ken Marshall.