A balancing act: COP28 and China’s critical role in the international climate crisis

24 October 2023

As we approach the convening of COP28 in Dubai from 30 November – 12 December, countries are working to finalise their domestic climate agendas and ascertain what they are capable of contributing to the international climate agenda. China, the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, is no exception.

Maintaining domestic stability is paramount to China’s leaders as they determine the country’s commitments to the international agenda. Domestically, stability involves building resilience and security in areas of politics, economics, technology, and climate. Abroad, it is inextricably linked to a stable geopolitical environment. Understanding what drives China’s approach to the international agenda is more important than purely focusing on calculations of climate emissions. Striking a balance between the two is imperative considering how significant its contribution to meeting the international climate agenda is.

China’s first engagement with international environmental law was at the 1972 Stockholm United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment, a year after gaining a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Since then, China has been a consistent participant in international environmental law, and its engagement has strengthened over time.

Despite China’s continued strengthening of its domestic climate agenda, it needs to take the same approach to its leadership in the international arena.

This was notably evident during President Xi Jinping’s video remarks at the 75th session of the UN General Assembly in 2020, where he announced that China will peak its carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. This major commitment would significantly assist the international community in meeting its targets under the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

China’s engagement with the international climate agenda

China’s approach to international environmental law is primarily determined by its current domestic context. It is essential to pay attention to three key factors.

First, China’s domestic policies are usually created before any international commitments and align closely with its domestic capacity. China’s domestic policy is encapsulated in its Five-Year Plans, with the first released in 1953. Since the first reference to the climate in its 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), the issue has played an increasingly significant role in these plans. In its 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), China established its first binding target for energy efficiency and implemented accountability measures for provincial and local leaders. This was followed domestically by the elevation of China’s National Climate Change Coordinating Group to a higher bureaucratic level, becoming the National Leading Group on Addressing Climate Change. The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) concentrated on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which resulted in further legislative reform and concentrated efforts to optimise its energy structure and control air pollution. The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) continued focusing on reducing both energy and carbon intensity. The goals established in its Five-Year Plans have been key in formulating its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that underpin China’s commitment to the Paris Agreement.

Complementing the Five-Year Plans is China’s understanding of its domestic capacities. Before entering into international commitments, China prioritises building up its domestic economy's regulatory, technological, and political capacity. This approach makes it less likely to accept externally determined targets and regulatory frameworks that it deems incompatible with its domestic situation. However, this approach explains why China has had greater involvement and success with the Paris Agreement.

The Paris Agreement is different from earlier international environmental law instruments like the Kyoto Protocol, which set externally determined targets that countries were expected to meet. The Paris Agreement focuses more on the domestic context of individual countries and what they could achieve. Countries are responsible for creating and submitting their own Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which serve as a report of what is being done by the country and what more they could do to advance the international climate agenda in line with their capacity. This type of framework is more compatible with China’s domestic approach to policy creation.

Second, China is classified as a developing country under the UN framework (Annex 1 country). According to the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR), although China has a common responsibility to protect the environment, it does not have the same responsibilities and obligations as developed countries. The CBDR principle places the onus for providing financial resources on economically developed countries, which are also expected to take greater actions towards mitigating climate change.

Third, geopolitical stability is crucial as China is still building up its domestic resilience as it still depends on global supply chains for many goods and services. Domestic security becomes paramount when these supply chains are threatened, as evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, which increased volatility in global supply chains for coal and put pressure on China’s energy security. As a result, it took advantage of purchasing and using discounted Russian coal, shifting away from its commitments to diversifying its renewable energy mix. Given the international community's dependence on China’s continued commitment to achieving the objectives under the Paris Agreement, geopolitical stability is crucial for it to remain on track.

China’s Stance on the International Finance Agenda

As the international climate agenda focuses more on adaptation and mitigation efforts, it is expected that climate financing will take centre stage at COP28. Keeping in mind the key factors shaping China’s engagement with the international climate agenda, we better understand China’s response.

Last year at COP27, countries reached a historic decision to establish a loss and damage fund to provide much-needed financial support to least-developed countries (LDCs) as they deal with the adverse impacts of climate change, such as sea level rise, ocean acidification, and the loss of arable land. Developed countries were able to achieve their rapid economic growth and development by emitting carbon. With developing countries now being told they cannot do the same, there is a desire to hold developed countries accountable and make them pay for the damage they caused and assist in supporting clean energy transitions for these countries.

China is in a precarious position. On the one hand, it is a developing country and could benefit from the fund, but on the other, it is the world's largest emitter and is contributing to the adverse effects of climate change suffered especially by LDCs. Despite supporting the loss and damage fund’s establishment, China maintains that under its status as a developing country, it does not have a responsibility to contribute.

All in on international leadership?

China’s classification as a developing country and membership of the global south is something that Vice President Han Zheng reinforced in his address at the 78th UN General Assembly (UNGA78) this September. This could remind the international community not to expect any contribution above what is deemed appropriate for a developing country. However, this stance appears contradictory when, in the same breath, Han Zheng reinforced China’s three global initiatives — the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) — that serve as an alternative to Western-led institutions, and presented China as an emerging global leader.

Considering the key factors that shape China’s engagement with international environmental law, it appears unlikely that China will take on the leadership of loss and damage finance. Ongoing domestic political and economic instability coupled with external geopolitical instability and vulnerabilities in supply chains poses too much of a risk for further ambition to be taken. Especially when China is currently more focused on building up its domestic resilience. Additionally, China’s developing country status and reinforcement of its membership of the Global South at UNGA78 also contradict the narrative for greater action in the international arena.

China has reached an impasse. Suppose it wants to continue down the path of rejecting hegemony, establishing multipolarity, strengthening its image as a global leader, and ensuring greater international stability. In that case, it cannot afford to be so selective with its contributions. Despite China’s continued strengthening of its domestic climate agenda, it needs to take the same approach to its leadership in the international arena. The one area where leadership is currently lacking is climate finance.

At COP28, when the loss and damage fund operationalisation comes to light, China is presented with an opportunity to take the lead. Its response will significantly alter its image in the international community going forward.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Taylah Bland is the Senior Program Officer for the China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute and Affiliated Fellow for Climate and the Environment with the Asia Society Policy Institute, Centre for China Analysis. She specialises in China’s domestic climate politics and international environmental law. She holds a Master’s in Global Affairs (Law and Public Policy) from Tsinghua University as a Schwarzman Scholar and a Bachelor of Social Science (Comparative Law) and Mandarin from New York University, Shanghai. Image credit: Unsplash/Alexander Tsang (cropped).