9DASHLINE — In Dialogue: Are current debates over the China threat to Taiwan too one-sided?

4 July 2023

IN DIALOGUE WITH BLAKE HERZINGER AND JUSTYNA SZCZUDLIK

With rising tensions between China, Taiwan, and the US, there is ample conjecture, trivialisation, and/or exaggeration about the prospects of large-scale violent conflict in the Indo-Pacific. State leaders, foreign policy-makers, defence strategists, and public commentators provide daily analyses of what steps each of the actors involved will take next. These analyses, however, tend to be rather speculative, and may actually risk treating a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan as a foregone conclusion.

9DASHLINE is curious whether some of the narratives about the US-Taiwan-China nexus make for a self-fulfilling prophecy with regard to war in the future. We asked two experts, Blake Herzinger and Justyna Szczudlik, to discuss the question: Are current debates over China's threat to Taiwan too one-sided?

The debate over Taiwan is difficult to describe. While a policy awakening to threats posed by the People’s Republic of China is a positive thing, the resultant panic is provoking an overwrought reaction that may be pushing the US toward confrontation, rather than heading off one. A general lack of familiarity with the issues, among both commentators and the public, has allowed some extreme voices to take centre stage. They seem to be advancing the position that a violent invasion of Taiwan is a given barring effective military deterrence. Increasingly, those that do not agree with such views are attacked and maligned as ‘soft on China’, rather than included in constructive debate. While a Chinese attack on Taiwan cannot be ruled out and would have catastrophic impacts, it is nowhere near a certainty. A healthy debate would consider all voices contributing in good faith.

In my opinion, the debates are becoming less one-sided and do not focus only, or even mainly, on military aspects or the threat of a Chinese attack. In recent months, the debate seems to have changed, with scenarios other than war being widely discussed. Currently, it seems that the narrative of a full-scale invasion is rarer than considerations of other crisis scenarios, such as a full or partial blockade of Taiwan, or even limited military action like China's takeover of the Kinmen, Matsu and/or Penghu Island chains. Nevertheless, I agree that a kind of panic when it comes to Taiwan is noticeable in these debates. Very tellingly, this is mainly in the US, but not necessarily in Taiwan, which is calm and seeks to tone down emotions.

It is worth considering the reasons why China might not feel compelled to invade Taiwan. Many of these are economic — the prospect of extensive sanctions, loss of economic opportunities, and supply chain interruptions. Others might include the difficulty and costs of occupying and pacifying a Taiwanese nation of nearly 24 million people, most of whom were born after the separation of Taiwan from the mainland. It is a population accustomed to an open society and without affinity for the Chinese Communist Party. Even the most hawkish voices on China — in the US and elsewhere — would benefit from considering these factors if only to better understand potential non-military policy choices that might represent unacceptable costs in Beijing.

This is not to discount the military aspect of this contest, nor to diminish the severity of a potential military clash between the United States and China. Washington should absolutely seek to modernise and expand its defence industrial base, invest appropriately in its own defence, and provide necessary arms to Taiwan. However, it is a mistake to assume that invasion is Beijing’s policy preference and that China would jump at an opportunity to attack. Narrowing the debate to purely military conditions creates a degree of path dependence that will produce poor policy outcomes.

I agree that reading the Chinese narrative on Taiwan more carefully, there are no clear and open signals about Beijing's preparations for invasion. China’s statements about the consideration to use non-peaceful means or its reluctance to renounce the use of force are not new at all. I also agree that an invasion is not in China's economic and political interest. However, we should not take this for granted, and not apply our perspective and understanding of what is reasonable in authoritarian and highly opaque regimes. No one knows what Xi Jinping is thinking or planning.

What is rational from our perspective is not necessarily rational from the perspective of the leader of an authoritarian state. Putin is a very good example. The invasion of Ukraine was hardly rational, but he chose to go to full-scale war anyway. In the case of China, the zero-Covid policy of the past two years and its abrupt end (which reportedly led to more than a million casualties), as well as the coercion of Lithuania through the weaponisation of supply chains that hurt Chinese economic interests, are examples that illustrate that in an authoritarian regime, rationality is a function of political interest, but not necessarily of well-thought-out economic and social considerations.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine also shows that it is better to be prepared for a worst-case scenario that almost no one believes. This is the purpose of the debate about a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan, but also of other variants of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. This debate could have a deterrent effect on China and will send a message to the West and Taiwan itself to be well prepared. Just in case.

You've raised two points here that I think are incredibly important. First, mirror imaging — presuming that our idea of rationality is somehow identical to that of Beijing's leadership — is something we certainly must guard against. I entirely agree that the invasion of Ukraine should stand as a stark reminder that rationality is not going to be defined or bound by economic or social considerations. To that end, countless times already we have heard from Beijing that Taiwan is the reddest of red lines for the CCP — while to outside observers the costs of an invasion might seem to outweigh any potential benefits, Beijing’s government may disagree.

Secondly, in terms of the complexity that authoritarianism adds to the question, we've seen repeated examples of the zero-sum nature of Chinese domestic politics. There is no reliable retirement plan for dictators and authoritarians. Accruing and maintaining power is paramount, and those realities will also enter into how rationality will express itself.

My main concern is the West’s — mostly the EU’s — unpreparedness. Brussels has already drawn two red lines: the first is a hypothetical delivery of lethal weapons by China to Russia, and the second is a PRC-initiated crisis in the Taiwan Strait. However, nobody knows what the EU will actually do if China decides to touch or cross the first, second, or both red lines. The United States’ possible response is more or less known. The EU's response, however, is a big question mark, except for issuing a statement of being extremely concerned.

Why am I raising the EU in our conversation on Taiwan? Because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown that Western unity is a crucial asset that enables effective assistance to Ukraine. Hopefully, this will also deter China from military support for Russia and the use of force against Taiwan. The same unity is required in case of war in the Taiwan Strait. In other words, raising awareness of any potential war through a debate about what such a crisis may look like must be accompanied by appropriate preparation for what exactly to do if something happens.

We're in alignment on your final point — Taiwan and its supporters must prepare for a worst-case outcome, even if it seems remote or unlikely today. I would say that the Ukraine example highlights the issue of preparedness for Taiwan in some unique ways, particularly because the post-facto response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine would not be possible for Taiwan. The difference in geography makes it reasonably clear that if Beijing launches an attack on Taiwan, Taipei will fight that war with what material it has in inventory at the outset, with little likelihood of meaningful resupply or rearmament for quite some time. This makes the question of preparation even more urgent for Taiwan than it may have been for Ukraine, and the process of arming and preparing Taipei for conflict may serve to deter Beijing from attempting to change the status quo.

However, I believe that we can, and must, go about that deterrence without the accompanying public spectacle and purposeful provocation of Beijing that would make the prospect of conflict more likely. Leading with the bark, without the bite to back it up, does not serve the strategic needs of Taiwan, nor those of its partners.

While I understand your concern about turning this very sensitive topic into a public spectacle, I have to again emphasise the importance of public debate. To make a long story short, my stance is that we should do two things simultaneously. First, we should publicly debate China’s threats to Taiwan, and run preparations for a possible Chinese invasion. The public debate is indispensable in raising awareness of the detrimental consequences of such a crisis, both for China and the world. It is also crucial for the EU to avoid thinking that a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait will not have a noticeable impact on Europe. The detrimental impact (such as a halt of trade, destruction of supply chains, lowering the sense of security, and consequent lower quality of life) will be huge and felt immediately after the crisis has started. Europeans must be aware of that. Second, we should signal to China that the West is seriously working on its contingency planning. The credibility and safety of the EU and the whole of the so-called ‘collective West’ is at stake.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biographies

Blake Herzinger is a Research Fellow in the Foreign Policy and Defence Program at the United States Studies Centre.

Justyna Szczudlik is a Deputy Head of Research and China analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). Image credit: Flickr/Makoto Lin/ Office of the President of Taiwan.