China will alter the balance of power in the South China Sea within a decade

30 March 2020

In late December 2016, China’ sole aircraft carrier, the Soviet-built Liaoning transited the Miyako Strait, passing close to the Ryukyu island chain and Okinawa before proceeding out into the Pacific. Accompanying the Chinese carrier was a screening force of modern escorts consisting of three Type 052D destroyers, 2 Type 054 multi-purpose frigates and a replenishment vessel.

The route undertaken by the Liaoning and her carrier group was highly charged politically, transiting the disputed East China Sea and passing close enough to Japanese islands to be photographed from the land by the Self Defence Forces. From there it proceeded south into the South China Sea towards the Philippines before finally transiting past Taiwan, which resulted in Taipei scrambling jets in response. The Liaoning and her group concluded their deployment at Sanya Naval Base on Hainan Island in early January.

The Liaoning’s brief venture into the eastern Pacific that year was lionised unsurprisingly by the Global Times and other Chinese state-run media as an example of Beijing’s growing naval prowess. Western analysts, however, were more restrained, given the limited character of the Liaoning’s venture beyond home waters.

The decision to send a carrier battlegroup close to Japan and Taiwan was however an important statement of intent by Beijing. At present, the United States is the only nation in the Asia-Pacific that can deploy aircraft carrier battle groups in strength, witnessed most recently in March 2020 when the USS Theodore Roosevelt and amphibious assault ship USS America transited through the South China Sea following a visit to Vietnam. Whilst China has invested heavily in asymmetric means to strike at the American flattops through cyber-attack and ballistic missiles, Beijing has not ignored the power and prestige awarded to nations that field large aircraft carriers.

Last year saw two vessels commissioned that indicate China’s growing carrier ambitions. In September 2019, China launched the Type 075 amphibious assault ship. With a displacement of 40,000 tons and able to field an air wing of 30 helicopters, two additional members of the class are also believed to be under construction. Two months later in December, China’s newest carrier, the Shandong was formerly, commissioned by President Xi Jinping and entered active service. Designated the Type 001A during its construction at Dalian shipyards, the ‘Shandong’, is China’s first domestic-built carrier hull confirming, as many observers believed, that the Liaoning, a former Ukrainian carrier, is serving effectively as an aviation-training platform.

Speaking to the Xinhua state-run news agency, Rear Admiral Yin Zhou confirmed as much, indicating that the Type 001A is expected to be the first of several both conventional and later nuclear-powered carriers, produced by China over the coming years. These warships, Zhou stated, would defend China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea and other overseas interests. Underlying his answer however was Beijing’s growing ambition to project military power into its near abroad very shortly, neutralising the South China Sea as a venue for other navies.

Wu Shengli: The Princeling Admiral

The rise of China as a naval power can be attributed to two key flag officers. The first is Admiral Liu Huaqing, (1916–2011) who served as the Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and later sat on the Central Military Commission as Vice Chairman. Liu is widely viewed as the father of China’s naval modernisation. A veteran of the war against both Japan and Chang-kai Shek’s Nationalists, during the 1980s and 1990s, he was at the forefront of revolutionising the PLAN’s strategic doctrine, pushing Deng Xiaoping to develop China’s under-resourced fleet into a regional force, embracing technological advances and enunciating a strategy that identified the importance of the First and Second Island chains in the defence of mainland China. Above all else, Liu’s ambition was by the 2020s to have carrier strike groups operating under a Chinese banner in the South China Sea. Though Liu never lived to see his dream, Liu’s ambition for multiple aircraft carriers heavily influenced succeeding generations of PLAN officers.

Now despite his stature, following Deng’s death in 1997 President Jiang Zemin purged Liu and other figures close to the former ‘Core Leader’, replaced instead with loyalists close to Jiang. Referred to as the ‘Princelings’ due to their wealth, influence and ties to China’s coastal cities like Shanghai, these men have played a key role in China’s modernisation in the 21st Century.

In 2004, with a growing economy and rising defence spending, President Hu Jintao gave a key address which committed the PLA to “New Historic Missions”; committing China’s military to protect both international peace and security but also increase its far-flung economic interests. The most important of which are the sea lines of communication on which China is so dependent and vulnerable. Hu Jintao’s speech represented a key moment where the ambitions of Liu were translated into policy and the man who stepped forward to carry this out was Admiral Wu Shengli, who served as the PLAN’s Commander in Chief from 2006 to 2017.

Without Wu Shengli, China would not be the rising naval power it is today. With high-level and historic family ties within the Communist party, Wu is a ‘Princeling’ believed to have close ties to Jiang Zemin, having served in Shanghai during the latter’s tenure as mayor. As a former commander of the South Sea Fleet, Wu was present at the 1988 Johnson South Reef Skirmish that killed 64 Vietnamese sailors and marines. Thus, as one of the few PLAN officers to have been close to combat, Wu is perceived to have a high degree of influence within the CCP.

Admiral Wu Shengli has also demonstrated tremendous survivability skills amidst the political intrigue in Beijing. Despite his close ties to Jiang Zemin, he served for over a decade as the head of China’s navy without being purged or losing favour. This proved especially important as the administration of Hu Jintao transitioned to that of Xi Jinping in November 2012. Since assuming the presidency, Xi Jinping has removed any associates of Jiang from power in a wide-ranging grab for power.

Under Xi, however, not only did Wu Shengli retain his position but also seemingly gained an ally, as Xi Jinping’s vision of the ‘Chinese Dream’ which sees the rejuvenation of China includes building a blue water fleet, along the lines envisioned by Liu Huaqing. Thus under the power axis of President Xi and Admiral Wu, we have witnessed two key trends in China’s posture:

Firstly, China’s navy has demonstrated increasing assertiveness and is increasingly capable of conducting missions beyond Chinese waters.

Since 2012, we have seen a shift towards more ambitious deployments at greater range. China under Wu has sent its ships and submarines deep into the Western Pacific and Indian oceans, shadowing and participating in international exercises like RIMPAC, and evacuating Chinese citizens first from Libya and later Yemen. The most controversial task undertaken by the PLAN however has been the operations to assert control of waters claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea. Since the news first broke in December 2013 regarding Beijing’s artificial island program in the South China Sea, Chinese vessels have become a common sight. In 2019 we have seen repeated military exercises intended to assert Beijing’s sovereignty over the South China Sea.

Secondly, under the ‘Princelings’ we have seen an increase in the size and sophistication of the ships now operated by China. This is now visible in Shanghai with the development of the 14,000 ton Type 055 destroyer, the successor to the already formidable Type 052D destroyer that is expected to enter service after 2019. Though designated a destroyer, the Type 055 exceeds in size Japan’s Kongo-class destroyers and is more akin in displacement to a cruiser. Type 055 is believed to be equipped with four large AESA radar arrays, similar to the SPY-1D operated by the United States and 128 vertical launch system (VLS) cells equipped with either YJ-18 or YJ-100 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM).

Once in service, the Type-055 is set to be the largest and most powerful surface warship ever operated by China.

Taken in isolation, the Type 055’s ability to project power in Asia’s maritime spaces will be significant, given there is no equal in the navies of Vietnam, Philippines or other claimant states. However given the sheer size of the vessel, its armament and the ambitions of those who commissioned its construction, by all indications the warship is intended for a greater purpose. Type 055 is intended as an escort, likely operating in an air defence capacity, for a far larger vessel, namely the Shandong and its sister ships now under construction.

“Cross the river by feeling the stones”

Upon retiring in 2017, Admiral Wu Shengli has passed onto his successor and fellow ‘princeling’ Admiral Shen Jinlong, a growing fleet of Chinese aircraft carriers, beginning with the commissioning of the Liaoning in 2012.

The conventionally powered Liaoning displaces over 50,000 tons when fully loaded and fields a limited air wing consisting of 24 Shenyang J-15 fighters and 12 anti-submarine, early warning and rescue helicopters. Upon entering service the Liaoning was hardly a game-changer in northeast Asia. What it was, however, was an important testbed providing Chinese pilots, sailors and engineers with important skill sets and lessons in how to operate these most sophisticated of vessels.

The trends also suggest a gradual learning curve, best personified by Deng Xiaoping’s idiom “to cross the river by feeling the stones”.

The current types of the carrier in service with the PLAN, the Liaoning and Shandong, are Short Take-Off but Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) vessels, equipped with ski ramps at the bow. This system requires the J-15 aircraft to carry less fuel and weapons payloads to launch and is thus less combat efficient when compared to its American counterpart. The presence of a ski ramp also means that the two carriers will be unable to carry airborne early warning aircraft due to their weight.

Despite these limitations according to Admiral Song Xue, the PLAN’s deputy chief of staff, the Shandong represents an important improvement on the Liaoning. At an estimated 65,000 tons, China’s newest carrier is larger than Liaoning and is expected to operate an air wing of between 45–50 aircraft and helicopters. This would give China’s new carrier a significantly larger air wing, though still operating at half the strength of an American air wing of 90 aircraft aboard a Nimitz class.

However, the Shandong and Liaoning aren’t just intended for American eyes but those of Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. As with the Type 055 destroyer, when it comes to operating an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea, Beijing faces no regional competitor. With the Shandong close to completing its sea trials and expected to deploy in 2021, its strike group consisting of Type 055/052 destroyers supported by submarines and frigates will be formidable. Importantly there will be no equivalent force operated by other navies of South China Sea claimant states.

Indeed with the Shandong now completed, indications are that China is already constructing a successor class of carrier. There are indications that China’s second domestically built carrier, referred to as Type 002 may be equipped with catapults and arrestor cables (CATOBAR) and indeed may already be under construction in secret at the Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai.

Reports also indicate that the PLAN’s land-based carrier training facility in Wuhan, Hubei Province, is undergoing modifications. Gone are the ski ramps associated with the Liaoning and Shandong, instead of satellite images appear to show arrestor cables. This would indicate that the Type-002 would build upon the knowledge gained from operating Liaoning and constructing Shandong to develop China’s first true carrier, negating the limitations provided by utilising a ski-ramp and instead allowing for greater combat power and range.

Indeed in reviewing Chinese social media posts, rumours are circulating of a Type-003 carrier possibly in development and intended for service post-2028. The obvious trend from the Type-002 would suggest that this vessel would be equipped with catapults but importantly may also be nuclear powered. Given Beijing already operates nuclear submarines, this claim has merit and if realised would finally bring to fruition the vision of Admiral Liu Huaqing of an Asian navy equalling the United States for the first time since the Second World War.

A shift in the balance of the South China Sea

The prospect of Chinese carrier groups operating in the South China Sea has important regional implications in the run-up to 2030.

Despite Beijing’s 9-dash line claims being rebuffed by an international tribunal in July 2016, China continues to push its historic and legal claims. In 2019-20, China’s maritime militia was heavily active in the waters of Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia. The rotation of PLAN carrier groups through the South China Sea, establishing a continuous at-sea presence would be hard to oppose by individual actors in the South China Sea. Given the rising naval capabilities of China, a potential scenario would see the 9-Dash Line, whilst illegitimate under international law, is enforced through the sheer hull size and military strength of China’s South Sea Fleet.

Indeed just such a scenario is envisioned in a University of Sydney report that did the rounds in Western media circles in 2019. The report’s authors warn that at China’s present rate of expansion, by 2030 the strategic waterways and lines of communication of the South China Sea would be to Beijing what the Sea of Okhotsk was to the former Soviet Union: a Chinese lake where the PLAN’s influence would be overwhelming; thus potentially giving Beijing the freedom of action regionally it has not known since before 1839.

The role of the United States as an arbiter for the status quo in the South China Sea now has greater importance given the ability to balance the strategic weight of China’s rising military strength. The US Navy, however, has commitments around the world, to NATO and the Persian Gulf. China however can concentrate its fleet in the South China Sea and possibly even outnumber the US Pacific Fleet. The recent news of the deployment of missiles to China’s artificial islands and the slow but steady stream of Freedom of Navigation Patrols (FONOPs) by the US Navy since 2018 in the South China Sea suggests neither side is willing to back down. In the coming decade two things now seem likely, both American and Chinese carriers will be operating in these disputed waters and the balance of naval power will slowly be trending towards Beijing not Washington.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

John Pollock is the Editor of 9DASHLINE. Image credit: U.S. Navy/Flickr.

Southeast Asia9DLMarch 30, 2020China, Indo-Pacific