What multipolar world order and for whom?

What multipolar world order and for whom?


WRITTEN BY DR FELIX HEIDUK AND DR JOHANNES THIMM

30 April 2024

A wide spectrum of political actors claim that the world order is currently in a state of upheaval and is shifting towards multipolarity. Some say the multipolar era has already arrived, while others believe its arrival is imminent. Yet the meaning of the term remains rather vague. Russia and China use the term "multipolarity" primarily to describe their preferred alternative to the current international order, which they regard as dominated by the US. In their view, a multipolar order would be fairer because international politics would no longer be dominated by just one state.

European leaders are also suggesting that the development towards multipolarity is desirable. The President of the European Council Charles Michel told the United Nations General Assembly: "The European Union is striving for a multipolar world, a world that cooperates and moves towards more democracy and more respect for human rights". French President Emmanuel Macron has expressed similar sentiments. Others use the term to describe the present situation, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently did on X (formerly Twitter): "The world is multipolar, so we have to act accordingly now". However, the terms “multipolar” and “multipolarity” are deeply problematic, both as descriptors of the current situation and as a vision of the future.

Polarity in international politics

Conceiving international politics in terms of polarity is based on the assumption that a unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar international system can be distinguished based on the number of major powers that dominate international politics. From this perspective, the bloc confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, with their zones of influence, alliance systems, and client states, was clearly bipolar. After the collapse of the USSR, a unipolar moment (in the words of Charles Krauthammer) with the US as the only remaining superpower followed.

The use of polarity as an analytical category is based on a very specific understanding of international politics. The central actors are nation-states, represented by their respective executive branches, who pursue a coherent and integrated political agenda. Their foreign policy options depend on their material resources, the most important being military power. Other forms of power, such as economic or soft power (cultural, diplomatic, etc.), are of secondary importance. Therefore, the status of a "pole" is primarily determined by military strength.

Currently, the global balance of power is shifting again, according to many, in the direction of multipolarity. But even if one accepts the concept of polarity in principle, the question immediately becomes which states could be considered as additional poles. China certainly qualifies, but beyond that?

The concept of polarity, which is borrowed from physics, might actually obfuscate more than it illuminates. The analogy to physics works best in a bipolar system. In physics, not only are there two poles, but the attractive or repulsive effect of poles, which leads to a stable equilibrium, also corresponds best with the dynamics of a bipolar bloc confrontation in which two major powers struggle for spheres of influence.

However, a brief review of international politics during the Cold War reveals the concept’s weaknesses if we look beyond the West: in many parts of the world, the bipolar order was neither particularly stable nor was the “Cold War” actually a cold war in many places, as evidenced by the Vietnam War and many other armed conflicts of the era. Many states in the then-so-called “Third World” were not willing to align themselves with one of the two poles. Many explicitly and successfully refrained from doing so, as the Non-Aligned Movement illustrates. Similarly, while political elites in Europe and the United States predominantly associate the American unipolar moment from 1990 onwards with stability and prosperity, it is surely perceived very differently in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Power shifts

Currently, the global balance of power is shifting again, according to many, in the direction of multipolarity. But even if one accepts the concept of polarity in principle, the question immediately becomes which states could be considered as additional poles. China certainly qualifies, but beyond that? Russia, as a nuclear power, despite its less than impressive performance in the ongoing war against Ukraine — a war in which it is trying to compensate for a lack of quick military success with maximum brutality. Could India, as the most populous country in the world, be a contender? What about Saudi Arabia, with arguably the largest oil reserves? Or perhaps Brazil, South Africa, or even the EU?

If we take military power as the basis for our assessment of polarity in current international politics, we are likely heading towards a new era of bipolarity rather than multipolarity, with the US and China as the dominant and antagonistic poles. If we consider other indicators, such as economic power or population size, the circle of great powers expands.

We therefore need to ask what those who are so eagerly calling for a multipolar world order hope to achieve. Most of them aim to challenge American primacy. This certainly is true for the Russian and Chinese leadership, who have been systematically trying to promote a more multipolar world order for at least the last two decades. When European politicians such as French President Macron adopt the concept, it is often interpreted as an attempt to put some distance between himself and the United States as well. On the other hand, it is doubtful if German Chancellor Scholz wants to convey a similar message when he claims that we live in a multipolar world.

When political leaders speak of multipolarity, two distinct intentions are at play. The first is to signal that the global dominance of the US or “the West” is over and that the so-called Global South, for lack of a better term, should be given more influence in the future world order. Countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America should have a greater voice in world affairs. The pursuit of multipolarity is linked to the implicit expectation that it will foster increased international cooperation on an equal footing. In other words, a multipolar world is assumed to be more multilateral and fairer.

The second intention is to avoid setting the stage for a new bipolar competition between the United States and China. After all, should a new Cold War arise, other states must choose sides — a scenario most of them desperately want to avoid. However, presenting multipolarity as an alternative implies an equally static, structurally fixed order. In that case, according to the logic of polarity, all small and medium-sized countries will sooner or later have to align themselves to one of three, four, five, or six poles. The poles for their part compete for power and influence, either by themselves or in coalitions and alliances.

Beyond polarity

Yet, in reality, international politics today is much more dynamic, fluid, and complex than the concept of polarity suggests. The distribution of power varies from one policy field to another. Patterns of interactions are constantly changing. This observation is not supposed to conceal existing hierarchies and power relations. We are a long way from an egalitarian community of sovereign states. However, focusing on polarities obscures the fact that global order structures are the product of the interactions of many different states. While military capabilities are still an important indicator of power — and are experiencing a resurgence in the 21st century — other factors matter as well.

To give an example, Taiwan is currently one of the key players in chip manufacturing, and the Netherlands is one of the key players in the production of the necessary equipment for it. It is a multiplicity of actors, not just great powers, that are able to exercise power despite often limited military capabilities — either in specific policy fields, in a (sub)region or in coalition with other small and medium-sized powers. Polarity as a concept fails to capture these dynamics.

The key problem is this: Thinking in terms of polarity implies that the distribution of power as well as the interests of states are static. The balance of power between major powers is an important structural factor, but not the only one. Today’s international politics, however, is complex and dynamic. To be able to deal with the relevant issues in international politics, rather than the distribution of power, we should focus on how states make use of their power, what goals they pursue, and how they interact with each other. Whether governments rely on coercion or cooperation vis-à-vis others remains a key determinant of the state of the world we live in.

Neither unipolarity, bipolarity, nor multipolarity is per se more stable, fairer, more cooperative, or more democratic. Crucially, we can derive very few specific recommendations for foreign policy making from it — neither for how to avoid wars nor for how to deal with problems such as global warming. But such solutions are exactly what is needed.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author Biography

Dr Felix Heiduk is head of the Asia Research Division at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs).

Dr Johannes Thimm is deputy head of the Americas Research Division at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs). Image credit: Image credit: Unsplash/Markus Krisetya (cropped).