Is Sino-European cooperation on counter-terrorism possible in the near future?
Is Sino-European cooperation on counter-terrorism possible in the near future?
WRITTEN BY CHI ZHANG, JILONG YANG AND XUECHEN CHEN
3 August 2022
Terrorism is a security threat for both the European Union and China — despite each having very different definitions of the term. The EU is vulnerable to militant Islamists and right-wing extremism, and China claims to be threatened by the ‘East Turkestan’ forces who seek the independence of its Xinjiang region through violent means. The highly criticised ‘de-radicalisation programmes’ in Xinjiang have been driven by Beijing’s attempt to eliminate extremism.
Given the EU’s disapproval of China’s approach to terrorism, the answer to the question of whether Sino-European cooperation on counter-terrorism is possible in the near future seems to be apparent. However, there was a time when counter-terrorism cooperation could have been possible between China and the EU. While concerns about human rights and democracy existed before the 2010s, the EU did not consider China a major security threat. On the contrary, it welcomed China’s emergence and engaged the country in a normative way. Since the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was established in 2003, counter-terrorism has been an important thematic issue for both actors.
Emphasising multilateralism and the key role of the United Nations is not only the consensus between China and the EU with respect to the global efforts to address terrorism but also the cornerstone of their counter-terrorism cooperation and coordination. In 2013, Brussels and Beijing jointly adopted the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, which committed to strengthening EU-China cooperation by holding special consultations on issues of anti-terrorism.
The outlook for Sino-European cooperation on counter-terrorism depends heavily on the political wisdom and open-mindedness of both actors.
The document also mentioned cooperating on police training. While the current tensions around Xinjiang have prevented any meaningful dialogue and cooperation between Brussels and Beijing, opportunities for multilateral cooperation have not all been closed. It would be in the interests of both sides to continue engaging in cooperation where they have shared interests.
A dim prospect for cooperation?
A significant deterioration of the relationship took place over the past decade, with the EU witnessing collective securitisation of the ‘China threat’ across multiple policy frames. Specifically, the EU has framed China as an existential threat in areas such as economic security, political security, Asian regional security, as well as information and technology, and cybersecurity. Mutual discontent culminated when the much-hailed EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment was put to a halt by the controversies over forced labour in Xinjiang. The issue of forced labour is related to China’s attempts to eliminate ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ in Xinjiang. The EU is concerned about the “arbitrary nature” by which the Chinese government defines and labels individuals as ‘terrorists’ or ‘extremists’. Therefore, disagreement on the very definition of terrorism makes it difficult to proceed with any meaningful dialogues.
Since 2019, Brussels has repeatedly described Beijing as a “systemic rival” and coordinated its China policy with that of the United States, and even with the US-dominated NATO. NATO’s new 2022 Strategic Concept describes China as a challenger of its “interests, security, and values”. Viewing Beijing itself as a source of cybersecurity threat, the joint position on counter-terrorism that the Concept sets out obviously does not include China. While constructive engagement remains a possibility in, for example, improving reciprocal transparency, there is a trust deficit which precludes any meaningful cooperation that would require information and intelligence sharing.
Irrespective of these difficulties, Beijing continues to seek cooperation at multilateral forums, such as the First Global Parliamentary Summit on Counter-Terrorism held in Vienna. Last year, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations also took the initiative in holding the Second International Seminar on Counterterrorism in Beijing. However, France was the only EU member state to join the seminar, which suggests limited interest within the EU in getting involved in Beijing-led counter-terrorism dialogues.
More widely, China’s opposition to NATO enlargement makes it vulnerable to the accusation of being complicit in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This has reinforced the perceived binary between the Russia-China bloc and the US-led NATO, thus making them more unwilling to share critical security intelligence, which is key to counter-terrorism cooperation.
Possible arenas for Sino-European cooperation on counter-terrorism
Even when China’s (so-called) ‘de-radicalisation programmes’ in Xinjiang attracted international criticism, there was an attempt by one EU member state, Denmark, to engage with China on counter-terrorism operations. On 19 June 2018, the Danish Foreign Policy Society co-hosted a joint conference between the Royal Danish Defence College and the Academy of Military Science in Beijing. The conference’s opening remarks reflected not only the expectations for institutional cooperation and exchange between the Danish and Chinese militaries but also hopes for continual dialogue between China and NATO.
However, the speeches made at the conference were more of an introduction of the Chinese and Danish views and NATO’s approach to terrorism — with little coverage on how cooperation could be materialised. Nevertheless, this conference was a rare example of the People’s Liberation Army’s highest-level research institute engaging in dialogue with a foreign institute. This sends a strong signal of China’s desire to carry out counter-terrorism dialogues through semi-official channels.
While bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation between Europe and China seems almost impossible given their confrontations over the Xinjiang issue, collaboration within international multilateral frameworks and in a third country or region remains possible and viable. For example, since 2008, under the UN Security Council’s authorisation, China actively contributed to the EU-led joint antipiracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden — although it primarily focused on protecting Chinese interests overseas. To protect its own overseas interests, it has become critical for Beijing to increase the exchange of information and improve its coordination with other countries. The experience China gained from such activities can be translated into future cooperation with the EU.
Within the UN-based international multilateral system, there is scope for China and the EU to work together to enhance the multilateral framework for counter-terrorism, including pushing for the conclusion of negotiations on a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. Aside from the UN, there are a number of other international and regional multilateral institutions and channels, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Munich Security Conference, and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.
These provide China and the EU with great opportunities to enhance their mutual understanding, build international consensus on counter-terrorism, and promote international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. For instance, by highlighting the importance of confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy, the ASEAN Regional Forum can serve as a useful platform through which China and the EU can foster mutual trust and share best practices in terms of counter-terrorism. Moreover, when it comes to specific issues regarding counter-terrorism, such as addressing root causes and cutting off terrorist financing sources, Beijing and Brussels have a great deal of common ground that allows them to communicate, coordinate, and cooperate.
Furthermore, while China has sought to remain neutral in Russia’s war against Ukraine, it offered 15 million yuan (around USD 2.2 million) in humanitarian assistance to Ukraine over both February and March — which is consistent with its overall approach of avoiding military involvement. This shows a glimpse of hope for engaging China in international security, but obviously much is to be done to clear ideological obstacles. Grouping China and Russia together as ideological rivals to the West will push the two countries further into each other’s arms. The current sanctions regime against Russia is working in terms of disincentivising Beijing from supplying Moscow with aircraft parts. This approach should be continued with a reasonable expectation regarding China’s stance — China is unlikely to condemn Russia explicitly, but it can still contribute to humanitarian assistance in Ukraine.
Looking forward
In the context of continued discussions around human rights issues in Xinjiang, it seems that the divergence between the EU and China in terms of values has become remarkably salient. However, as two of the most influential global players both dealing with international and domestic terrorism, China and the EU share a degree of consensus regarding the need to address terrorist threats. There is a diverse range of bilateral and multilateral channels and numerous opportunities for counter-terrorism dialogues.
The outlook for Sino-European cooperation on counter-terrorism depends heavily on the political wisdom and open-mindedness of both actors. Given that Beijing is already engaged in multilateral platforms and semi-official channels, it would be constructive to continue having dialogues to identify grounds for further consensus, rather than assuming the worst based on an entrenched liberal/illiberal binary. Platforms that emphasise confidence building, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, are important arenas where these dialogues can take place.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Chi Zhang is a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of St Andrews, and an Associate Member of the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.
Jilong Yang is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Dr Xuechen Chen is an Assistant Professor in Politics and International Relations at Northeastern University London and a Visiting Research Fellow at the London Asia-Pacific Centre for Social Science, King's College London. Image credit: European Union, 2017.