ASEAN, Myanmar, and the crisis of regionalism: Between centrality and irrelevance
ASEAN, Myanmar, and the Crisis of Regionalism: Between
Centrality and Irrelevance
WRITTEN BY ANIELLO IANNONE
04 November 2025
Almost five years after Myanmar’s military coup, Southeast Asia’s premier regional organisation stands at a crossroads. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), once hailed as a successful experiment in regional conflict avoidance and institutional resilience, now faces a legitimacy crisis of its own making. Despite thousands of civilians killed, millions displaced, and a civil war that shows no signs of ending, the bloc remains unwilling or perhaps structurally unable to take decisive action.
This paralysis is not an aberration; it is the clearest expression of ASEAN’s original design and the deeper political economy that sustains Southeast Asia’s regional order. Yet, as the crisis deepens, ASEAN finds itself in a delicate position: its credibility as the region’s central convening power is being tested, and its failure to act risks transforming centrality into irrelevance.
ASEAN’s paralysis: between principle and power
The standard explanation for ASEAN’s inaction points to its foundational principles: non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, and a preference for dialogue over coercion. These norms, often referred to as the ‘ASEAN Way’, were crafted during the Cold War to shield fragile post-colonial states from superpower intervention and from one another’s internal upheavals. They ensured that sovereignty remained sacrosanct and regime security untouchable.
ASEAN’s future will not be determined by declarations or summit communiqués. It will hinge on whether the organisation can transcend the comfort of paralysis and confront the contradictions that sustain it.
Yet these same principles, once functional, now operate as constraints. They have become instruments of elite self-preservation rather than regional problem-solving. ASEAN’s structure reflects a tacit agreement among ruling classes: no member will challenge the domestic political order of another, because doing so would legitimise external scrutiny of their own regimes. This mutual insurance pact explains why even the most brutal actions of Myanmar’s junta — over 6,000 civilians killed and 27,000 detained since the 2021 coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a Myanmar-based human rights organisation that systematically documents political arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings under the junta — have triggered little more than statements of ‘deep concern’ and symbolic gestures, such as excluding generals from high-level meetings. The Five-Point Consensus, adopted in April 2021 to halt violence, initiate dialogue, and deliver humanitarian aid, has been almost entirely ignored by the junta. Yet, ASEAN has neither revised the framework nor imposed costs for non-compliance. ASEAN’s persistence with the Five-Point Consensus, despite its obvious failure, is a political strategy: it enables engagement without challenging the structural conditions that sustain military rule.
ASEAN’s paralysis is best understood not through the actions of one state but through the collective logic that guides all its members. Indonesia’s experience illustrates this balance between aspiration and restraint. Under President Joko Widodo, Jakarta sought to restore ASEAN’s diplomatic credibility through quiet engagement, prioritising humanitarian access and dialogue over confrontation. Yet this cautious pragmatism is not unique to Indonesia. Thailand, economically entangled with Myanmar through cross-border energy projects, has preferred to safeguard border stability rather than apply political pressure. Singapore publicly condemned the coup but continued to provide a safe financial environment for military-linked entities, reflecting the limits of normative commitment when set against economic interests. Malaysia adopted a more vocal humanitarian stance, advocating for the inclusion of Myanmar’s opposition in dialogue, but it also avoided coordinated sanctions or regional enforcement mechanisms.
Taken together, these approaches reflect ASEAN’s structural logic: a shared preference for engagement without consequence and stability over accountability. Each member state, in defending its own political and economic interests, reinforces the broader regional order that prioritises sovereignty over solidarity. Even with new leadership in Jakarta under Prabowo Subianto, this pattern is unlikely to change. His realist and security-oriented worldview suggests continuity rather than rupture, reaffirming ASEAN’s cautious consensus as both its defining principle and central constraint.
The political economy of inaction
A deeper explanation for ASEAN’s inaction lies not only in its political norms but also in its material interests. Myanmar’s economy, though weakened, remains intertwined with its neighbours’. Thailand continues to import gas from Myanmar’s Yadana and Zawtika fields, a revenue source that sustains the junta. Singapore continues to host financial intermediaries and investment vehicles historically linked to Myanmar’s military-owned conglomerates, as highlighted by United Nations reports on arms-related trade channels and broader commercial ties. Even Indonesia maintains significant trade ties, with bilateral trade of about USD 1.1 billion in 2023, largely in palm oil and refined petroleum.
Material interdependence creates powerful disincentives to punitive measures and constrains regional action. Sanctions, trade suspensions, or coordinated economic pressure would not only destabilise Myanmar but also disrupt regional supply chains and investment flows. This reflects a regional order in which ruling elites prioritise capital mobility and regime stability over normative commitments. ASEAN’s reluctance to act is thus not simply a product of diplomatic caution; it is a rational defence of the economic structures that sustain elite power.
Despite this inertia, forces for change are emerging from outside and beneath member states, challenging ASEAN’s state-centric order. Externally, ASEAN’s reputation as a credible regional actor is eroding. Western and multilateral institutions increasingly bypass the bloc, dealing directly with Myanmar’s resistance groups or focusing on humanitarian interventions through the UN and non-governmental organisations.
This threatens ASEAN’s prized claim of centrality, the foundation of its diplomatic relevance in the Indo-Pacific. As centrality weakens, member states such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore may feel compelled to recalibrate their approach to preserve influence. Such recalibration would not necessarily reflect a turn toward normative politics, but rather a strategic adaptation to maintain national and regional leverage amid shifting power configurations. For Indonesia, which has long relied on ASEAN’s collective legitimacy to amplify its middle-power status, a weakened bloc risks diminishing its diplomatic weight in wider Indo-Pacific forums. Malaysia’s more vocal humanitarian stance already signals a search for moral leadership within the region, an attempt to differentiate itself as ASEAN’s pragmatic conscience. Singapore, whose economic networks and security partnerships are deeply embedded in global markets, views ASEAN’s credibility as essential to regional stability and investor confidence. In this sense, preserving ASEAN’s centrality is not about embracing liberal values but about safeguarding the material and reputational infrastructure that underpins each state’s external influence.
Internally, societal actors are reshaping the discourse. Transnational advocacy networks, human rights organisations, and diaspora communities are building cross-border solidarity that challenges state-centric narratives. These networks are pushing ASEAN governments to engage more directly with Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) and to consider alternative forms of legitimacy beyond the junta’s monopoly on power. Although these movements lack institutional leverage, they exert discursive pressure that could gradually shift the boundaries of what is politically possible.
From non-interference to non-indifference?
So, what might a more proactive ASEAN approach look like? The most likely scenario is not a dramatic break with foundational principles, but a strategic reinterpretation of them. Non-interference may evolve into ‘non-indifference’, allowing humanitarian action under the pretext of collective security. Consensus may become more flexible, enabling ‘coalitions of the willing’ to act without full unanimity. We are already seeing early signs of such adaptation: proposals for cross-border humanitarian corridors, limited engagement with Myanmar’s opposition, and discussions on targeted sanctions against military-linked businesses.
Such measures would not transform ASEAN into a rights-driven organisation overnight. But they would mark a significant departure from its current posture of ritualised inaction — a shift from sovereignty as insulation to sovereignty as stewardship. This evolution would also signal the emergence of a more pluralistic regional order in which state and non-state actors, domestic and transnational forces, increasingly share the governance space.
The stakes are high. If ASEAN continues to prioritise consensus over consequence, it risks drifting into geopolitical irrelevance. Major powers will increasingly bypass it, civil society will lose faith in its capacity to deliver justice, and its claim to centrality will become a hollow slogan. But if it can evolve and transform crisis management into crisis resolution, ASEAN could still redefine its purpose for a more contested Indo-Pacific era.
Myanmar is more than a test of diplomatic agility. It is a mirror reflecting the fundamental contradictions of Southeast Asian regionalism: between sovereignty and responsibility, stability and justice, elite power and popular legitimacy. The crisis exposes the limitations of a system built for the 20th century but now struggling to meet the challenges of the 21st century. ASEAN’s future will not be determined by declarations or summit communiqués. It will hinge on whether the organisation can transcend the comfort of paralysis and confront the contradictions that sustain it. If it fails, it will remain a stage for empty rituals. If it adapts, it may yet emerge as a more mature, strategic, and legitimate actor not by abandoning its principles but by reimagining them for a new regional order.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent those of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Aniello Iannone is a lecturer in Indonesian and Southeast Asian Politics at the Department of Political Science and Government at Diponegoro University. His research focuses on the International Relations of Southeast Asia, Indonesian politics, comparative politics within Southeast Asia, and ASEAN’s role as a regional actor. Image credit: David MacSweeney.