The Tatmadaw’s flawed theory of victory

31 January 2022

Despite a political system that gave the military 25 per cent of parliamentary seats, an effective veto on constitutional reform, control over three key ministries, extraordinary emergency powers, and domination over key sectors of the economy — all while avoiding civilian oversight over military budgets and personnel — Myanmar’s Tatmadaw’s leadership was unwilling to share power with a democratically elected government. The Tatmadaw carried out a coup d’etat on 1 February 2021, following their second humiliating defeat at the polls in five years.

General Min Aung Hlaing and Myanmar’s military leadership assumed that the coup would be a fait accompli and that the population, which had lived mostly under military rule between 1962 and 2015, would quickly acquiesce.

However, their theory of success was based on several assumptions, five of which were deeply flawed.

Public opposition would be short-lived, contained in the cities, and easily deterred

Despite threats of violence, arrests, and other coercion, the nationwide civil disobedience movement has sustained itself for a year. Protests across the country, from towns to cities, continue even though the government has indiscriminately killed over 1400 civilians, arrested some 11,000 political prisoners, meted out death sentences to dozens, systematically tortured detainees, and killed over 130 in detention. The general public refuses to cede their democratic gains, media freedoms, and improved economic conditions.

Most Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) would remain committed to the existing ceasefire with the military, and not resume large-scale violence.

The EAO situation is complex. Some, including the Kachin Independence Army and Karen National Liberation Army, quickly declared their opposition to the coup and threw their support behind the National Unity Government (NUG) in exile. Since the coup, they each have had thousands of encounters with the army. The United Wa State Army tacitly endorsed the coup, but largely so that they could continue to churn out record amounts of methamphetamine. The Arakan Army has used the coup to solidify its autonomy, saying that it will resume fighting only if the military begins to challenge their self-rule. What has been more surprising though, is the proliferation of hundreds of local People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) around the country. This is a flat-out rejection of Suu Kyi’s long-held call for non-violent struggle against the regime, although she no longer opposes it.

Whereas the PDFs have limited resources, they have engaged government forces daily, created multiple fronts, and spread the military thin. When the NUG declared a defensive people’s war in September 2021, few gave the PDFs much of a chance. And yet, they have proven themselves; they are increasingly well-equipped and staging more complex tactical operations. They have taken the fight to the cities, including the fortress capital of Naypyidaw. Yangon alone has seen 121 IED attacks since the coup, belying the junta’s claims of control.

The NUG established a nationwide coordination committee to pull the PDFs into a chain of command and synch operations with the EAOs. The NUG already claims to “have the upper hand on the ground”. But that raises an interesting question: why is the Tatmadaw’s “Four Cuts” strategy, which was designed to terrorise the population into not supporting armed opposition to the government, no longer working? The Four Cuts is a strategy of deterrence, but for deterrence to work, the target audience has to be deterred. Today the people of Myanmar are becoming more emboldened.

The Tatmadaw isn’t looking so omnipotent. There are cracks, defections, and battlefield losses. And across the country, the military has lost its legitimacy. Its massacres and razing of towns, 1,963 homes and use of airpower are signs of desperation. Leaked recordings of military leaders acknowledge their loss of control of townships and their lack of legitimacy. Today, the Tatmadaw is having recruitment issues and has therefore commenced conscription in some locales. Even their respected Defense Service Academy is unable to fill its seats. The military is reviled and has lost its vaunted place in the public’s eyes. For the first time, there is something beyond parochial EAOs for the people to support.

Decapitating the National League for Democracy (NLD) leadership would result in a leadership vacuum, and no organised opposition would emerge.

The military government has arrested some 650 members of the NLD including much of their leadership. Aung San Suu Kyi has now been convicted in military tribunals for four separate “crimes”. President Win Myint was convicted of two, and both face five additional charges. And yet, the opposition did not collapse. The military assumed that if they could neutralise the ageing NLD leadership, there would be no organisation with nationwide legitimacy and an ability to coordinate disparate actors. Yet, the NUG is broad-based and includes more representation from the ethnic minorities than the NLD government elected in November 2020. The NUG has popular legitimacy, witnessed by the nationwide strike that humiliated the military regime.

The NUG’s fundraising, whether through lotteries or online bond sales, are another manifestation of the NUG’s legitimacy. The junta can only get people to pay their electric bills through coercion. The NUG, while imperfect and with limited resources, is working to coordinate the activities of the hundreds of PDFs and the various EAOs that have pledged their support. These PDFs have targeted hundreds of civil servants loyal to the junta. In that vacuum, the NUG is providing basic social services, often with the assistance of striking civil servants. Their leadership has led to unprecedented coordination and solidarity amongst EAOs and other political opposition. The NUG’s stated end goal, a federal republic with equitable power-sharing, has widespread support amongst both the ethnic Bamar and minority populations.

The economy would recover quickly after a short-term hit, and the Tatmadaw’s revenue stream would give the regime breathing room

Myanmar’s economy has been hard hit as a result of the coup, the COVID-19 pandemic, international sanctions, and the crippling effects of the civil disobedience movement that shut down entire sectors of the economy for periods of time. The economy contracted by an estimated 18 per cent. Exports of non-hydrocarbons flatlined, the kyat lost 24 per cent of its value, the government had to block imports, it sold off USD 443.8 million worth of reserves to keep the government afloat, and lost hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign investment. Tax revenue in 2021 fell by 35 per cent compared to 2020. Short of cash, the government has turned on the printing presses and has embezzled international pandemic assistance.

The military’s economic incompetence has meant that half of the population lives in poverty, after a decade of economic growth. Inflation, especially of food staples, has soared. The military is somewhat insulated from the worst of the economic impacts. Even though Total Energy and Chevron finally bowed to international pressure and announced that they would pull out of Myanmar, the regime will still be able to export oil and gas to China and Thailand, for which it is paid in dollars. It sells off natural resource concessions in dollars or yuan. The military’s two conglomerates, while sanctioned, dominate much of the domestic economy. But still, the military’s incompetence is causing real economic hardship, and they are incapable of reversing it.

The security forces would remain cohesive, disciplined, and under the firm leadership of the junta leaders; defections would be minimal

The final assumption is perhaps the greatest threat to the regime. Two non-governmental organisations have been established to help facilitate military defections. The desertions of soldiers and officers alike are happening on a routine basis. As of November 2021, People’s Embrace claimed that 2,000 soldiers and 6,000 police had defected. These defections are largely driven by disgust at being forced to attack civilians, raze villages, use human shields, and commit egregious war crimes. So far, only a few senior officers have defected, but it’s important to note that the military keeps officers’ family members living on cantonments, working in military companies, and under close watch. Even for enlisted men, the fear of leaving family members in jeopardy deters many from defecting.

One thing that remains to be seen is whether the NUG can begin to cope with defections in larger numbers. NGOs are assisting in providing stipends for defectors. To date, the NUG has worked with the ICRC to ensure access to POWs, and unlike the military, they have largely complied with international humanitarian law. Still, the NUG claims to have killed over 7,000 members of the Tatmadaw since September alone, though there is no way to independently verify this. The Tatmadaw has acknowledged increased casualties, however. Most of the fighting is done by the 12 mobile Light Infantry Divisions, 14 regional commands, and artillery battalions.

My high estimate is that they account for no more than 250,000 of the Tatmadaw’s 350,000-man force. The current rate of casualties and desertions have impacted operational readiness, with many units already undermanned. Military training for soldiers’ children is already compulsory, while family members are being conscripted into guard duty, and reservists are being recalled. The more weaponry and ammunition the PDFs capture, the higher those casualty rates will be. The PDFs and EAOs are increasingly targeting the Tatmadaw’s long and vulnerable supply lines. Recently they’ve targeted jet fuel supplies, which should impact the Tatmadaw’s air attacks. Finally, despite the difficulty in getting reliable data, there is evidence that unit strength is down, and discipline and esprit de corps are at a nadir.

The international community would accept the coup and not interfere in Myanmar’s domestic affairs

One other assumption held by the junta has proved to be the more durable. China, while not happy with the coup, has given the junta diplomatic cover, as has Russia. While the United States and the European Union condemned the coup and sanctioned the regime, no other major powers have taken those steps. Even in this regard, however, there are signs this is changing. Moreover, the United States has been unable to bring along key allies, such as Japan and South Korea, in imposing greater economic and political pressure.

ASEAN has been divided on the issue. It largely accepted the coup but quickly negotiated the Five Point consensus, on which the junta immediately reneged. ASEAN made the unprecedented decision to not invite coup leader General Min Aung Hlaing to the annual summit, but that step was completely undermined when Hun Sen, the 2022 chairman of ASEAN, legitimised the junta by meeting with the leadership in Naypyidaw in January 2022. After Hun Sen pushed to have the junta’s foreign minister seated at the ASEAN foreign minister’s meeting, the summit was indefinitely postponed. Further schisms within the regional bloc have emerged.

Only five countries — all authoritarian — sent official greetings to the junta on Myanmar’s Independence Day: Russia, Belarus, Serbia, North Korea, and Cambodia. All but Cambodia are important arms sellers to the regime. Even China and Thailand did not send greetings. While most of the international community is not giving the junta the recognition they crave, they are also not substantially raising the costs or recognising the NUG.

Implications

No military strategy can succeed upon so many flawed assumptions. Myanmar is entering the second year of civil war. The junta is increasingly desperate to stabilise the economy and possibly win back support from regional economic partners and investors, especially China. Entering the second year, one thing is certain: the military is getting both frustrated and desperate. Generals are being rotated and replaced with loyalists. The army will increase attacks on civilians, and that will further weaken morale for all but the most hardcore and indoctrinated. Should casualties and desertions climb to 15 per cent or more, the colonels and one-star generals at the operational level are going to have some very tough choices to make.

The PDFs and EAOs may wear the Tatmadaw down through attrition, but they are unlikely to defeat the military. Hence, the way this ends is when a sufficient number of officers realises that the war, which is now against both ethnic minorities and the Bamar majority, is unwinnable. When they realise that they are waging war on the population for rapacious generals, that their manpower is depleted, and that the continuation of the current strategy will undermine the military’s economic and political interests as well as reputation. Only then, will the NUG force the junta out.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Zachary Abuza is a Professor at the National War College in Washington, DC. The views expressed here are his own and not represent the National War College or US Department of Defense. Image credit: Wikimedia.